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Reorienting America:  
Race, Geopolitics, and the Repeal of Asian Exclusion, 1940-1952 
 
Abstract  
 
 This dissertation examines the movement to repeal the Asian exclusion laws in 
the United States during World War II and the early Cold War years. It situates 
campaigns for repeal in the context of two interrelated developments: African American 
civil rights activism in the United States and shifting U.S. geopolitical interests in post-
1940 Asia. As U.S. foreign policy priorities pivoted toward Asia beginning in World War 
II, Americans’ view of the world changed in ways that, at times, allowed geopolitics to 
supersede restrictions based on race. Drawing from U.S., Indian, and Korean sources, the 
project charts how a transnational cast of American missionaries, U.S. and Asian state 
officials, and Asian and Asian American activists used the newly expedient language and 
logic of geopolitics to end the racial exclusion of Asians from immigration and 
naturalization eligibility.  
The study highlights a paradox at the heart of the repeal campaigns: beginning in 
World War II, the perceived foreignness that underwrote the historical exclusion of 
Asians as “aliens ineligible to citizenship” legitimized them as spokespersons for repeal. 
During a time when few Americans had knowledge of Asia, Asian American activists 
parlayed their presumptive expertise as Asian “insiders” to secure a foothold as lobbyists 
on Capitol Hill. The strategy undermined Asian Americans’ claims to inclusion in the 
long-term, however, by reinforcing their image as racial foreigners in America.  
! iv 
The dissertation builds on a growing body of literature interrogating the 
relationship between international developments and U.S. racial reform. Comparatively 
little scholarship about this period has looked beyond a white-black racial binary, in spite 
of Japanese internment, U.S. military occupations in postwar Japan and Korea, and 
unprecedented American intervention across Cold War Asia. My study demonstrates how 
developments particular to Asia – the Pacific front of World War II, Asian 
decolonization, and the Korean War – both facilitated and constrained the scope of 
legislative reform activists achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Creating the Problem of Asian1 Exclusion 
 
 On December 17, 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 
Magnuson bill into law, repealing the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act more than six decades 
after it was first enacted.2 At a time when the Sino-American military alliance against 
Japan hung in the balance, Roosevelt expressed “particular pride and pleasure” that an 
“unfortunate barrier between allies had been removed.” Upon passage of the legislation, 
he declared that the “war effort in the Far East can now be carried on with a greater vigor 
and a larger understanding of our common purpose.”3  
Roosevelt’s statement reflected a new wartime reality in which the United States, 
its allies, and its enemies viewed U.S. immigration policy as a problem of America’s 
international diplomacy. This understanding animated the mid-century movement for 
Asian exclusion repeal in the United States. Notably, the President defined repeal as a 
matter of U.S. security interests overseas. In an erasure that would characterize the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The 1917 Immigration Act actually used the term “Asiatic” to encompass the peoples of Asia (those that 
fell within the geographically designated “Asiatic Barred Zone”), but for consistency, I use the term 
“Asian” throughout the study.  
 
2 The 1943 Magnuson Act also repealed the twelve subsequent laws that built upon the original 1882 Act’s 
provisions, including the 1903 legislation that extended the restrictions on Chinese immigration 
indefinitely. 
 
3 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement by the President on the Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 
December 17, 1943, reprinted in Fred Riggs, Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese 
Exclusion (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1950), 211. Historians have noted the significance of the 
Magnuson Act as an important, if largely symbolic, milestone in U.S.-China relations. In addition to 
repealing the long-hated Chinese Exclusion laws, the measure gave China an annual immigration quota of 
105 and made persons of Chinese descent eligible for U.S. citizenship for the first time in American 
history, including the approximately 37,000 foreign-born Chinese then living in the United States. The 
Chinese population in the mainland United States in 1940 was 77,500 total. Just over half (40,262) were 
U.S.-born Chinese American citizens. Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983); Meredith Oyen, “Allies, Enemies and Aliens: Migration and U.S. 
Chinese Relations, 1940-1965” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2009). 
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official debate over repeal for decades, he made no mention of Asians already living in 
the United States. In similar fashion, proponents strategically framed their appeals for the 
reform of Asian exclusion in terms of foreign policy and immigration-related concerns. 
Like Roosevelt, many downplayed the domestic issue of naturalization, even though 
hundreds of thousands of Asian Americans, including some of those advocating for 
repeal, remained racially ineligible for U.S. citizenship.4  
The 1943 effort for Chinese exclusion repeal exemplified this dynamic. The white 
American elites who spearheaded the public campaign actively discouraged meaningful 
Chinese American participation in order to maintain an emphasis on diplomatic concerns 
and immigration quotas over naturalization. Scholar L. Ling-chi Wang has highlighted 
the apparent contradiction in that the group that “stood to benefit most” from the 
proposed legal gains was “systematically excluded from the legislative process.”5 
Historian Renqiu Yu has echoed this sentiment, noting the irony of the domestic push to 
pass the Magnuson bill’s almost complete exclusion of Chinese Americans.6  
The passage of the Magnuson Act in late 1943, and the campaign that preceded it, 
generated political and social momentum on which Asian American advocates of repeal 
sought to build. Encouraged by the success of the Chinese measure, a small group of 
Indian, Korean, and Japanese American activists joined with their allies in the United !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 According to the 1940 U.S. Census, 254,918 persons of Asian descent (or 0.2 percent of the population) 
lived on the U.S. mainland. 1940 U.S. Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940).  
 
5 To support his point, Wang quoted one Chinese American contemporary of the campaign who described 
the community’s role in the effort as one of “outsider observers.” L. Ling-chi Wang, “Politics of the Repeal 
of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,” Remembering 1882: Fighting for Civil Rights in the Shadow of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 1993), 2, 17-18.  
 
6 Renqiu Yu, “Little Heard Voices: The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and the China Daily News’ 
Appeal for Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943,” in Chinese America: History and Perspectives 
(1990), 21. 
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States and in Asia to lobby for legislation that would extend immigration quotas and 
naturalization rights to other Asian peoples. In the absence of significant voting power in 
the United States, they embraced the language and logic of geopolitics to advance bills 
for repeal in Congress. During a time of unprecedented U.S. intervention and interest in 
Asia, their appeals drew upon the U.S. foreign policy goals and geopolitical 
developments of the moment to persuade Washington lawmakers of the need for repeal.  
The mid-century movement for repeal nationalized the debate over Asian 
American citizenship and tested the terms of Asian Americans’ inclusion in a period of 
growing racial unrest at home and U.S. military intervention across the Asian continent. 
America’s move toward internationalism beginning in World War II inspired new 
political possibilities and strategies for reform. The heightened importance of geopolitics 
during World War II and the early Cold War made repeal politically viable for the first 
time. Within this new paradigm of internationalism, Asian Americans adopted the 
strategy of playing on their presumptive ties to Asia in order to amplify their political 
voice in Washington. But this use of foreignness as a strategy produced a paradox at the 
heart of the repeal movement: The same perceived foreignness that underwrote the 
historical exclusion of Asians as “aliens ineligible to citizenship” served to legitimize 
them as spokespersons for repeal. This dissertation examines Asian American lobbying at 
the national level in order to illuminate the relationship between race and U.S. 
internationalism against the backdrop of America’s foreign policy pivot toward Asia. 
In spotlighting Asian American activism in this period, this study joins a recent 
surge in scholarship exploring questions of race and Asian American citizenship during 
what one historian has described as the “important, but relatively unexplored, 
! 4 
interregnum between the Exclusion Era (from the late nineteenth century to World War 
II) and the post-1965 regime of the model minority.”7 While much of this work takes up 
the question of how the nation incorporated Asian Americans after the end of exclusion, 
we continue to know little about how legal exclusion actually ended. To be sure, 
geopolitics remained a primary indicator of an individual bill’s likely success.8 But 
geopolitics alone did not bring about legislative change. People did. The foremost 
concern of this dissertation, therefore, is not to explain why Asian exclusion ended, but 
rather, the politics of how it ended and the implications for Asian American communities 
and racial reform in the mid-twentieth century United States. Toward this end, it focuses 
on the network of actors who campaigned for the cause, the strategies they employed, and 
what these reveal about how, beginning in World War II, America’s changing 
engagement with Asia and the world transformed the nation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Ellen Wu, “Introduction,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31:4 (Summer 2012): 8. Select titles 
include Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and 
Festival in Los Angeles, 1934–1990 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Catherine 
Ceniza Choy, Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History (Durham, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Shirley Jennifer Lim, A Feeling of Belonging: Asian American 
Women’s Public Culture, 1930–1960 (New York: NYU Press, 2005); Arissa Oh, “A New Kind of 
Missionary Work: Christians, Christian Americanists, and the Adoption of Korean GI Babies, 1955–1961,” 
Women’s Studies Quarterly 33, nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 2005): 161–88; Ellen D. Wu, “America’s Chinese: 
Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War,” Pacific Historical Review 
77, no. 3 (August 2008): 319–422; Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Matthew Briones, Jim and Jap Crow: A Cultural History of 1940s 
Interracial America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Greg Robinson, After Camp: 
Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2012); Cindy I-Fen Cheng, Citizens of Asian America. Democracy and Race during the Cold War 
(New York: NYU Press, 2013); and Ellen Wu’s forthcoming The Color of Success: Asian Americans and 
the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). Vivek Bald, Bengali 
Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013) 
is a notable addition to the dearth of scholarship on South Asian American communities during this period.  
 
8 Scholars across disciplines – political science, history, and legal studies – have highlighted the 
international developments that made repeal measures politically viable beginning in World War II. See, 
for example, Fred Riggs, Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: 
King’s Crown Press, 1950), Chapter 1; Meredith Oyen, “Allies, Enemies and Aliens: Migration and U.S. 
Chinese Relations, 1940-1965” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2009), 65-95; David Reimers, Still the 
Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), Chapter 
1.  
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In recent years, a growing body of scholarship has illuminated the close 
relationship between international developments and the passage of civil rights reforms 
for African Americans.9 The literature builds on the interest-convergence principle of law 
professor Derrick Bell. In a landmark 1980 Harvard Law Review article, Bell argued that 
elite white Americans came to support civil rights reform for black Americans after 
World War II to fortify America’s international image and its claims to practice racial 
equality against attack by Communist Moscow.10 Historians including Mary Dudziak and 
Brenda Gayle Plummer have demonstrated how America’s Cold War imperative to 
rehabilitate its tarnished domestic record on race and counter international charges of 
American racial hypocrisy both facilitated and constrained legal gains for African 
Americans at home.11  
This study tracks a similar interplay between U.S. foreign policy goals and the 
gradual liberalization of immigration policies toward Asia after 1943.12 Scholars of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Doug McAdam, “On the International Origins of Domestic Political Opportunities,” in Anne Costain and 
Andrew McFarland, eds., Social Movements and American Political Institutions (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998), 251-267. McAdam argued that “World War II and the onset of the Cold War effectively 
terminated the ‘isolationist’ foreign policy that had long defined American’s relationship to the rest of the 
world.” Consequently, “unlike their predecessors” decades earlier, in the postwar period, “national political 
leaders found themselves exposed to international political pressures and considerations that their 
predecessors had been spared.” He cited civil rights reforms of the World War II and Cold War years as 
prime examples. 
 
10 Derrick Bell, “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma,” 93 Harvard Law 
Review 518 (1980).  !
11!Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image 
of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).!
 
12 Legal scholar John Hayakawa Torok has extended Bell’s argument to the liberalization of U.S. 
immigration and naturalization policies toward Asian peoples over the same period. According to Torok, 
“in the Asian American context” the interest-convergence principle explained “both the gradual 
liberalization of the laws and the restrictions inscribed at each stage” of the “movement from immigration 
exclusion to restriction.” John Hayakawa Torok, “‘Interest Convergence’ and the Liberalization of 
Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization,” Chinese America: History & Perspectives (January 
1995): 1. !
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immigration have been quick to note parallels between the postwar movements for black 
civil rights and Asian immigration reform – in particular, their common use of Cold War 
rhetoric and argumentation to win official support. This study expands upon this 
connection, demonstrating how geopolitics provided advocates of repeal with a race-
neutral and politically viable basis for legislative reform. It moves the start date earlier to 
World War II and, as such, is not simply a Cold War story.13  
Beginning in World War II, U.S. immigration reform toward Asia tracked 
developments specific to American relations with Asian powers. Comparatively little 
work has been done to look beyond a white-black racial binary in a period marked by the 
Pacific front of World War II, Asian decolonization, and the U.S. Cold War in Asia.14 
Filling this lacuna, this study demonstrates how developments particular to Asia both 
facilitated and constrained the scope of legislative reform.  
Basic differences distinguished Asian Americans’ use of geopolitics and 
internationalism as strategies for reform. Key among these was a singular history of racial 
alienage and legal exclusion in the United States. Asian Americans’ racialization as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
13 This earlier periodization builds on an article by Justin Hart, in which he challenged the Cold War Civil 
Rights historiography to argue that the World War II years, and not the Cold War, were the “decisive 
turning point when the history of domestic race relations could no longer be sanguinely ignored by U.S. 
policymakers.” Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the 
Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War II,” Pacific Historical Review 73:1 (2004): 49-
84.  
 
14 This discussion of postwar pressures impinging on U.S. domestic policy adopts historian Jason Parker’s 
more expansive definition of the Cold War as a “protean conflict whose fluctuating ‘East-West’ dynamics 
slowed, stalled, and then sped the ‘North-South’ decolonization and race revolutions.” By exploring the 
interplay of these movements through the lens of U.S. immigration reform, this study secondarily seeks to 
advance understanding of the “precise, subtle, and intricate connections between the Cold War, the global 
postwar ‘race revolution,’ and the course of Third World decolonization.” Jason Parker, “‘Cold War II’: 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” 
Diplomatic History, 30 (Nov. 2006), 868-9. Matthew Connolly’s seminal work “Taking Off the Cold War 
Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” promotes a broader 
framework for understanding these movements American Historical Review (June 2000): 739-769. 
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extensions of peoples in Asia served both to constrain and amplify their political voice in 
Washington.15 At the same time, their distinct history of discrimination in the United 
States shaped their goals for redress. While African Americans sought to realize the full 
privileges of their legal citizenship, racial bars on naturalization left Asian Americans 
unable even to claim the right to U.S. citizenship itself. This fostered an expansive 
understanding of civil rights among Asian Americans as including eligibility for U.S. 
citizenship as well as fair employment, housing, and other basic rights.  
To the extent that Asian Americans had long been engaged in challenging their 
legal exclusion as well as lobbying Washington officials on behalf of their Asian 
homelands, they brought to the repeal movement distinct histories of engagement and 
familiarity with the U.S. state. Because of their historical ineligibility to U.S. citizenship, 
Asian American lobbyists could not singlehandedly drive reform but also relied on their 
indirect influence through white intermediaries and allies. This study suggests how this 
involvement shaped the longer movement and reflected the distinctive nature of Asian 
Americans’ engagement with U.S. foreign affairs as Washington shifted toward Asia and 
away from its historical emphasis on Europe alone. 
In departure from previous studies that focus narrowly on the politics leading up 
to the 1943 Magnuson Act, this dissertation takes the Chinese measure as the starting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
15 Cultural theorist Lisa Lowe has used the term “foreigner-within” to describe this phenomenon. Lisa 
Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 4-6. 
Also see Cindy Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War (New York: 
New York University Press, 2013), Introduction. MIT political scientist Myron Weiner made a related 
observation when he noted how “[r]ace, as an element in generating an ethnic identity, plays a role for 
Asian Americans that was not relevant to the experiences of the earlier European immigrants . . . Asians, by 
virtue of their race, are often regarded by other U.S. citizens as distinctive no matter how great their 
assimilation.” Myron Weiner, “Asian Immigrants & U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Immigration and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, eds. Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Kelly, and Linda Wrigley (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1998), 194.  
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point of a longer movement. The theme of exclusion has long dominated scholarly 
literature on Asian immigration to the United States. Scholars across fields – history, 
legal studies, and political science – have explored exclusion policies in terms of their 
origins, their implementation and enforcement, and their impact on Asian American 
experiences.16 Of the individual campaigns that made up the longer movement for repeal, 
the World War II effort to repeal the Chinese Exclusion laws has received the most 
scholarly attention.17 However, scholars have largely overlooked the process by which 
the U.S. Congress overturned these laws in toto after World War II. General works on 
U.S. immigration have explained the end of Asian exclusion as a natural corollary to the 
general liberalization of immigration policy after World War II amid greater political 
support for cultural pluralism.18 The broader story of repeal also conforms to political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
16 U.S. labor historians were the first to trace the origins of Asian and specifically, Chinese exclusion. 
Alexander Saxton tracked the emergence of an anti-Chinese movement in the American West, and showed 
how fears of labor competition and the workings of partisan politics culminated in the passage of the 1882 
Exclusion Act. Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in 
California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). More recently, scholars of immigration law 
have linked the demands of enforcing Chinese exclusion to the rise of a centralized state bureaucracy over 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During 
the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Lucy Salyer, Laws 
Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995). Erika Lee and Mae Ngai explored the ramifications that 
restrictive immigration policies had to shape Asians’ experiences in America. Mae Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
 
17 Historians and political scientists have examined Chinese exclusion repeal through the lens of pressure 
politics, presidential power, U.S.-China diplomacy, and Chinese American participation. Fred Riggs, 
explores the tactics and strategies of the Citizens Committee in his Pressures on Congress: A Study of the 
Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1950). Karen Leong’s article-length study 
examines the administration’s role in the passage of Chinese exclusion repeal. Karen Leong, “Foreign 
Policy, National Identity, and Citizenship: The Roosevelt White House and the Expediency of Repeal,” 
Journal of American Ethnic History, 22:4 (2003), 3-30. On Chinese American involvement, see Renqiu Yu, 
“Little Heard Voices: The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and the China Daily News’ Appeal for Repeal 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943,” in Chinese America: History and Perspectives (1990): 21-35 and L. 
Ling-chi Wang, “Politics of the Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,” The Repeal and Its Legacy, 
Proceedings of the Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the 1943 Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, at 
San Francisco State University, ed. Robert Fung (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 
1993).  
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scientist Daniel Tichenor’s observation that “global pressures” and “international crises” 
created domestic political opportunities for immigration reform by “reshaping the 
interests and relative power of state actors.”19 But these explanations fail to distinguish 
the particular way that racial formation influenced U.S. immigration policy reform 
toward Asia relative to Europe, and the ramifications of these differences for the politics 
and process of repeal itself.  
This dissertation brings race to the center of the story of repeal as a key factor that 
distinguished the movement to reform U.S. immigration policy toward Asia from efforts 
by European groups to revise the national origins quota system. Critical race theorists 
have examined Asian exclusion repeal through the lens of racial formation, or the 
racialization of Asian American actors.20 By granting rights to individual Asian groups 
by name (e.g. Chinese, Indian) in the piecemeal acts of the 1940s, Neil Gotanda argued 
that law racialized ethnicity for Asian groups in a way it never had for Europeans; he 
called this new category encompassing Asian groups “orientalized ethnics.”21!The study !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Many of the standard immigration histories of this period fall into this group, including David Reimers, 
Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 
and Robert Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
A recent study by political scientist Daniel Tichenor framed postwar immigration control largely in terms 
of an “inter-branch struggle” between “restrictionist legislators and expansionist presidents” which “closely 
resembled the ‘liberal-presidential’ and ‘conservative-congressional’ fault lines” that divided civil rights 
politics in this period. Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 179. 
 
19 Tichenor, 45. 
 
20 Sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant have described race as an “unstable and de-centered 
complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle,” and “racial formation” as 
an approach that “treat[s] race in the United States as a fundamental organizing principle of social 
relationships.” See Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States (New York: 
Routledge, 1986), 66-69, emphasis in original.!
 
21 According to Gotanda, the racial basis of repeal legislation – specifically, its use of “descent” and 
“blood-lines” to determine quotas and citizenship eligibility – meant the abandonment of “national origin” 
in the Asian immigration quotas, a move that sharply distinguished U.S. immigration and naturalization 
policies toward Asians different from that of European groups. Neil Gotanda, “Towards Repeal of Asian 
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shifts the focus from legal constructions of race to practice, examining repeal as a social 
and transnational movement. In so doing, it brings the concerns of Asian American 
Studies into dialogue with those of policy history and transnational U.S. history, 
enriching all three fields.22 In its focus on the politics and process of exclusion repeal, the 
study performs the task of policy history to bridge elite policymaking in Washington with 
grassroots activism among state and non-state actors across the United States and Asia. 
At the same time, it takes seriously Asian American racial formation by assessing the 
influence of Asian Americans’ racialization as extensions of Asia on the politics of 
repeal. The dissertation is primarily concerned with questions of process. Key among 
these: How did racial formation shape Asian Americans’ lobbying strategies and 
reception? Not simply subjects being acted upon, this study treats Asian Americans as 
agents that engaged with and re-appropriated Asian American racial formation toward the 
goal of repeal.  
By treating multiple Asian groups – Indian, Korean, and Japanese Americans – 
within a common frame of analysis, this study accounts for the multi-faceted and 
heterogeneous nature of Asian American activism for repeal and the dialogic character of 
the longer movement. In so doing, it makes two important contributions to the fields of 
Asian American Studies and history. First, it highlights the important role Japanese 
Americans played in the Cold War campaigns that culminated in the wholesale repeal of 
the Asian Exclusion laws by the early 1950s. A closer look at Japanese Americans’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Exclusion,” in Hyung-Chan Kim, ed., Asian Americans and Congress: A Documentary History (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 318, 325.!
 
22 For a concise overview of policy history, see Julian E. Zelizer, “Introduction: New Directions in Policy 
History,” Journal of Policy History 17:1 (2005): 1-11. For more on Asian American racial formation, see 
Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics, Chapter 1.  
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attempts to partner with other Asian ethnic and racial groups illuminates the possibilities 
and limitations of inter-ethnic and inter-racial coalition-building during this period.  
Second, this dissertation recovers the importance of colonialism to the 
experiences and political activism of Asians in America. Scholarship on Asian 
immigration and communities largely neglects Indian and Korean Americans.23 The two 
communities’ long-standing involvement in diasporic movements for their homelands’ 
independence shaped their activism for repeal distinctly relative to their Chinese and 
Japanese American counterparts. By recovering the prominent role of Indian and Korean 
anti-colonial actors in repeal, this dissertation illuminates cross-pollination between 
domestic campaigns for U.S. immigration reform and transnational activism on behalf of 
Asian independence.24 In doing so, it reveals how, for many Asian colonial advocates in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
23 Recent studies on Asian colonial groups in America include Richard S. Kim, Quest for Statehood: 
Korean Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1905–45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011); David K. Yoo, Contentious Spirits: Religion in Korean American. History, 1903–1945 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Vivek Bald, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South 
Asian America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). For a comparative discussion of 
colonialism in European and Asian immigration, see Sucheng Chan, “European and Asian Immigration into 
the United States in Comparative Perspective, 1820s to 1920s,” in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed., 
Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 
37-75. 
 
24 Diasporic connections constitute a largely unexplored dimension of America’s relationship to 
decolonization in Asia after World War II. The absence of studies to date relating decolonization in Asia to 
reform movements in the United States arguably reflects: (1) the dominance of a black-white racial 
paradigm in U.S. civil rights historiography; and (2) the relatively small Asian American population before 
1965. The literature on America’s role in Asian decolonization comprises mostly individual case studies 
(e.g. on India, Korea, the Philippines).!The more fraught and complicated nature of the decolonization 
process in Africa arguably explains the larger body of literature exploring America’s role there. Mark T. 
Berger’s The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
presents one of the few general works to treat the American relationship to Asian decolonization but 
focuses on economy and the pre-history that made the “Asian economic miracle” of the 1970s and 1980s 
possible. The dearth of scholarship relating the U.S. to Asian decolonization is even more striking 
considering America’s role in pioneering the process. For a provocative discussion of the ironies 
surrounding the U.S. decision to relinquish the Philippines, see Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: 
Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006), Chapter 6. !
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America, the effort to secure legal recognition from the U.S. government became 
embedded in and structured by a set of transnational discourses and political projects.  
Even as it draws from explicitly transnational approaches, this study takes to heart 
historian Marilyn Young’s caveat that in trying to de-center the U.S. in world history, 
scholars should not de-center the reality of American power, which was “preponderant" 
in the decades after World War II.25 While recognizing a common global context, this 
study notably differentiates the United States by illuminating how postwar trends in 
Asian immigration were mutually implicated with the expansion of the American 
presence in Asia after 1940.26 Following in the line of scholars like Walter LaFeber, this 
dissertation sees U.S. involvements in postwar Asia as part of a longer history of 
American empire.27 It was precisely America’s unparalleled military and economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Young borrowed this term from Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 
Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Marilyn B. 
Young, “The Age of Global Power,” Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 271, 295. Existing literature evidences the pitfalls of 
taking the effort to “de-exceptionalize” the United States too far, even as these works make important 
contributions to our understanding of the international context in which U.S. policies of Asian exclusion 
ended. Australian immigration historian Sean Brawley was the first to discuss Asian immigration 
liberalization in the U.S. alongside parallel developments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In all 
four cases, he concluded, “postwar internationalism” became “immigration exclusionists’ greatest enemy”; 
as state officials came to recognize the need for good relations with newly independent nations in the Asia-
Pacific region, they gradually acceded to demands for reform. According to Brawley, the shift to 
multiculturalism had completed – at least formally – by the 1970s. Sean Brawley, The White Peril: Foreign 
Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919-78 (Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press, 1995), 199. Brawley’s work anticipated the work of Latrobe professor Marilyn Lake, 
who tracked the rise of Asian exclusion as a transnational phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in a 2008 synthesis. Rather than make a case for any single nation’s distinctiveness, 
Lake and Reynolds attempted to racially restrictive immigration policies as part of a global history of 
“white supremacy.” Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Color Line: White Men’s 
Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
 
26 This discussion builds on Matthew Jacobson’s framing of “immigration and expansion” as “two sides of 
the same coin.” Matthew Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at 
Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000), 4, 265.  !
27 A student of William Appleman Williams, Walter LaFeber follows in a long line of scholars that saw the 
United States as expansionist and imperial from its beginning. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); also see 
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power that made U.S. intervention possible in ways that had far-ranging impact for Asia, 
and the world as a whole. Such policies combined formal and informal arrangements with 
economic and cultural influence; together they produced new waves of migration to the 
United States that multiplied the Asian presence in America and set into high relief the 
re-negotiation of national borders and security under the evolving legal (and illegal) 
immigration regime. 
 
A Brief History of Asian Exclusion 
The story of Asiatic exclusion in the United States starts with the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, the first law in American history explicitly to restrict a racial or 
ethnic group by name.28 In practice, the law did not bar all Chinese from entering the 
United States but instead inhibited the migration of unskilled laborers while permitting 
the entry of higher-income, special groups – merchants, diplomats, and students, among 
others.29 The original 1882 Act stipulated an enforcement period of ten years, but a 1903 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 201. 
Williams saw World War II as marking an even more fundamental shift, when the “convergence of a sense 
of economic necessity and a moral calling transformed the traditional concept of open door expansion into 
a vision of the American century.”  
 
28 Some scholars date the origins of Asiatic exclusion earlier to the 1875 Page Law and an 1862 precursor. 
See, for example, Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 6. Other notable works on Chinese exclusion 
include Sucheng Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860-1910 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986); Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle 
Against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); 
Lucy Salyer, Laws as Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Judy Yung, Unbound Feet: A Social History of 
Chinese Women in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Madeline Y. Hsu, 
Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and 
South China, 1882-1943 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco 
1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Nayan Shah, 
Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). !
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law extended the restrictions on unskilled labor migration indefinitely and, according to 
historian Erika Lee, established gatekeeping as a permanent feature of U.S. immigration 
policy.30 While scholars continue to debate the degree of various actors’ culpability – 
organized labor and national politicians, among others – for helping pass the exclusion 
laws, they do not dispute the legislation’s domestic origins in anxieties over labor 
competition, party politics, and long-standing societal conceptions of Chinese as a 
despised racial other.31 Initially, Chinese state officials expressed objections to the 
Chinese Exclusion laws as an insult to the Chinese people. But Washington generally 
ignored these objections, secure in China’s weakness on the late nineteenth-century’s 
international stage. Increasingly distracted by threats to their power at home, historian 
Michael Hunt writes, by 1895 the Chinese imperial government, in turn, had “fully 
acquiesced in the U.S. policy of exclusion.”32  
Japan had higher status internationally, and this delayed the stigma of official 
exclusion. In the early years of the twentieth century, anti-Japanese violence on the U.S. 
West Coast put Tokyo officials in an awkward position, as did the work of exclusionist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 In a recent article, historian Gordon Chang offered a valuable reminder that the “Chinese Exclusion Act” 
was not originally known as such. The term “Exclusion Act” only came into popular use much later. 
Gordon H. Chang, “China and the Pursuit of America's Destiny: Nineteenth-Century Imagining and Why 
Immigration Restriction Took So Long,” Journal of Asian American Studies 15:2 (2012): 145-169, at 145. 
 
30 Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).  
 
31 U.S. labor historians were the first to study the origins of Chinese exclusion in depth. Notable among 
these, Alexander Saxton tracked the emergence of an anti-Chinese movement in the American West and 
showed how fears of labor competition and the workings of partisan politics culminated in the passage of 
the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Andrew Gyory shifted the focus to national politicians and the demands 
of political party competition during the Gilded Age. Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor 
and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Andrew 
Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998).  
 
32 Hunt, Making of a Special Relationship, 108.   
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groups like the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League to agitate for a national law that 
barred Japanese as the 1882 law had done for the Chinese.33 Eager to avoid the public 
stigma of exclusion, in 1907 Japan informally agreed to restrict the emigration of 
unskilled Japanese laborers to the U.S. in return for Washington’s efforts to squelch 
discrimination against Japanese in California. The Gentleman’s Agreement, as the 
arrangement came to be known, saved face for Japan, preserving the appearance of 
Japanese equality with European powers while meeting American restrictionists’ 
demands to reduce immigration from Asia.34 Koreans also came under the terms of the 
Agreement after Japan formally annexed the Korean peninsula in 1910. As a stopgap 
measure, however, the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement only addressed the problem of 
Japanese migration temporarily. 
The World War I years brought the first legal articulation of comprehensive Asian 
exclusion. A series of laws passed during and immediately after the war expanded the 
racial bar on immigration to all Asian peoples. The first of three (1917, 1921, 1924), the 
Immigration Act of 1917 created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” a geographical designation 
that excluded Indian immigrants for the first time in American history. While the 
legislation did not mention Indians explicitly, its disproportionate impact prompted one 
scholar to dub the law the “Asian Indian Exclusion Act.”35 During the same period, legal 
cases challenging Asian naturalization claims both strengthened and complicated the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
33 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle 
for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).!
 
34 Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 
Immigration Act (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 4-5.  
 
35 Arthur Helweg, “The Immigration Act of 1917: The Asian Indian Exclusion Act,” in Hyung-Chan Kim, 
ed., Asian Americans and Congress: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 153-
223.   
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racial bar preventing foreign-born Asians from seeking U.S. citizenship. In Ozawa v. U.S. 
(1922), the Supreme Court upheld Japanese ineligibility for American citizenship on the 
grounds that Japanese persons were not Caucasian and therefore did not qualify as 
racially white under the 1790 Naturalization Act.36 One year later, in Thind v. U.S. 
(1923), the Court ruled that, even if technically “Caucasian,” Indians also did not qualify 
for citizenship because they were not racially “white” according to the commonsense 
understanding of the term.37 As these cases illustrate, before World War II, Asian 
Americans largely argued for inclusion on the government’s terms. That is, they sought 
to prove that they deserved citizenship but stopped short of challenging the 
discriminatory nature of the laws themselves.  
The 1924 Immigration Act finalized Asian exclusion as a legal and racial regime, 
and set the stage for the longer movement interrogated by this study. The law’s Japanese 
Exclusion clause closed the loophole that exempted Japan from immigration restriction, 
solidifying the ban on all of Asia.38 It further conjoined immigration and naturalization 
law by making immigration contingent upon one’s ability to naturalize in the United 
States. As “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” Asians did not qualify. According to historian 
Mae Ngai, the effect of these provisions was to “complete Asiatic exclusion” and 
“constitut[e] ‘Asian’ as a peculiarly American racial category.” 39 These features set the 
stage for the 1940s and 1950s campaigns for repeal in two ways. First, the structure of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
36 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). 
 
37 United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923). 
 
38 As a U.S. territory, the Philippines were exempt from the restrictions.  
 
39 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 37.  
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1924 law meant that legislation to repeal exclusion also had to address issues of both 
immigration and naturalization. This explains why the Magnuson bill, the piece of 
legislation that initiated the longer movement, included not only provisions repealing the 
Chinese exclusion acts, but also sections that created an annual immigration quota for 
Chinese and granted citizenship eligibility to persons of Chinese descent. Second, the 
racial category of “Asian” created by the 1924 Act allowed for slippage between ethnic 
and racial identities, ambiguity that Asian American lobbyists and their allies could and 
often did use to their advantage. In practice, the term encompassed many groups with no 
sense of unity outside the gaze of the law or white U.S. officials. But the expansiveness 
of Asian exclusion and the shared struggle to overcome it created the potential, not 
always realized, for groups as diverse as Chinese, Indians, and Japanese to unite in the 
cause of repeal.  
 
A History of Anti-Exclusion in the United States 
Efforts to overturn the Asian Exclusion laws had a long history in the United 
States. Both government and non-governmental actors had been protesting legal 
discriminations based on race, ethnicity, and national origins for decades by the time the 
Magnuson bill was introduced in 1943. Three groups led the charge: Asian and U.S. 
government officials, white Americans acting as private citizens, and Asians in the 
United States. 
The sustained interest and involvement of both U.S. and Asian state officials in 
overturning the Asian exclusion laws reflected a mutual understanding that immigration 
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policy was also foreign policy.40 Even before the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act first 
passed, Chinese officials and Chinese in America formally protested the insult of U.S. 
laws’ explicit restrictions on Chinese people.41 The 1924 Immigration Act’s formal 
exclusion of Japan evoked an even greater outcry in Tokyo. Arguments about whether 
this blow to Japanese pride had been a principal cause of the Pacific War featured 
prominently in Congressional debates over exclusion repeal throughout the 1940s and 
1950s.42 Eager to remove obstacles hindering U.S. diplomacy with Asian powers, U.S. 
government entities charged with overseeing foreign policy – namely, the White House 
and State Department – were some of the earliest and most steadfast supporters of repeal. 
Nevertheless, the reluctance of officials on both sides of the ocean to risk overstepping 
their jurisdiction meant that the work of lobbying largely fell to non-state actors, who had 
a conspicuous role in the U.S.-based repeal movement. 
White Americans acting as private citizens composed the second major contingent 
to contest exclusion before World War II.43 The prominence of non-state actors in prewar 
activism for repeal was consistent with their prominence in U.S.-Asia diplomacy more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
40 Oyen, 416 and Introduction. !
41 For more on resistance to Chinese exclusion, see Hunt, Chapter 7; K. Scott Wong, “Cultural Defenders 
and Brokers: Chinese Responses to the Anti-Chinese Movement,” in Sucheng Chan, ed., Claiming 
America: Constructing Chinese American Identities during the Exclusion Era (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1998): 3-40; Xiaohua Ma, “The Sino-American Alliance during World War II and the 
Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts,” American Studies International 38:2 (June 2000): 39-61. 
 
42 On efforts to overturn Japanese exclusion, see Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: 
Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001), introduction; Sandra C. Taylor, Advocate of Understanding: Sidney Gulick and the Search for Peace 
with Japan  (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1985), Chapters 7-9, especially 7.  
 
43 Private actors on the ground in Asia also contested exclusion through public demonstrations and appeals 
addressed to U.S. government agencies. At times, as in the 1905 Chinese boycott, their efforts attracted 
widespread, even international, attention. In general, though, Asians outside of government had on indirect, 
more abstract than concrete or individualized influence on U.S. lawmakers.  
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generally. As one scholar of American foreign diplomacy has noted, the relative lack of 
priority that Washington historically ascribed non-European regions meant that the 
“influence of non-governmental groups rises correspondingly outside of Europe.” This 
was particularly true for the East Asian region, where the U.S. State Department had little 
staff or funding to support diplomatic infrastructure. The promise of a largely untapped 
Asia market had become a powerful draw for American companies and businessmen 
looking for profitable new trading ventures and new audiences for their goods and 
services.44 Along with missionaries, business interests had particular influence on U.S.-
Asia diplomacy in the absence of governmental actors.45 A desire to court would-be 
Asian consumers and the belief that exclusionary laws impeded healthy trade relations 
between American sellers and Asian buyers motivated a strong business push for repeal. 
American religious leaders, including Protestant missionaries, supported the repeal of 
exclusionary laws on similar grounds, hoping that repeal would facilitate the spread of 
Christianity in Asia. A faith-based commitment to what one missionary activist described 
as “equality and Christian principles of love and self-sacrifice” also supported religious 
actors’ advocacy for repeal.46 American businessmen’s investment in repeal fluctuated 
over time, but before 1940, Protestant missionaries remained some of the most consistent 
and vocal defenders of Asians’ right both to immigrate to the United States and to claim 
legal protections from the American government once they arrived.47  
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44 See Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 
1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).   
 
45 According to Hirobe, the two groups were “in the forefront of American expansion” in the Far East and 
Asia. Hirobe, 10. 
 
46 Quoted in Sandra C. Taylor, Advocate of Understanding: Sidney Gulick and the Search for Peace with 
Japan (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University. Press, 1985), 120. 
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 Asians in America were the third major group of advocates for repeal before 
World War II. The first targets of explicit race-based restrictions, Chinese migrants were 
also their earliest resisters. With the help of consular officials and white Americans, 
Chinese contested and circumvented the legal restrictions placed upon them in myriad 
ways; they sought legal counsel, appealed immigration rulings, and otherwise employed 
the American legal system to circumvent the very restrictions it imposed upon them.48 In 
Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v. U.S. (1893), Chinese plaintiffs took 
their challenges all the way to the Supreme Court, albeit without success.49 After 1913, 
Japanese and Indian Americans likewise turned to the U.S. judicial system: first, for relief 
from Alien Land Laws that prevented them from leasing or owning agricultural land in 
California and several West Coast states, and later, for the right to naturalize as U.S. 
citizens. Changes in U.S. immigration procedure, combined with Supreme Court rulings 
upholding Asians’ racial ineligibility to U.S. citizenship in the early 1920s, foreclosed the 
courts as a forum to advance Asian rights with respect to land or naturalization.50 But the 
act of challenging the legality of discriminatory laws served as an early crucible for the 
development of Asian Americans’ political consciousness. Through these interactions 
with the U.S. state, Asian Americans gained familiarity with the American political and 
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47 See, for example, Jennifer C. Snow, Protestant Missionaries, Asian Immigrants, and Ideologies of Race 
in America, 1850–1924 (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 
48 Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Charles McClain, In Search of Equality: The 
Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996); Erika Lee, At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 
1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), Chapter 4. 
 
49 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893).   
 
50 For more, see Salyer, xvii. !
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legal process, and the potential as well as the limitations of law to bring redress. To 
varying degrees, all three groups – government officials, white American business and 
religious interests, and Asian Americans – would remain active in lobbying for repeal 
during and after World War II. 
 
Building a Network for Repeal 
This study argues that the success of the repeal movement beginning in World 
War II depended on a strategic interplay of American, Asian, and Asian American forces. 
Despite their myriad differences, two things bound these motley groups together: first, a 
belief in the need to end wholesale Asian exclusion; and second, a common discourse of 
geopolitics and internationalist rhetoric from which they all drew. Each group brought a 
different sense of urgency and legitimacy to the cause. Among the state proponents of 
reform, U.S. State Department officials and other internationalists in the executive branch 
joined a small, bipartisan core of Congressmen and women to introduce bills, petition 
committees, and secure endorsements in their bid to convince lawmakers of the need for 
change. Asian state officials worked behind the scenes and used backchannels to prompt 
official debate in Washington, reflecting the significance of Asian exclusion repeal as a 
pressing matter of international diplomacy. Outside of government circles, white 
American liberals and religious advocates expertly mobilized U.S. media outlets, 
churches, and other organizations behind the cause of repeal. Lobbying vehicles such as 
the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion provided a forum for influential 
cultural and literary figures to work toward a common goal through both informal and 
formal partnerships. Figures like Time-Life Inc. publisher Henry Luce and Nobel Prize-
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winning author Pearl Buck used their influence to broadcast the case for repeal to a 
broader American public.  
A small group of Asian American lobbyists seized upon U.S. officials’ increased 
interest in Asia to advance the cause of repeal with renewed force. A diverse group, they 
included foreign-born immigrants, international students, and native-born U.S. citizens 
from several ethnic communities: Indian, Korean, and Japanese Americans, among 
others. While they did not always share the same goals, their mutual exclusion under the 
1924 Immigration Act’s exclusionary laws created at least a basis for solidarity. Because 
of their proximity to Washington and other centers of power, Asian American lobbyists 
emerged as a steady presence on Capitol Hill, where their facility in English and 
familiarity with the U.S. political system enabled them to speak to a broader American 
audience. Yet, without the formal political power of a large voting bloc, Asian American 
activists faced a formidable challenge. Over the 1940s and early 1950s, persons of Asian 
descent made up only 0.2 percent of the mainland U.S. population, and the majority of 
these were noncitizens.51 In terms of petitioning Congress, then, Asian Americans 
represented a politically insignificant force; their small numbers and racial ineligibility 
for naturalized citizenship suggested that this would not change anytime soon.  
During a time when Washington increasingly looked to Asia as a key site of its 
overseas security interests, Asian Americans found that their most ready source of 
political leverage lay in their presumptive ties to Asia. They discovered that presenting 
themselves as unofficial spokespersons for Asian peoples gave their petitions greater 
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51 Within the continental United States, there were an estimated 254,918 persons of Asian descent as of 
1940. 1940 U.S. Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940). By 1950, that number had 
grown only incrementally to 321,033. These figures did not include the Hawaiian Islands.  
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weight in official circles. This gave rise to a political strategy in which Asian American 
advocates actively emphasized their ties to Asian homelands in order to secure a foothold 
as lobbyists on Capitol Hill and advance their legal struggles for rights. This reflects what 
one scholar has described as U.S. officials’ tendency to conceive immigration policies 
toward Asia with “Asian, not Asian American, audiences in mind.”52 By contrast, 
southern and eastern European groups during the same period drew upon their increased 
electoral power within the United States to make their own demands for immigration 
reform toward southern and Eastern Europe. African Americans, in addition to making 
internationalist claims, also leveraged their newfound power within the Democratic Party 
to push for civil rights reforms at the federal level. The persistent racialization of Asian 
Americans as extensions of peoples in Asia shaped the arguments they could make for 
repeal – less as Asian Americans with a stake in the United States, and primarily as 
presumptive spokespersons for their Asian countrymen abroad. 
 
Creating Momentum for Repeal  
After decades of activism by diverse actors for repeal, what accounted for the 
newfound political viability of repeal beginning in the World War II period? What 
changed?  
Two important developments gave the mid-century movement for repeal the 
momentum to achieve success. In the first, Americans moved toward internationalism in 
the years leading up to World War II. Against the backdrop of growing conflict in both 
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Europe and Asia, the White House led the official shift in priority from domestic to 
international affairs. Historian Akira Iriye has described this development as the 
“emergence of geopolitical-mindedness” or “power-political thinking,” a change marked 
by a newfound “consciousness of power and the readiness to consider war as an 
instrument of national policy.”53 Americans outside of official circles registered the 
change as well.54 The popularity of such titles as Walter Lippmann’s U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Shield of the Republic (1943) reflected the broader shift in American public 
thought and the emergence of a public consensus that global peace and stability depended 
on American intervention. A new openness to sacrifice other elements of America’s own 
domestic interest for the sake of international peace and stability accompanied 
Americans’ willingness to accept, even if not outright support, an active U.S. role in 
world affairs.  
Within this broader paradigm shift, Washington’s policy pivoted toward Asia and 
the world’s non-white peoples and away from its long-standing focus on Europe. 
Scholars continue to debate the precise turning point in U.S.-Asia relations, when 
Washington began to prioritize Asia in the context of America’s international interests.55 
But wide agreement dates the shift to the late 1930s, in response to Japanese 
expansionism and wide-scale devastation in China. If Asian weakness and American !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 According to Iriye, this shift represented a “major phenomenon in American intellectual and diplomatic 
history.” Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 167, 
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54 A growing consensus of Americans both in and outside government came to embrace “military force, 
power politics, and international collective action as necessary to preserve the peace and to prevent 
aggression.” Iriye, 167, 169, and Chapter 10 in general, especially 164-169. 
 
55 Cohen, “American Leaders and East Asia,” 2, 25. For a longer discussion, see Waldo Heinrichs, “The 
Middle Years, 1900-1945, and the Question of a Large U.S. Policy for East Asia,” in New Frontiers in 
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indifference contributed to the longevity of Asian exclusion as a feature of U.S. 
immigration and naturalization policy, America’s foreign policy pivot or reorientation 
toward Asia made repeal politically viable as a necessary response to mounting 
international scrutiny and critique by America’s foreign enemies. As one historian has 
noted, the “coupling of East Asian and world politics” “finally produced a fundamental 
American commitment in East Asia.”56 In other words, Washington policymakers’ view 
of Asia did not change, but rather, their understanding of Asia as connected to a broader 
international danger to American interests. As part of this mindset shift beginning in the 
late 1930s, Washington policymakers and officials began to consider Asian powers like 
China and Japan relevant to America’s own security interests as never before. Slow at 
first, the pivot accelerated after World War II as Asia became a prime site of military 
conflict in America’s Cold War battle against Soviet and later, Chinese, Communism.  
In the second major development that laid the groundwork for repeal, Washington 
developed newfound concern with managing America’s international image. Beginning 
in World War II, America’s record on race, namely, its racial policies and treatment of 
racial minority groups, became a particular focus of Washington’s anxieties. Japanese 
propaganda targeting U.S. Asian exclusion laws as evidence of U.S. racial hypocrisy 
began the process of raising the stakes of exclusion as a problem of wartime diplomacy. 
Soviet attacks on America’s race record after 1947 added to the urgency. As historian 
Justin Hart explains, “changes in the nature of U.S. foreign relations also changed the 
relation of people and ideas to the foreign policy process.”57 The events described in this 
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dissertation particularly reflected Washington’s newfound desire to manage America’s 
international image, which  gave previously marginalized and minority groups – Asian 
Americans, in this case – greater ability to influence foreign relations than ever before.  
 
Chapter Summary and Outline  
This dissertation narrates, in four parts, the longer movement by which Asian 
exclusion ended. The repeal movement cut across three major episodes in U.S.-Asia 
relations: the Pacific War, Asian decolonization following World War II, and the Cold 
War. In contrast to the Chinese case for repeal, which centered on a formal wartime 
alliance between China and the United States, complex questions about America’s 
relationship to anti-colonial nationalism and Communism in postwar Asia complicated 
advocacy for repeal measures benefiting Indians, Koreans, and Japanese.  
Parts I and II tell the story of the first two milestones in the legal dismantling of 
exclusion. The Magnuson Act (1943) and Luce-Celler Act (1946) extended immigration 
quotas and naturalization privileges to Chinese and to Asian Indians and Filipinos, 
respectively. The piecemeal legislation of the 1940s pitted different Asian groups against 
each other, privileging some and disregarding others based on which held greatest 
strategic importance to U.S. geopolitical interests at a given moment. As Mae Ngai has 
argued, to the extent that the 1917 and 1924 Immigration Acts imposed a blanket ban on 
all peoples from the Asia-Pacific region, Congressional lawmakers considered them in 
tandem, as a racial category united by their common exclusion.58 Yet key markers 
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continued to distinguish one people group from another, such as differences in language, 
history, and cultural practice. Congressional hearings give insight into competing 
constructions of “Asian” as a racial, legal, and social designation, and efforts by some to 
exploit the vagaries of racial and ethnic categories toward particular ends. This section 
considers how the fight for piecemeal repeal legislation sifted and re-sifted racial and 
ethnic solidarities, both as perceived by outside observers and understood by Asian 
American activists themselves.  
Part I, “World War II and the Problem of Chinese Exclusion, 1943” explores the 
immediate international and domestic developments during World War II that made 
repeal of Chinese exclusion politically viable as never before. Chapter 1, “The Citizens 
Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion: Establishing Geopolitics as the Language of 
Repeal,” considers how this initial legislative campaign and victory guided the longer 
movement’s organization, argumentation, and strategy.  
Part II, “The Colonial Cases: Repeal as an Anti-Colonial Imperative, 1943-1946” 
analyzes cross-pollination between domestic campaigns for U.S. immigration reform and 
transnational activism on behalf of Asian independence. In a corollary to Thomas 
Borstelmann’s effort to relate the African decolonization struggle to the African 
American freedom movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s, my research draws 
links between the struggles of Asian colonial groups for inclusion in the United States 
with their diasporic campaigns for homeland independence.59 Diasporic connections 
constitute a largely unexplored dimension of America’s relationship to Asian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Ngai argued that the 1924 Immigration Act’s “Asiatic Barred Zone” created “Asian” as a “peculiarly 
American racial category,” a legal and racial group defined by its exclusion and ineligibility to U.S. 
citizenship. Ngai, 37. 
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decolonization. This study considers Indian American campaigns alongside those of 
Korean Americans, expanding understanding of America’s role in and relationship to the 
postwar decolonization of Asia as a larger phenomenon. Its focus on Asian colonial 
diasporas in America also reframes U.S. immigration reform as a transnational effort.  
Chapter 2, “A Tale of Two Leagues: Entwining Indian Independence and 
Immigration Reform,” situates the success of the Indian immigration and naturalization 
campaign in the United States within the longer story of India’s struggle for 
independence from Great Britain. Chapter 3, “The Limits of Reform: Korean Americans 
and the Problem of Korean Independence,” examines the concurrent Korean campaign to 
demonstrate the effect of colonial status in the lobby for rights. The failure of the Korean 
colonial campaign further illustrates the limits of geopolitics and international pressures 
as a compelling driver for repeal.  
Part III, “The Cold War Campaigns: Bringing Asian Exclusion Repeal into the 
Story of Cold War Civil Rights, 1947-1952,” analyzes Asian Americans’ engagement 
with the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Passed at the height of the Korean War on the 
global stage and the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy on the domestic front, the 
McCarran-Walter Act articulated America’s early Cold War priorities. It formally ended 
America’s policy of Asian exclusion by striking down racial restrictions to U.S. 
citizenship and opening America to small numbers of immigrants from Asia. At the same 
time, it retained the racial quotas of the Magnuson and Luce-Celler legislation and 
reaffirmed the federal government’s power to deport and denaturalize suspected 
subversives, including many of Asian descent. The Act’s national security provisions 
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would serve as the legal basis for some of the most repressive state practices associated 
with McCarthyism (the Second Red Scare) in the United States. 
Chapter 4, “Reconceptualizing Civil Rights: The Japanese American Citizens 
League and the Judd Bill,” examines the Japanese American Citizens League’s role in 
passage of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. As the most prominent Asian American 
organization supporting the omnibus measure, the JACL demonstrated the political 
viability of Asian American internationalism as a Cold War strategy. The League used 
Japan’s favored status within the U.S. Cold War project in Asia to support the law’s 
highly contested passage through Congress in 1952. The JACL campaign reflected how 
Asian Americans’ singular history of legal exclusion and racial alienage in the U.S. 
resulted in distinct goals and strategies for redress.  
Chapter 5, “Bridging Korea and Korean America: The Cold War Campaign for 
Korean Rights,” considers the campaigns two Korean American organizations launched 
for citizenship eligibility during the early Cold War years. Shifting the focus from 
policymaking to enforcement, it traces the impact of the 1952 law’s deportation 
provisions on Koreans in the United States. The deportation cases of Korean-born 
radicals suggested that ties to an Asian homeland, whether real or perceived, could 
undermine Asian Americans’ claims to American-ness as readily as they advanced them.  
The epilogue looks ahead to the fourth and final phase of the movement for 
comprehensive immigration reform in relation to Asian Americans: the 1965 Immigration 
(Hart-Celler) Act. The law abolished once and for all the national origins quota system 
created by the Immigration Act of 1924.!Many considerations – economic, cultural, and 
political – contributed to the legislation in its final form. But few fully anticipated how 
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the new system of preferences it created would transform the racial and ethnic 
composition of the nation.60 
*  *  *  *  * 
 If, as Matthew Jacobson writes, it is in the “crucible of foreign policy and 
immigration that dominant notions of Americanism and citizenship are largely formed,” 
the repeal of Asian exclusion heralded the transformation of Asian American citizenship 
in the context of America’s foreign policy pivot toward Asia after 1940.61 This 
dissertation reveals the transnational cast of actors scattered throughout the United States 
and Asia that remade the racial boundaries of the American nation through their 
participation in the movement for repeal.  
As presumptive spokespersons for peoples in Asia, Asian American lobbyists 
communicated with particular force the significance of domestic policies passed at home 
for U.S. security goals in Asia. Through their petitions, speeches, and other lobbying 
activities, they concretized the link between the international and the domestic for 
Congressional and American popular audiences. But their use of racial foreignness as a 
political strategy had its own cost. For one, it shifted Asian Americans’ source of 
authority and legitimacy from the United States to an imagined ancestral homeland in 
Asia. The persistent racialization of Asian Americans as extensions of peoples in Asia 
indelibly shaped their perception as political actors in ways that resonate with us today: 
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reinforcing their image less as ethnic Americans with a stake in the United States, and 
primarily as presumptive spokespersons for their Asian counterparts abroad. 
  
Part I 
 
World War II and the Problem of Chinese Exclusion, 1943 
 
On May 25, 1943, a Japanese radio broadcaster commented on legislation then 
pending in the U.S. Congress that proposed to repeal Chinese exclusion in the United 
States. In his telling: 
Japan has no reason to oppose the [ ] Bill providing for repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act which has been existent for a half century to the humiliation not 
only of the Chinese but of all Asiatics. It is safe to assume that if such a 
discriminatory law had been repealed or even mitigated twenty or even ten years 
ago, the present conflict in the Pacific could have been avoided. In enacting a 
successive series of discriminatory laws against Orientals, the United States 
planted the seeds of irritation and conflict which later were to burst out in the 
Pacific.1  
 
Observers on both sides of the Pacific had been making similar arguments for years. 
Notoriously, the Japanese Emperor Hirohito was reported to have credited the rejection 
of Japanese immigrants in California as a major cause of the Pacific War.2 Missionary 
activists and business interests championed this logic throughout the interwar years in 
their efforts to secure annual immigration quotas for Japan and other Asian powers 
formally excluded by the 1917 and 1924 Immigration Acts.3 But, to no avail. 
Washington’s interest in bolstering a tenuous military alliance between the U.S. and 
China renewed the rhetorical power and political expediency of this logic during World 
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War II as an argument for repeal. By again singling out America’s exclusion laws as a 
racial affront to Asian peoples, Tokyo broadcasters effectively elevated the issue of 
exclusion from a minor irritant in Chinese-American relations to a major problem of 
wartime diplomacy that warranted immediate action by the U.S. Congress. 
*  *  *  *  * 
The Magnuson Act marked both an end and a beginning. On the one hand, 
passage of the 1943 legislation, popularly known as the “Chinese Exclusion Repealer,” 
culminated decades of activism by Chinese officials, Chinese Americans, and white 
American advocates to end America's exclusionary policies against Chinese. The 1943 
law repealed the thirteen Chinese exclusion laws passed between 1882 and 1913, 
reopened the U.S. to nominal Chinese immigration with a race-based immigration quota 
of 105, and granted naturalization rights to an Asian group for the first time in American 
history. The 1943 Magnuson Act was also the beginning of the end of Asian exclusion in 
the United States. Chapter 1 examines the 1943 campaign to repeal Chinese exclusion as 
a starting point for the longer repeal movement. The main lobbying organ responsible for 
its success was the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion (hereafter, Citizens 
Committee). The Committee created an organizational blueprint upon which subsequent 
campaigns consciously drew. Its main contribution was to establish geopolitics, or more 
precisely, U.S. international security interests, as a politically viable basis for repeal. The 
victory of the Chinese legislation demonstrated the newfound power of America’s 
geopolitical interests in Asia to compel changes in U.S. immigration and naturalization 
policy. 
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From Interstate Irritant to International Problem  
The World War II campaign to repeal Chinese Exclusion followed a longer 
history of contestation and resistance. Protest of the discriminatory laws began even 
before the original 1882 law passed Congress, and campaigns for repeal launched 
sporadically over the next six decades that the restrictions remained in effect.  
Nevertheless, several factors conspired to undermine the strength of the anti-exclusion 
movement before World War II. The first was the power of the legislative branch over 
immigration and naturalization policy. The White House and executive branch 
historically supported policy liberalization, but the control of Congress over this arena 
meant that a strategically placed contingent of restrictionist forces could block policy 
revision at will. Through the 1940s, a conservative coalition of restrictionist Southern 
Democrats and Western Republicans that overwhelmingly supported exclusion 
dominated Congressional committees on immigration. Their control over House and 
Senate immigration committees, the first gateway to legislative reform, enabled them to 
keep Chinese exclusion repeal off the Congressional agenda through the first four 
decades of the twentieth century. The second was the marginalized and decentralized 
nature of opposition to Chinese exclusion before World War II. Groups periodically 
launched protests and campaigns, but these were often small-scale and short-lived, due to 
limited resources.  
Several groups led the charge against Chinese exclusion before World War II. 
The first were Chinese nationals, including both state and non-state advocates. Beginning 
in the 1880s, Chinese state officials and diplomats repeatedly petitioned for the repeal of 
the exclusion laws as an affront to the Chinese people. In May 1905, Chinese merchants 
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in China organized a boycott of American goods to protest recent U.S. legislation 
extending the exclusion laws indefinitely. Chinese throughout Asia and the United States 
joined the boycott in what one scholar of the episode described as an expression of 
“trans-Pacific Chinese nationalism.4 Chinese in America offered another strong voice 
against exclusion. Scholars including Lucy Salyer, Charles McClain, and Erika Lee have 
documented the diverse and creative strategies that Chinese Americans of varied 
backgrounds – elite and non-elite, citizen and non-citizen alike – employed to challenge 
and circumvent legal restrictions.5 Organizations like the Chinese Six Companies and 
other chapters of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association retained lawyers to 
defend individual Chinese in U.S. courts and before state immigration boards.6 In 1942, 
less than one year before the Magnuson Act passed, a Chinese intellectual living in New 
York penned a pamphlet titled “What ‘Chinese Exclusion’ Really Means,” in which he 
called for a nominal Chinese quota to end the stigma of Chinese exclusion once and for 
all.7 As his deeply researched appeal reflected, Chinese in America remained some of the 
most committed and creative opponents of exclusion and advocates on their own behalf !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 148-161. 
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throughout the exclusion era. But as “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” barred from the 
vote on racial grounds, they remained a negligible political force. 
Private American actors composed the other main advocates of Chinese exclusion 
repeal.8 The American religious community, particularly missionaries, represented a key 
portion of this group. American missionaries William Speer, Otis Gibson, and Samuel 
Wells Williams were some of the earliest and most vocal challengers of Chinese 
exclusion, defending the right of Asians to immigrate into the U.S. and eventually to 
become American citizens.9 But the growing secularization of the public sphere made 
missionaries a marginal voice after World War I as Americans became more critical of 
the evangelical missionary project.10 Lured by the potential of the China market, 
American business and commercial interests comprised the second major group of white 
repeal advocates.11 The Chinese boycott of 1905 prompted the American Asiatic 
Association (AAA), a group of American traders and business interests active in the Far 
East, to become one of the most vocal forces urging repeal.12 For the next few decades 
until the organization went defunct in the late 1930s, AAA leaders continued to lobby for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Washington’s traditional emphasis on diplomacy with Europe meant that non-state or private actors 
historically exercised a disproportionate influence in American-East Asian affairs. In the absence of strong 
interest by Washington, the task of challenging Chinese exclusion fell largely to Americans outside of 
government. See Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of 
the 1924 Immigration Act (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), Introduction. 
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10 Snow, xv. 
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a modified immigration policy with China as the key to preventing recurrence of 
disruptions to Sino-American and U.S.-Asia commerce.13 Liberal, idealistic, and 
humanitarian organizations joined these religious and commercial advocates supporting 
repeal on moral, internationalist, and other ideological grounds. A motley group, they 
encompassed entities as diverse as the YMCA and YWCA, the National Institute of 
Immigrant Welfare, the National Council of Jewish Women, the American Civil Liberties 
Union, as well as individual Americans with an interest in China. But not until World 
War II, with the creation of the Citizens Committee, did any centralized vehicle exist to 
coordinate or channel the influence of these disparate forces to overturn Chinese 
exclusion once and for all.14 
The single most important factor contributing to the persistence of Chinese 
exclusion was Asia’s geopolitical weakness, and more specifically, China’s inferior 
status, on the international stage. In the years before World War II, China was, at best, a 
semi-colonial power. If Chinese weakness facilitated the initial passage and persistence 
of America’s exclusion laws through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its 
heightened status as a formal U.S. partner in the Pacific War against Japan underwrote 
the newfound political viability of repeal beginning in the early 1940s.  
A low point in the U.S.-China military alliance in the Pacific War created an ideal 
moment for advocates to call for repeal. America’s entry into World War II following 
Pearl Harbor made American and China, led by the Nationalist regime of Chiang !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See, for example, James J. Lorence, Organized Business and the Myth of the China Market: The 
American Asiatic Association, 1898-1937 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1981).  
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Kaishek, formal military Allies and partners for the first time in the Pacific War against 
Japan. Never before had Americans fought alongside an Asian power as ostensible 
equals, and never before had U.S. policymakers had such incentive to maintain a strong 
relationship with China. Washington’s top priority to defeat Germany on the war’s 
Western front, known in shorthand as the “Europe First” policy, threatened this 
partnership. Throughout 1942, Washington diverted the bulk of U.S. troops and resources 
to Europe, leaving the war-weary Chinese to bear the brunt of Allied casualties in Asia. 
As U.S. promises of aid and supplies repeatedly failed to materialize, Chinese morale fell 
to an all-time low.  
Japan sought to exploit this weakness with radio campaigns singling out 
America’s history of exclusionary laws against Asians, and Chinese, in particular. In one 
December 1942 message, a Japanese broadcaster condemned America’s racial hypocrisy, 
noting that “Chinese are rigidly excluded from attaining American citizenship by 
naturalization, a right which is accorded to the lowliest immigrant from Europe.”15 In 
messages aired throughout occupied Asia, Japanese-controlled radio derided American 
claims to democracy, while calling on Asian audiences to unite under Japanese leadership 
against the forces of white, Western imperialism. The special publication and distribution 
of a pamphlet excerpting similar Japanese broadcasts for the House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization in 1943 ignited alarm among Congressional lawmakers.16 
Its contents identified America’s exclusion laws as a major impediment to U.S. wartime 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Quoted in Riggs, 161. 
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goals in the Pacific. More than any other single factor, these attacks on America’s anti-
Chinese and anti-Asian laws strengthened the case for repeal of Chinese exclusion.  
 Impressed with the necessity of keeping China in the war at all costs, Roosevelt 
and the U.S. State Department turned to concessionary, symbolic gestures to reassure 
Chungking of America’s commitment to the Pacific front. In January 1943, the United 
States renounced its extraterritoriality privileges in China with an official abrogation of 
the unequal treaties. Over the same period, Roosevelt took pains to include Chinese 
Nationalist President Chiang Kaishek at international conferences alongside leaders from 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union. This was part of the effort to elevate China’s status to 
that of a Great Power on par with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union – 
a step that Roosevelt and his advisors believed was necessary to ensure a postwar peace 
in East Asia. Calls for repeal legislation followed the same logic. The act of American 
goodwill, proponents argued, would not only advance Allied victory on the Pacific front 
by bolstering Chinese morale; it would actively promote a strong China, a move that 
would counterbalance an expansionist Japanese power in the region. The language and 
logic of geopolitics made repeal finally resonate with Congressional lawmakers. But the 
restrictionist opposition in Congress that had long blocked reform persisted and this 
coalition’s views about race and America’s rightful role in the world differed from the 
one on which these arguments depended.  
 Internationalism versus isolationism, and U.S. foreign versus domestic policy 
were some of the key issues woven through the repeal debates. With growing American 
involvement in the world, U.S. policymakers found American interests overseas and at 
home increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to separate. The task was especially 
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difficult to accomplish with respect to immigration, which historically cross-cut both 
arenas. Insofar as immigration laws were a domestic matter with direct implications for a 
nation’s home society, the international community had long regarded a nation’s 
immigration laws inviolate as a matter of national sovereignty. Yet, immigration policies 
necessarily involved relations with foreign powers, and as such, were simultaneously 
issues of foreign policy. During World War II, a small group of state and non-state 
advocates would successfully seize upon the latter understanding – emphasizing the 
geopolitical and foreign policy dimensions of U.S. immigration policies toward Asia – to 
make the case for Chinese exclusion repeal. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion: 
Establishing Geopolitics as the Language of Repeal 
 
 
On February 18, 1943, Soong Meiling, the wife of Chinese Nationalist leader 
Chiang Kai-shek and “First Lady” of China, addressed a joint session of U.S. Congress to 
request more American aid to China in the Pacific War against Japan. America and the 
other Allied powers had it wrong, she suggested, if they believed that Germany was a 
greater threat than Japan; such a belief was “not borne out by actual facts,” particularly as 
Japan had far “greater resources at her command than Germany.”1 A media sensation, the 
Madame’s speech unleashed an outpouring of public support for America’s Chinese 
allies.2 Congressional lawmakers seized upon the momentum to introduce a series of bills 
intended to demonstrate America’s commitment to its Chinese allies. These included 
legislation to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts and extend immigration and 
naturalization rights to native-born Chinese. Such petitions were not new. Diverse forces 
– American missionaries and religious leaders, Chinese diplomats, and Chinese 
Americans – had been agitating to overturn the exclusion laws targeting Chinese for 
years. But only World War II, and a faltering Sino-American alliance on the Pacific front, 
could bring legislative change in the form of the 1943 Magnuson Act.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Her exact words were that “ . . . the prevailing opinion seems to consider the defeat of the Japanese as of 
relative unimportance and that Hitler is our first concern. This is not borne out by actual facts, nor is it to 
the interests of the United Nations as a whole to allow Japan to continue, not only as a vital potential threat 
but as a waiting sword of Damocles, ready to descend at a moment's notice.” Reprinted in “Speech to 
Congress,” Life Magazine, March 1, 1943. !
 
2 For more on American media coverage of the visit, see Lorraine Dong, “Song Meiling in America 1943,” 
in The Repeal and Its Legacy: Proceedings of the Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Repeal of the 
Exclusion Acts (San Francisco; Chinese Historical Society of America, 1994): 39-46.  
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Many groups contributed to the success of the Magnuson Act. Within government 
circles, U.S. State Department officials and other internationalists in the executive branch 
joined a small bipartisan core of Congressmen and women to draft and sponsor 
legislation, petition committees, and secure powerful endorsements in the effort to 
convince lawmakers to vote for repeal. At the heart of the Magnuson bill’s success was a 
pressure group called the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion and Place 
Immigration on a Quota Basis (hereafter, Citizens Committee).3 Between the spring and 
fall of 1943, the group capitalized upon public support for China to push repeal through a 
reluctant Congress. Founded by New York-based publisher Richard Walsh, the 
Committee brought together some of the most powerful white American friends of China 
around a common cause.  
An understanding of the history of the movement toward Asian exclusion repeal 
begins with understanding the critical legislative effort that began it all. This chapter 
reviews the 1943 campaign to repeal Chinese exclusion in light of the longer movement 
for Asian exclusion repeal. It argues that the Chinese repeal campaign laid the 
groundwork for comprehensive repeal in three main ways. The first was organization. 
The Chinese campaign brought together a core network of supporters committed to 
repealing exclusionary laws for not only Chinese, but for all Asian groups. Several of the 
figures involved in the 1943 campaign would become staples of the longer movement for 
repeal. These included former China missionary turned Congressman Walter Judd (R-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The tactics and strategies of the Citizens Committee are the subject of Fred Riggs, Pressures on 
Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1950). Its initial 
“Friends of China” mailing list included more than 4,400 names, along with the membership rosters of pro-
China interest groups like the Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, which numbered in 
the tens of thousands. With the possible exception of India, no other Asian power at the time could boast 
anywhere near that level of baseline support. Riggs, 46, 61.  
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MN). Judd’s rise to influence testified to the political cachet of foreign policy expertise 
during World War II. An extended discussion of Judd’s missionary background and early 
Congressional career establish the backdrop for his two decades of activism for repeal. 
The second area of influence lay in the strategy of the campaign. Ongoing negotiation 
between proponents and Congressional opponents of repeal produced the Citizens 
Committee’s three-point agenda focused on Chinese gains. Its success established 
geopolitics as the definitive language and logic of the longer movement. Finally, the 
Magnuson Act influenced the movement for Asian exclusion repeal by emboldening 
members of other excluded Asian groups to make similar claims on behalf of their own 
communities, beginning with members of the Indian and Korean communities in the 
United States.  
 
Laying a Blueprint for Repeal: The Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion 
The Citizens Committee faced stiff opposition in its campaign for Chinese 
exclusion repeal in the early 1940s. During and immediately after World War II, 
American public opinion strongly favored maintaining or further restricting the numbers 
of people entering the United States. Groups that had long protested Chinese immigration 
– organized labor, veterans organizations, West Coast interests, and “patriotic societies” – 
continued to oppose any relaxation of restrictions as a threat to the nation. Within 
Congress, a “conservative coalition” of restrictionist Southern Democrats and Western 
Republicans maintained a majority on the committees overseeing immigration and 
naturalization policies.4 In the face of these harsh political realities, the Citizens !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 According to Tichenor, “[o]ne of the most important sources of restrictionist policy equilibrium” was the 
“chair of the standing Immigration Committee, in each house of Congress, who was almost invariably a 
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Committee and its allies seized upon all the advantages they could muster to mobilize 
popular and official support for repeal. Formed in the spring of 1943, the Citizens 
Committee channeled diverse forces working for repeal into a powerful force for change 
on Capitol Hill. As a “catalytic” pressure group, it did not “manufacture” public interest 
in China so much as it coordinated the efforts of other groups already seeking repeal.5 Far 
from challenging the racial ideas and prejudices that underwrote exclusion, the Citizens 
Committee relied on a strategy of political expediency and pragmatism to win the support 
of Congressional lawmakers. Although the organization formally existed for only seven 
months, its tactics and strategies would shape the longer movement for repeal for the next 
two decades.  
* * * * * 
The seeds of the Citizens Committee took root in 1941, when a U.S. consul in 
Hong Kong named Donald Dunham contacted New York publisher Richard Walsh to 
discuss the need for repeal legislation.6 Alarmed at the embarrassing effects of the 
exclusion laws on U.S. diplomacy with the Chinese, Dunham asked Walsh to initiate a 
popular campaign in America to overturn them. Walsh was a strategic choice. As the 
founder and president of the John Day Publishing Company, Walsh was well known for 
publishing important titles on Asia, including (his eventual wife) Pearl Buck’s Nobel 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Southern or Western conservative and who worked closely with nativist groups to frustrate pro-
immigration reformers seeking to dismantle national origins quotas. Their power was buoyed by the 
seniority system and a formidable ‘conservative coalition’ of Southern Democrats and Western 
Republicans.” These Committee heads took “pains to fashion a distinctly nativist implementation process.” 
In this way, Tichenor writes, restrictionists were able to maintain their policy regimes based on national 
origins quotas and Asian exclusion well after the 1920s. Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of 
Immigration Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 149. 
 
5 Riggs, 57. 
 
6 Riggs, 48-50. 
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Prize-winning novel The Good Earth (1931). Moreover, as editor of the monthly journal 
Asia and the Americas, he enjoyed special influence among Americans with an interest in 
the Far East. Persuaded by Dunham’s appeals, Walsh enlisted Charles Nelson Spinks, an 
expert on East Asia, to publish an article titled “Repeal Chinese Exclusion” in the 
journal’s February 1942 issue. Describing repeal as an expedient act of wartime 
diplomacy needed to shore up the Sino-American alliance and blunt the edge of Japanese 
propaganda, the piece elicited offers of help from hundreds of individual Americans and 
organizations sympathetic to the cause.7 Respondents included representatives of 
organized labor, churches, missions boards, liberal and humanitarian groups, including 
several of the figures who came to make up the Citizens Committee’s executive core: 
Pearl Buck, Monroe Sweetland of the C.I.O. labor union, Read Lewis of the Common 
Council for American Unity, and Bruno Lasker of the National Council on Naturalization 
and Citizenship. Roger Baldwin of the ACLU and U.S. Congressman Walter Judd, both 
of whom became mainstays in the longer movement for repeal, also joined the effort in 
its early stages.  
The diversity of support for repeal presented both a strength and a challenge. By 
the time the Citizens Committee was officially formed in May 1943, a diverse coalition 
of groups had signed on to support the popular campaign for repeal under its direction, 
totaling more than 250 members from 40 states. Reflecting a wide range of motivations 
and political interests, not all supporters agreed on the basic contours of the campaign. 
The task fell to Committee chairman, Richard Walsh, and members of its executive core !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Despite its titular focus on Chinese, the 1942 editorial was notably inclusive of other Asian groups, with 
an appeal to “racial equality” and a broad critique of America’s exclusion laws that “so glaringly place the 
Asiatic races in a different category from the rest of mankind.” “Repeal Chinese Exclusion,” Asia and the 
Americas XLII (February 1942), 92-94. It was followed by a similar piece in Contemporary 
China.“Exclusion and Extraterritoriality,” Contemporary China 1:26 (May 18, 1942). 
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to decide these matters. In practice, Walsh’s mantra of accommodation for the sake of 
victory centrally informed all aspects of the campaign, from what the Committee would 
demand to the arguments it used to make its case and through which spokespeople. The 
Citizens Committee’s top-heavy leadership and ad-hoc structure led to Walsh’s outsize 
influence. Approximately ten of the group’s most committed New York-based members 
composed the Committee’s executive committee and made all of its decisions. They 
served on a volunteer basis, and the Citizens Committee retained only one paid 
employee, a secretary and legislative agent based in Washington, DC, during the seven-
month campaign. 
 As late as April 1943, up to half of the Citizens Committee’s list of supporters 
reported a strong preference for a broad-based measure for general Asian exclusion 
repeal over a piecemeal bill for Chinese alone.8 Liberal, humanitarian, and religious 
groups who opposed racial restrictions on principle objected to a bill only benefiting 
Chinese people. Within the American Protestant community, the Federal Council of 
Churches (FCC) emerged as one of the most vocal advocates of comprehensive change. 
In fact, the outpouring of support from the Christian community had made such an 
impression that, in late 1942, Walsh offered to step aside and let Walter Van Kirk, one of 
the FCC’s division secretaries, oversee the campaign for repeal. As an umbrella 
organization representing thirty-two mainline Protestant denominations, the FCC was 
well positioned to capitalize on long-standing support for repeal among American 
Christians, churches, and missionaries. Walsh changed his mind, however, after Van Kirk 
and the FCC refused to limit their demands to Chinese only but continued to insist on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Riggs, 135.  
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comprehensive repeal of “Oriental exclusion” in its entirety.9 Officials in the U.S. 
executive branch shared the FCC’s broader commitment on pragmatic grounds; the U.S. 
State Department, for its part, had long supported wholesale repeal as necessary to the 
conduct of U.S.-Asia diplomacy. Over the first few months of 1943, members of the U.S. 
State Department worked closely with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
and the newly elected Walter Judd, a former China missionary turned Congressman from 
Minnesota, to draft legislation providing for the comprehensive repeal of the Asiatic 
exclusion laws.10  
 Although he agreed in principle with calls for broad-based repeal, Walsh 
countered that war with Japan and American anti-Japanese sentiment made it politically 
impossible. In written appeals to fellow supporters, he recounted the failure of a general 
Asian immigration bill introduced by Rep. Vito Marcantonio of New York earlier that 
year; the mere suggestion that such a bill could eventually open the United States to 
Japanese immigration had doomed the bill from the start.11  
Congressional actions eventually forced a decision. In April, the House 
Committee on Immigration announced a hearing on bills related to Chinese exclusion 
repeal only. With just weeks to spare, Walsh and a core group moved decisively to make 
membership in the newly formed Citizens Committee contingent upon the acceptance of 
three goals: (1) the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts; (2) an annual immigration 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
9 Riggs, 96. 
 
10 The joint bill proposed to circumvent the issue of Japanese immigration by limiting the extension of 
immigration and naturalization rights to Asian groups “friendly” to the U.S., a detail that strategically 
exempted the enemy Japanese from these gains. 
 
11 Riggs, 53-54. 
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quota for Chinese; (3) Chinese eligibility for U.S. citizenship as an exception to the racial 
ban on Asiatic naturalization. While some protested, most supporters accepted Walsh’s 
advice to see the Chinese campaign as a first step in a gradual process of repealing 
exclusion laws for all Asian peoples.12 At Walsh’s request, Judd and his government 
colleagues scrapped their broad-based proposal in favor of a Chinese-only measure. 
However, the broad-based proposal would later resurface as the basis for the Judd bill, a 
measure granting immigration quotas and citizenship eligibility to all Asian peoples, 
which the lawmaker introduced to Congress in 1947. 
Two additional issues arose over the course of the public campaign for repeal. 
The first concerned the annual immigration quota. To mollify critics’ concerns that the 
quota would usher a “flood” of Chinese into the United States (from Hong Kong, 
Southeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere), the Citizens Committee agreed to support 
an amendment to the Magnuson bill stipulating that China’s annual immigration quota 
would operate on the basis of race and not nationality. The racial quota would restrict the 
immigration of all persons of Chinese descent regardless of their place of birth (unless 
they were born in the United States and were therefore citizens by birth).13 As 
Congressional sponsor Rep. Warren Magnuson (R-WA) explained, the modification 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Van Kirk, as a representative for the FCC, continued to work independently for broad-based repeal. The 
organization presented a petition to the House Immigration Committee that May on behalf of the Council’s 
twenty-four member denominations denouncing discriminatory laws against Asian peoples as doing 
“violence to the Christian view of one humanity under God” and called for the repeal of exclusionary laws 
barring the migration of “friendly” Oriental peoples to the U.S. Quoted in Riggs, 97.  
 
13 This clause was intended to discourage Chinese immigration through Hong Kong, which, as a British 
colony, enjoyed access to the UK’s generous annual quota. It was also designed to limit Chinese migrating 
to the U.S. from the Western Hemisphere, which through 1965, had fewer restrictions. 
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ensured that the total number of persons of Chinese descent entering the U.S. from 
anywhere in the world would never exceed 105 a year.14 
The second involved petitions to allow the alien Chinese wives of U.S. citizens to 
enter the country outside the annual immigration quota. Chinese Americans like Boston 
resident Charles Lee had been lobbying on this issue for several years by the time the 
Citizens Committee took up the Magnuson bill in 1943. As scholar L. Ling-chi Wang has 
observed, the Citizens Committee tended to ignore the desires of Chinese Americans 
themselves, as their neglect of this issue likewise reflects.15 Chinese Americans had a 
much more prominent role in this largely separate campaign. In this regard, the Chinese 
War Brides Act passed in August 1946 legislation represented more of a direct victory for 
Chinese American activists and community organizations. The law amended the 
Magnuson Act to exempt Chinese alien wives of U.S. citizens and soldiers, a large 
number of whom were Chinese American, from the annual quota.16  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
14 The quota number of 105 was computed based on the formula outlined in section 11(a) of the 1924 
Immigration Act: “The annual immigration quota of any nationality shall be 2 per centum of the number of 
foreign-born individuals of such nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the 
United States Census of 1890, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100.” 
 
15 L. Ling-chi Wang, “Politics of the Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,” Remembering 1882: Fighting 
for Civil Rights in the Shadow of the Chinese Exclusion Act (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of 
America, 1993), 2-3. For more on both of these debates, see Riggs, Chapter 10. 
 
16 H.R. 4844 (1946); Pub.L. 79-713; 60 stat. 975. It was formally titled, “An Act to Place Chinese Wives of 
American Citizens on a Nonquota Basis.” Another law the following year (1947) did away with racial 
restrictions on the admission of alien wives of American citizens altogether. See K. Scott Wong, 
Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 193-197. 
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Establishing Geopolitics as the Language of Repeal  
Washington’s military commitments to China and the Pacific War provided the 
language, but the Citizens Committee and its allies popularized the Magnuson bill’s value 
as an expedient wartime measure necessary to advance Allied victory in Asia. The House 
Immigration Committee hearings on the proposed repeal, which took place over two 
weeks in late May and early June of 1943, exemplified this. Over the weeks prior to the 
House hearing, the Committee’s secretary Geneva Cranston handpicked and personally 
coached witnesses on what points to emphasize and which to avoid in arguing for 
repeal.17 Witnesses strayed little from the Committee-endorsed script, presenting 
variations on the argument that repeal represented an act of wartime diplomacy needed to 
shore up the faltering U.S.-China alliance, blunt the sting of Japanese propaganda attacks 
on the United States, and ultimately ensure Allied victory in the Pacific War against 
Japan.18 These performances meant to maximize impact and neutralize the opposition, 
particularly critics’ anxieties over race.  
The racial climate of early 1940s Washington was unusually tense. Scholars often 
describe World War II as a “watershed” in America’s domestic race relations, but in 
1943, it was a shift still in the making. A. Philip Randolph’s threatened March on 
Washington had forced Roosevelt to act on fair employment practices in 1941, and the 
African American media launched its “double V” campaign for victory against racism at 
home and fascism abroad in the same year. Black-white racial tensions were at their 
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17 For a list of the most and least effective arguments made for Chinese exclusion repeal, see Riggs, 127.  
 
18 See House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts: 
Hearings on H.R. 1882 and H.R. 2309, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, 78-86. 
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height, and Southern Democrats remained on the defensive. On Capitol Hill, 
restrictionists still matched or outnumbered sympathetic lawmakers in key positions 
within the House and Senate immigration committees. The widespread vilification of the 
Japanese enemy counterbalanced wartime approbation for China in 1943. The 
valorization of Chinese and demonization of Japanese had immediate and divergent 
consequences for Chinese and Japanese Americans on the home front. Even as 
Congressional lawmakers debated repeal for Chinese, they staunchly upheld the 
internment of more than 120,000 Japanese Americans – the majority of them U.S. 
citizens – in camps along the West Coast as “enemy aliens” under suspicion of aiding the 
Japanese enemy. The fact that German (and Italian) Americans were not subjected to 
similar treatment underscores the racist nature of U.S. state actions targeting Japanese 
American communities.19  
In an attempt to sidestep racial tensions, the Citizens Committee proactively 
defined the Magnuson bill in terms of U.S. wartime interests and encouraged others to do 
the same. Framing the legislation as a war measure had several immediate advantages. 
First, even the most reluctant Congressional lawmakers felt hard-pressed to deny a 
critical wartime ally during a time when Allied victory on the Pacific front was by no 
means assured.20 Second, the tactic ensured broad appeal, enabling advocates to market 
the cause of repeal to a general American audience beyond China enthusiasts alone; the 
war effort concerned all Americans committed to an Allied victory on the Pacific front, 
and not simply those who cared about the plight of a benighted minority community. 
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19 Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1993), Chapter 2. 
 
20 Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 215. 
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That it framed the debate apart from domestic impact – dodging, as one lawmaker said, 
“the racial question inside the United States” – undeniably presented the tactics’ greatest 
strength.21 The strategy aimed to neutralize the objections of Congressional Southern 
Democrats, who decried repeal’s potential to upset the domestic racial order and 
exacerbate racial unrest at home. By locating the locus for reform in Asia, advocates 
recast domestic questions of race as secondary concerns, less relevant to a discussion that 
emphasized U.S. military and security interests overseas. 
For their part, the House Immigration Committee’s contingent of Southern 
Democrats resisted the characterization of repeal as a war measure and emphasized 
instead the bill’s dire implications at home. Rep. Winstead (D-MS) addressed the Chinese 
bill’s detrimental impact on black-white relations, in particular. He warned that allowing 
more Chinese into the United States would set America back “5 to 10 years” by 
worsening an already “serious” “Negro problem” and otherwise increasing “hatred 
between the races.”22 Rather than buffering tensions between black and white Americans, 
Winstead maintained that increased Chinese immigration would “create hatred between 
the two races” by introducing a third “surly minority on the white side that [would] go out 
and insult any Negro.” As Winstead saw it, as a third-party quasi-white group, Chinese 
immigrants would exacerbate African American militancy by feeding their sense of racial 
oppression. It was a remarkable statement, reflecting Asians’ ambiguous place in a 
domestic racial order still envisioned in biracial terms. Expanding on the connection 
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21 This accusation was also levied by Rep. Elmer (R-MO) against Walter Van Kirk of the Federal Council 
of Churches of Christ in America. Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 121. 
 
22 For an example that references Southern opposition to an antipoll tax, see Repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts, 64-65. 
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between Chinese immigration and the “Negro problem,” Winstead likened the Chinese 
exclusion repeal bills to measures intended to restore voting rights to African Americans, 
several of which were pending in the House; to his mind, both represented attempts by 
“overstepping” federal lawmakers to “force down the Southerners’ throats” laws that 
went beyond their rightful jurisdiction.23 The same coalition of Southern Democrats and 
Western Republicans that protested repeal also opposed civil rights reforms for black 
Americans. 
The opposition’s fixation on domestic race relations created particular pitfalls for 
witnesses with liberal leanings on race. The most famous witness to speak at the hearing, 
Pearl Buck was a controversial figure. Her close ties with the African American 
community reinforced the impression by Allen and other Southerners on the committee 
that the Magnuson Act would upset the racial order in the South by promoting racial 
equality or, worse, integration. Buck’s record of liberal advocacy became a source of 
ammunition for Congressional critics. At one point, Rep. Allen read aloud an excerpt 
from a recent radio program in which the Good Earth author had called for “full and 
complete social equality among Negroes and whites, and all other groups,” and asked her 
to comment. Buck dodged the query by invoking the war, staying true to the Citizens 
Committee’s strategy. Coding her support in the neutral language of geopolitics, she 
maintained that the measure’s impact on the war made her views on domestic race 
relations irrelevant.24  
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23 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, 65, emphasis added.  
 
24 Quoted in Riggs, 236; Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 72-73. 
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Despite her controversial views, as a former missionary born and raised in China, 
Buck’s widely recognized expertise on China and the Far East gave her wide berth during 
the hearing to elaborate on the necessity of repeal to salvage America’s reputation among 
the Chinese, something she did at length. Invoking her forty years of personal experience 
as an “American in China,” Buck testified to the costs of exclusion laws on Chinese 
attitudes toward the United States and the “wall” it had erected between Americans and 
the “kindly Chinese.”25 At a time when few Americans had firsthand knowledge of Asia, 
Buck’s undeniable expertise gave her statements weight.  
The opposition’s objection to setting a racial precedent for repeal continued to 
loom over the debate, however. Congressional critics warned that passing the Magnuson 
Act granting rights to Chinese would prompt demands from other Asian groups for 
similar rights; that is, far from a one-time event, the law would set a precedent for further 
liberalization. Missouri Democrat Rep. A. Leonard Allen emerged as the main 
spokesman for this argument. “If you let one in, you let them all in,” he gloomily 
predicted. Should Congress give rights to the Chinese, he warned, they could expect 
“hundreds of millions of other Asiatics” to “ask for that same thing,” beginning with the 
“400,000,000 Hindus or Indians” living in Asia.26 Over the course of the nine-day 
hearing, Rep. Allen’s tirade against a precedent became a crusade. The lawmaker 
revisited the threat of the Chinese measure inviting an Asian flood into the United States 
no fewer than twenty-five times. He was particularly keen on rooting out witnesses’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
25 Buck grew up in Zhenjiang as the daughter of two Presbyterian missionaries and returned to serve in 
Nanking for nineteen of her adult years. She credited her nineteen years in the rural south of China for 
inspiring The Good Earth (1931), among her other writings about Asia. Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts, 69. 
 
26 Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 21, 26. 
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personal sympathies, seizing upon any hint of support for broader immigration reform 
toward Asia. Toward this end, he questioned witness after witness about their views on 
whether repeal should be expanded to Asians other than the Chinese – Indians, Koreans, 
or any of the other Asian groups that he insisted were “watching” in the hope of winning 
similar demands.27  
Nearer the beginning of the ten-day proceedings, Committee witnesses generally 
sidestepped the issue by denying its relevance or otherwise pleading ignorance. But as the 
hearing progressed, Citizens Committee strategists advised them to adjust their tactics. 
They should either emphasize the nominal nature of the immigration quota, which due to 
its limited size could have only “minimal impact” on American society, or underscore the 
unique merits of China’s wartime case and the necessity of repeal as a one-time act 
needed to bolster a critical but faltering Sino-American alliance. The Citizens 
Committee’s priority on short-term victory led it to emphasize China’s exceptionality 
even though these arguments might damage the prospect of long-term reform. Ultimately, 
the Committee’s efforts to shape the debate notwithstanding, the argument that repeal 
would set a dangerous precedent would prove much harder to neutralize as when Korean 
and Indian American groups did precisely as Allen and other critics predicted. 
 
The Politics of Representation: Race  
At the Citizens Committee’s first meeting in May 1943, Richard Walsh and the 
eleven other members present voted to restrict membership to white U.S. citizens. Wary 
of how Congress would perceive the fledgling organization, they agreed that Congress !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, 72. 
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would be “more impressed” by an organization of “Americans” – that is, white 
Americans – who did not have an “axe to grind.”28  As L. Ling-chi Wang has argued, this 
decision made Chinese Americans “outside observers” to the Committee-led public 
campaign, with a limited role in the public effort.29 In spite of their exclusion from the 
Citizens Committee, Chinese Americans fought for the success of repeal in other ways.30 
They raised awareness of the cause within the Chinese American community through 
writings in Chinese-language newspapers and other forums.31 They also supported the 
goal financially; funds collected by Chinese in Hawaii made up one-fourth of the Citizens 
Committee’s total operating budget.32   
After Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s February 1943 address to Congress spurred 
legislative momentum, other Nationalist Chinese officials living in the United States 
continued to promote repeal. Chinese consulates from Seattle to San Francisco quietly 
lobbied for the legislation through back channels, but largely refrained from public 
statements on the issue.33 Over the spring of 1943, members of the Chinese Embassy in 
Washington worked closely with the Citizens Committee leadership to recruit witnesses 
for Congressional hearings and solicit written endorsements, although both sides !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Quoted in Riggs, Pressures on Congress, 243. Also see Riggs, 56-59.  
 
29 Wang, “Politics of the Repeal,” 4.  
 
30 Wang, 2.  
 
31 Renqiu Yu, "Little Heard Voices: The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and the China Daily News' 
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33 As Meredith Oyen has shown, while “all-American” organizations may have been the public face of the 
“visible, vocal repeal movement” in the U.S., but Chinese consulate reports from sites including Seattle and 
Los Angeles reflect how the Chinese government took a “more activist approach than is normally portrayed 
by historians.” Meredith Oyen, “Allies, Enemies and Aliens: Migration and U.S. Chinese Relations, 1940-
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downplayed the Chinese government’s role. They believed that Congress had enacted 
Japanese exclusion in 1924 in part because of the Japanese government’s attempt to 
influence the vote’s outcome, and this presented a reason to keep the Chinese 
government’s role strictly in the background.  
The witnesses at the House Immigration Committee hearings in the spring of 
1943 did include two Chinese Americans at the Citizens Committee’s request. Fred Yee, 
an electronics engineer for the U.S. War Department, and Dr. Li Min Hin, a medical 
doctor and former commander of the American Legion in Hawaii appeared as paradigms 
of American patriotic service and professional success. Their remarks reflected a specific 
purpose to neutralize common objections to Chinese immigration by proving their ability 
to assimilate and their loyalty to America and the U.S. war effort. Their presence 
highlighted the challenges of self-advocacy and the very narrow parameters within which 
Asian American activists could acceptably make their case, as well as a growing 
awareness of racial novelty’s power at a time when Asian Americans made up only 0.2 
percent of the mainland U.S. population, and it was commonplace for many white 
Americans never to have seen an Asian face firsthand.34 Later repeal campaigns would 
evidence an understanding of these challenges.  
Yee and Li may have played the role of patriotic Americans well, but their 
undifferentiated patriotism reflected an understanding of American identity that left little 
space for a Chinese identity. A third-generation Chinese American, Yee notably began 
his testimony by disavowing personal association with any Chinese organization, and 
underscoring how he was not there to speak for any particular group. He then went on to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reaffirm his U.S. citizenship status in spite of what he called his “Chinese” features. 
Using the language of wartime patriotism, Yee described how, far from coolies, Chinese 
“specialists” like himself were using their “special faculties” to advance American 
victory to a degree “unequaled by any other nationality.”35 
Li offered a similarly simple understanding of American identity devoid of 
hyphenates. Like Yee, he downplayed his Chinese-ness, claiming that as a lifelong 
resident of Hawaii, he no longer felt “conscious” of his Chinese roots. Claiming to speak 
not only for himself but other Chinese Americans like him, he insisted on his single-
minded commitment to the United States.  “The only home we have is America,” he 
asserted. “What else is there to fight for?”36 Dr. Li went on to cite the Hawaii Chinese 
community as proof of Chinese people’s ability and eagerness to become American and 
contribute to the home front. With help from territorial delegate and House immigration 
committee member Joseph Farrington, he described the success that persons of Chinese 
descent in Hawaii had achieved in state and local government, the military, and the 
islands’ economy. In doing so, he suggested a color-blind understanding of American 
patriotism that did not differentiate on the grounds of color or race.  
But race did matter, and not simply as an obstacle to overcome. In a remarkable 
statement, Yee offered himself to House Committee lawmakers as an example or 
specimen of a successfully assimilated American of Chinese descent. Noting how “not all 
Americans have met, or are acquainted with an American Chinese who is actually living 
here and who has become assimilated,” he said candidly, “I like to be here just to show !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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you.”37 Yee’s embrace of his role as a representative for his fellow Chinese in America 
suggested an awareness of the power he potentially commanded as a pioneer within 
Washington circles, where many officials and lawmakers had never seen, much less 
interacted with an Asian American, particularly one that claimed U.S. citizenship and 
spoke English fluently. The challenge, which he would share with Asian Americans 
involved in subsequent campaigns, was how to translate this novelty into political 
influence.  
 
The Politics of Representation: Religion 
The language of geopolitics served a different but equally valuable function for 
the Magnuson bill’s many religious, and specifically missionary, supporters. Missionaries 
had long represented a significant force in immigration advocacy, and their prominence 
in the 1943 campaign continued in the same tradition. Among the forty-two witnesses to 
speak at the House Committee hearings, no fewer than seven had been missionaries to 
China or close family members of missionaries. As a group, they represented more than 
eighty years of religious service in China.38 Author Pearl Buck was arguably the most 
famous, while U.S. Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota was the most important 
missionary mainstay in the longer movement for Asian exclusion repeal. 
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* * * * * 
World War II brought mixed opportunities for Protestant missionaries and those 
with close missionary ties. On the one hand, American policymakers again turned to 
current and former missionaries to Asia as a source of much-needed intelligence and 
valuable eyewitness accounts to inform their wartime policymaking, while discouraging 
them from prescribing or promoting specific policies. Within the overwhelmingly secular 
and pluralistic climate of Washington and elite foreign policy circles, however, 
missionary credentials could hurt as much or more than they helped. As church historian 
Robert Handy has written, the “American religious depression” of the interwar years 
created a culture where the “rhetoric of a Christian America” was firmly “out of place” 
by the early 1940s.39 According to historian Paul Varg, “increasing apathy among laity,” 
“growing uncertainty in the realm of religious beliefs,” and above all, a “mounting 
hostility among intellectuals toward missionary work” marked the decline.40 Scholars and 
liberal writers used periodicals like Harper’s and Atlantic Monthly as vehicles to assail 
the traditional missionary project of world evangelization as not only foolish but inimical 
to other world cultures.41 Highly publicized events such as the Scopes trial (1925), fueled 
a “climate of opinion” in which the American missionary community had become a 
common target of ridicule, “satire and lampooning” by playwrights, pundits, and others.42 
Most commonly, critics accused missionaries of being out of touch, overly sentimental, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and, most damning during a time of war, unpatriotic with divided national loyalties. 
During World War II, missionary advocates seeking repeal adopted geopolitics as an 
unsentimental and patriotic language that would negate criticisms of missionaries.  
 
Walter Judd: A Missionary’s Dilemma 
Rep. Walter Judd (R-MN) came to Washington, DC, in 1942 after spending 
nearly ten years as a medical missionary in rural China.43 His experiences serving the 
rural populations of inland China informed a fervent and life-long commitment to China. 
They also animated his twenty years of advocacy for U.S. immigration and naturalization 
reform toward Asia. Two main forces shaped Judd’s missionary service: first, his 
Midwestern Congregationalist upbringing; second, his post-college work with the Student 
Volunteer Movement of Foreign Missions (SVMFM) during the 1920s. Exposed to 
missionaries from the time he was a child, Judd felt the call to service during his junior 
year of college. He went abroad after medical school in order to serve the physical as 
well as the spiritual needs of the peoples in his mission field.44 As a traveling secretary 
for the SVMFM in 1924-1925, Judd came under the influence of leader John Mott and 
his view of “Christian missions” as the “great and true internationalism.” Like many 
others of his generation, he had found the vision Mott described of a “missionary 
statesmanship,” which cast individual student volunteers as “ambassadors, interpreters, 
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and mediators in the most vital aspects of international and inter-racial relationships,” 
inspiring.45  
As a medical missionary in the Chinese countryside, Judd witnessed the human 
impact of Japanese expansionism on the Chinese people firsthand; in his telling, these 
experiences drove his personal crusade against Japanese aggression upon returning to the 
United States in 1938. Escalating violence and repeated bouts with malaria were the main 
factors that forced Judd to leave China. But he also cited his growing conviction that he 
“could do China more good” from America, and “in the Congress of the United States 
[more] than anywhere else.”! Well-received appearances before the House and Senate 
Committees on Foreign Affairs in 1939 raised his profile in Washington and in the media 
at large as an expert on Far Eastern affairs.46 In the wake of Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Judd parlayed his growing reputation for foreign policy expertise into a 
Congressional seat representing Minnesota in the U.S. House of Representatives.47   
From the time he took office in early 1943, Judd sought the repeal of all Asian 
exclusion laws. In private correspondence with likeminded colleagues, he frequently 
cited his desire for repeal as the reason he pursued office in the first place. He wrote 
bluntly to A.I. Ludlow, a prominent American medical missionary to Korea.  
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One of the things that was most important in influencing my decision to leave 
medicine and go into politics was the hope that sometime during the next two 
years I could help get through legislation that will remove the stupid and insulting 
immigration measures which stigmatizes all non-Caucasians as hopelessly inferior 
peoples.48  
 
Yet Judd knew that missionary ties could evoke public skepticism in Washington. 
He often worried that including too many missionaries in the public campaign would 
discredit the cause as a religious or moral crusade driven by the “starry-eyed idealism” of 
“sentimental and impractical” missionaries.49 In another letter to a colleague, Judd 
expressed concern that his “close identity for many years with the Chinese might give 
some opponents the weapon of saying that ‘Judd was more interested in China than in 
America.’”50 
Judd’s own constituents dismissed his work in precisely this way. In a letter, U.S. 
veteran Major Jones described repeal as an ill-timed distraction from the real concerns of 
war, which as a military man, he felt obliged to protest. While he thanked Judd for the 
“good work” he had done in Asia, Jones chided the Minnesota representative now to “do 
some of that same good for the people of your own country,” – taking exactly the line of 
questioning Judd’s loyalty that he feared opponents might. The Chinese could wait, Jones 
insisted, and Judd – with his firsthand “knowledge of the giney [sic] pig tendencies of the 
oriental peoples” – should know that.51 Lulu Avery of St. Paul, Minnesota, issued a more 
personal attack on the grounds that the lawmaker had not only spent ten years in China, 
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but had married an Australian.52 “Where is our American Congress?” she demanded. 
Citing Judd’s highly cosmopolitan resumé, she lamented that her district had been fooled 
into electing a “United Nations’ representative” they could not possibly expect to 
represent the interests of patriotic Americans like herself.53 
Judd focused on building his reputation as an authoritative voice on East Asian 
affairs. A review of his early speeches in the House suggests how Judd skillfully turned 
his years of missionary service in China into a qualification for, rather than a liability to, 
his political efficacy in Washington. In his first major address on the House floor in 
February 1943, he laid out the qualifications of Americans like himself with firsthand 
experience in Asia to speak on U.S. foreign policy issues. According to Judd, only 
Americans who had spent time in the Far East and “knew something of the psychology of 
the peoples who live there” could offer knowledge beyond the limited information in 
“Department of Commerce reports” and “the World Almanac”; he could offer, he argued, 
an understanding of what Asian peoples “really want, what they feel, what they are 
after.” He presented himself as an expert: “it is only because of such a background that I 
presume to stand before you . . . [and] discuss our situation in the Pacific exactly as a 
doctor studies the body of a patient at the autopsy table.” His prognosis: America’s 
relations with Asian powers could improve through “true understanding” and 
“knowledge.”54 House members responded to his words with a standing ovation.55  
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Judd extended the medical imagery a few weeks later in a second speech on the 
House floor. In an early expression of the logic that would underpin American 
containment policy in the Cold War, Judd called for a “biopsy” to root out the 
expansionist Japanese in Asia. Likening the Japanese enemy to a cancerous growth, he 
cited the danger of letting such a thing grow unchecked; appeasement was a “mistake” 
Americans should “learn from” and “not make . . . again.” “If they are lawless, we do not 
need to examine the rest,” he argued. “We know the whole thing is vicious and we care 
not temporize.” The next time “lawlessness breaks out anywhere in the world,” he 
therefore concluded, “Americans, in their own self-interest, must see that it is checked 
early, because if we do not check it early by preventive means, as was possible in the 
case of Japan, then we have no other means ultimately except rivers of American 
blood.”56 House Speaker John McCormack received his words with much enthusiasm; 
from across party lines, the Democratic Congressman hailed Judd’s “great contribution” 
as “having taken away the mist from [his] eyes,” revealing America’s interwar practices 
of neutrality and appeasement as “an inverted warlike policy” that had helped pave the 
way for the “tremendous catastrophe” of World War II.57 American media outlets, 
including liberal ones that typically did not endorse Republicans like Judd, joined the 
applause. That same month, The Nation’s Richard Rovere declared the Minnesotan as 
one of “eight hopeful Congressmen” to watch.58  
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By the time Judd addressed the House Immigration Committee at the repeal 
hearings in May 1943, he had an established reputation as an expert on East Asian affairs. 
His statement played a decisive role. In testimony that ran over twenty-five pages in the 
transcript, Judd explained that America could use U.S. immigration policy as a tool of 
diplomacy not only to further Allied victory in the Pacific but, in the longer term, to 
resolve America’s race problems in Asia and secure America’s place in the hearts of 
Asian peoples as a whole.59 According to Judd, achieving U.S. aims in Asia required 
immigration legislation. If, as he maintained, the Asian exclusion acts in 1924 had been a 
“major reason” for America’s current war with Japan, and Japan’s 1939 invasion of 
China had been, in turn, a “first step” in Tokyo’s plan to “get vengeance on America” as 
payback for its “racial humiliation of her,” then – according to Judd – preserving China’s 
friendship was the only way to stop the race war between the “white and colored races” 
that now raged in the Pacific.60  
As Judd explained it, both principle and practice prompted repeal, and the two 
rationales did not have to be at odds. “We ought to do it out of a sense of decency and 
brotherhood,” he maintained, “but if we are not that far advanced in our civilization then 
we ought to do it out of a decent instinct of self-preservation.”61 Rather than “try and 
bribe Orientals to go along with us” with “huge appropriations,” Americans should 
recognize that repeal offered the “most effective” and “cheapest” way to “gain Asians’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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favor.”62 He concluded: “The cynics always say that is idealism, but as a matter of fact, 
history is providing that those who imagined America could live by herself were the 
unrealistic dreamers, whereas our position was and is the practical one if we really want 
peace.”63 An exchange at the spring House hearing revealed how the debate over repeal 
became a proxy for more fundamental disagreement between isolationist and 
internationalist worldviews. Judd’s assertion that “America cannot live by herself alone” 
evoked a quick retort from Rep. Elmer (D-MO) to the contrary. “Yes, we can,” the 
Southern lawmaker protested. “We have, for 150 years, and have made a pretty good 
success at it.”64 Elmer’s response notwithstanding, Judd’s overwhelmingly positive 
reception among House lawmakers testified to his reputation, which leveraged his 
knowledge of Asia during a time when experts were few and hard to find.65 
Public skepticism toward religion notwithstanding, missionaries had acted as 
advisors to U.S. military and intelligence officials as valuable sources of information on 
Asian affairs since at least World War I. Minimal American scholarship on China, Japan, 
and East Asian affairs, coupled with scant coverage by major media outlets, left 
American military and political officials with limited information on the region. Few 
Americans had spent significant time in Asia, so missionaries – mostly Protestant – filled 
a vacuum. The writings and accounts of missionaries – who generally fit the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dominant socio-religious Anglo-Saxon Protestant mold – had long provided information 
to guide U.S. foreign policy decisions.66 The deficit in American scholarship persisted in 
the 1940s, and World War II marked the first time that the United States formally fought 
in the Pacific. Judd’s seeking and holding elected office distinguished him from other 
missionaries, who had shied away from the overtly political, however.67  
Additional factors strengthened the importance of missionary influence in the 
campaign for Chinese exclusion repeal. Although their numbers remained small, 
missionary supporters included some of the most prominent and well-connected figures 
in publishing and media. As three of the most influential writer-publishers of the time, 
Henry Luce, Pearl Buck, and Buck’s husband Richard Walsh exemplified the power of a 
few well-placed individuals with missionary ties to make the difference in public 
reception to a cause. Together they used their influence to draw public attention to the 
Chinese exclusion repeal cause. Changes within American Protestantism also bolstered 
the level of faith-based activism for repeal. The overall decline of Protestantism during 
the interwar years coincided with the splintering of the American Christian community 
and the growing popularity of ecumenicalism as an alternative to evangelicalism and the 
traditional conversion-centered missionary project.68 For the purposes of the repeal 
campaigns, the ecumenical movement’s emphasis on social progress, world unity, and 
racial equality dovetailed neatly with the effort to rid U.S. immigration policy of race-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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based discrimination. This confluence explains, in part, the repeal movement’s wide 
appeal among liberal and ecumenical Protestants and organizations like the Federal 
Council of Churches, as well as American missions organizations.69  
That repeal could bring together missionary figures as diverse as Pearl Buck, 
Henry Luce, and Walter Judd testified to its wide appeal across the political spectrum. 
While Judd first went to China as an adult, both Buck and Luce grew up in China as the 
children of American Presbyterian missionaries. After finishing college in the U.S., Buck 
returned to rural China as a missionary, serving alongside her first husband, another 
Presbyterian missionary, for nineteen years (1914-1931). It was during this time that she 
wrote the Good Earth (1931), a book that, in the words of historian Harold Isaacs, 
“‘created’ the Chinese . . . for a whole generation of Americans.”70 While her relationship 
with the missionary community and views on the evangelical missions project itself 
changed dramatically after 1931, her time spent living among and serving the Chinese 
people continued to animate her advocacy on behalf of Asia and its peoples until her 
death in 1973. Henry Robinson Luce, the co-founder and president of Time-Life Inc., also 
spent much of his childhood in China as the son of American Presbyterian missionaries. 
A lifelong and sometimes controversial crusader for American involvement in Asia, Luce 
unabashedly used his highly influential publications as a “secular pulpit” to preach the 
“virtues of American engagement in Asia,” and especially to rally U.S. support for 
Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) government in China.71 Although co-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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lobbyists in the campaigns for repeal, the three missionary figures sharply diverged in 
their visions for American engagement with Asia during the Cold War. Buck, for her 
part, drew upon her years as an educational missionary in rural China to develop a 
gendered critique of U.S. interventionism in Asia as another form of Western 
imperialism.72 Staunch anti-Communists, Judd and Luce mobilized their substantial 
influence and connections in U.S. government and media circles in support of Chiang 
Kai-shek and the KMT. As founding members of the China Lobby, they championed 
U.S. intervention whenever and wherever Communist forces threatened Asian 
democracy.  
 
Toward Broad-Based Repeal   
Restrictionists’ main argument against passage of the Magnuson bill – namely, 
that it would set a precedent for other Asian groups – turned out to be prescient. And the 
agitation came sooner than expected. Even before the Magnuson bill reached the floors of 
Congress for a full vote in the fall of 1943, Korean and Indian Americans initiated efforts 
to secure similar legislative gains. They were discreet at first. While the Chinese bill 
remained in contention, they limited their petitions to personal correspondence and other 
private channels. But their efforts behind the scenes of the Magnuson lobby set the stage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for highly visible campaigns, which members of both communities and their allies 
launched in earnest the following year.  
* * * * * 
News of the Chinese repeal measure ignited a flurry of discussion in more than 
one Indian American group over the prospect of a similar bill for Indians. In the wake of 
Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s February 1943 Congressional address, the New York-based 
India Welfare League seized upon growing momentum for Chinese relief to revive its 
petitions for greater Indian rights. Welfare League president Mubarek Ali Khan 
approached Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles for the State Department’s help in 
securing citizenship for long-time Indian residents of the United States. When Welles 
demurred, on the grounds that Congress determined naturalization policy, not the 
executive branch, Khan turned to Welles’ colleague, Cordell Hull for assistance.73 While 
he called the Magnuson bill an “act of justice,” the Indian leader protested that in making 
an exception of China the bill “split the unity of the Chinese and Indian peoples” during a 
time when Allied military operations in Asia depended on their cooperation. This gave 
Indian and Japanese critics fodder to allege American favoritism for “China over India,” 
a charge potentially detrimental to the U.S.-Indian relationship.74 In the meantime, Khan 
appealed to Congressional lawmakers directly on behalf of his organization’s more 
limited measure. Employing an ambitious letter-writing campaign, he put the Welfare 
League’s demands in the hand of every member of the House and Senate. In this he won 
the support of a new Congressional sponsor, Senator William Langer of North Dakota !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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(D-ND), who reintroduced a previously unsuccessful bill for Indian citizenship on their 
behalf later that year.  
Half a world away on the Asian subcontinent, news of the Magnuson bill stirred 
resentment among members of the Indian National Congress and the British Colonial 
Government in Delhi at America’s apparent slight favoring China over its Indian ally. In 
June 1943, Indian Agent-General Sir Girja Bajpai, the Government of India’s official 
representative attached to the British Embassy in Washington, approached Assistant U.S. 
Secretary of State Adolph Berle to inquire about the possibility of a bill for Indians in the 
Magnuson Act’s mold to affirm India’s “equality with the Chinese.” As Bajpai reported 
back to Delhi, U.S. officials had received the proposal favorably, although Berle advised 
waiting until the Chinese bill had passed before taking action on an Indian one. The 
Agent-General unabashedly spelled out the value of a strategy in which Indians 
capitalized on American approbation for the Chinese to win collateral gains for India; if 
Indians could win similar gains “by skillfully riding the high tide of American 
Sinophilism, he maintained, “so much the better.”75 
Similar attempts by Korean Americans met with less enthusiasm. In the weeks 
leading up to the House Committee hearings on Chinese repeal, Kilsoo Haan of Hawaii 
pled with Rep. Warren Magnuson (D-WA), the bill’s sponsor in the House, to introduce 
an amendment to the legislation that named Koreans the co-beneficiaries of immigration 
quotas and citizenship eligibility. Haan argued that China and Korea’s military 
partnership against Japan and Korea’s long history of enmity with Japan, which had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Agent-General Bajpai to O.K. Caroe, Secretary of Indian External Affairs Department, June 10, 1943, 
File 379-X/43, Department of External Affairs, Indian National Archives, Delhi, India. For further 
discussion of Indians’ use of this strategy, see Chapter 2. 
 ! 73 
lasted “more than three and one-half centuries,” called for the measure. As Japan’s 
“number one enemy,” Koreans deserved whatever form of relief the United States could 
provide.76 Already anticipating a difficult legislative battle, Magnuson’s office gave no 
reply. As Chapter Three explores in greater depth, several factors complicated Korea’s 
cause. The Sino-Korean military partnership to which Haan alluded was real, but 
cooperation was informal and limited. Relative to the central role played by the Chinese 
military, which bore the brunt of Allied casualties on the Pacific front, U.S. policymakers 
estimated Korea’s military value to the war as minimal at best.77 Moreover, unlike 
Indians, Korean Americans lacked a friendly colonial government advocating on their 
behalf. As a Japanese colony, Korea was technically under enemy rule. For many 
Washington lawmakers, this made diplomatic intervention or negotiation with anyone 
claiming to represent Korea or the Korean people impossible so long as the war 
continued.  
Kilsoo Haan, speaking for the Hawaii-based Sino-Korean People’s League 
(SKPL), joined long-time U.S. resident and Indian scholar Dr. Taraknath Das to testify in 
support of the Magnuson bill at the Spring House Committee hearings. As the only non-
Chinese witnesses of Asian descent to address the House Immigration Committee, at 
least rhetorically, they were the two speakers best positioned to assuage Southern 
lawmakers’ fears that the Magnuson bill would set a precedent for other Asian groups. 
All they had to do was reassure lawmakers that their communities had no plans to renew !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Haan to Warren Magnuson, April 30, 1943, Box 1, Folder 33, Kilsoo Haan papers, University of 
California-Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA.  
 
77 The Japanese prohibition against firearm ownership effectively precluded any real potential for an 
internal uprising. The scarcity of American resources led officials like Assistant Secretary of State Kermit 
Roosevelt, Jr. to argue as early as 1942 that priority should be given to China, which could, in turn, allocate 
some of its aid to Korean military units under Chinese command. Timothy L. Savage, “The American 
Response to the Korean Independence Movement, 1910-1945,” Korean Studies 20-21 (1996), 215. 
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or launch similar campaigns of their own, regardless of whether that was actually true. 
Haan generally complied. But Das – who two decades earlier, had sued the government 
for U.S. citizenship – did not. Not surprisingly, their remarks elicited very different 
reactions from the House lawmakers present. 
Haan disavowed personal investment in the cause to present a more neutral war-
centered case for repeal. He began his statement by clarifying that he did not appear on 
behalf of “Korea or the Koreans,” but rather, out of a desire to “save as many lives of 
Americans as possible” in the war against Japan. Echoing the Citizens Committee line, he 
called on lawmakers to consider repeal “purely as a war measure” and not “a domestic 
immigration question”; winning the war, he stressed repeatedly, was the “first 
consideration.” When a committee member asked him whether Koreans would seize 
upon a Chinese bill to make similar demands, he avoided a direct response, denying the 
charge implicitly by reiterating the exceptionality of China’s case. When a member asked 
him whether he believed Indians should receive a similar bill, Haan likewise sidestepped; 
describing the future of the subcontinent and its people as a matter unrelated to America’s 
“conduct of the war,” he maintained that it was “a problem in which England must say 
more than we.”78 Insofar as he focused his comments on the war in Asia, Haan’s 
statement passed without major comment.  
Haan’s history of anti-Japanese warnings gained the favor of lawmakers, who saw 
his Korean identity as a source of special insight. The SKPL spokesman notably claimed 
wartime loyalty to America in a way that explicitly disavowed the relevance of his 
Korean heritage, even as it invoked unique advantages of his Korean-ness that made him 
an asset to American policymakers. In citing special knowledge of Japanese plots !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, 133, 136, 140. 
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purportedly obtained by his network of informants, Haan presented his Korean identity as 
a badge that gave him access to networks of intelligence beyond the reach of white 
American officials. He described global schemes by Tokyo to expand Japanese influence 
across Asia and America. He recounted an official “Japanization” program to inter-marry 
150,000 Japanese women to grooms across Southeast Asia, as well as a secret peace 
proposal sent by Tokyo to Chungking pledging a return of China’s former territories and 
a lend-lease aid program in exchange for China’s withdrawal from the United Nations. 
The latter report would have raised alarm at a time when the Sino-American alliance 
remained strained. Within the U.S., Haan cited ongoing efforts by Tokyo to mobilize a 
“Jap occupation army” that employed “Jap-Americans [who] know the Pacific coast only 
too well.” He described the force, which was eventually to take over the West Coast 
United States, as comprising “10,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry, born in 
Hawaii and America” and “2,000 Japanese born in Japan but who grew up and were 
educated” in America. A year and a half after the Pearl Harbor attack, Haan’s positive 
reception by the House committee’s staunchest opponent of repeal as the “the man who 
tipped [Congress] off on Pearl Harbor” testified to lawmakers’ anti-Japanese sentiment.79 
It also suggested how antipathy for the Japanese could serve as common ground for 
supporters and critics of repeal alike. 
If Haan lessened lawmakers’ concerns about precedent, the Indian witness, Dr. 
Das, amplified them. He openly argued that repeal should benefit other Asian groups, 
including the Indian community. Das used the hearing as a platform to admonish white 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 133-134, 136. On Japanese American internment, see Daniels, 
Prisoners Without Trial; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans 
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), 379-406; Brian Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The 
Japanese American Internment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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Americans, and U.S. government officials in particular, for what he described as their 
“unholy attitude” of white superiority and “Nazi-like race prejudice against the peoples of 
the Orient.” So long as Anglo-American powers continued to practice this discrimination 
against Asian peoples, he warned, the “vast majority” of Asians have no “genuine 
confidence” in Western “professions of…world democracy and world brotherhood.”80 
Das’ frank statement elicited a harsh response from the committee’s Southern Democrats. 
An indignant Rep. Allen protested that an “Oriental…born thousands of miles away” 
could not come before Congress and “criticize [the U.S.] country and courts.” Das 
attempted to conciliate by affirming the “debt” that he owed America. As a long-time 
resident of New York City and professor at a public university, he noted he could not 
repay the United States “even by giving [his] life for this country.” But his words came 
too late. In overall effect, Allen likely congratulated Das accurately for having done the 
cause of repeal “more harm than anybody else.”81 Das’ reception reflects the very narrow 
grounds upon which Asian Americans could advocate for themselves, and the real 
consequences of the decision to cross the line separating acceptable petition from 
unacceptable critique. It not only diminished the chances of legislative success but 
unleashed nativist sentiments. 
* * * * * * 
After the Spring 1943 hearing failed to bring any immediate action by the House, 
the Citizens Committee launched an ambitious publicity and media offensive that 
summer to build momentum for the Magnuson bill going into the fall Congressional term. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
80 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, 35-36. 
 
81 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, 40-41. 
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The group’s efforts received a great boost with the endorsement of the Roosevelt White 
House and the U.S. State Department that October. In his letter of support, the President 
described exclusion as a “historic mistake” and called on Congressional lawmakers to 
pass the Magnuson bill for the “cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure 
peace.”82 Congressional lawmakers complied, resigned to accept, even if not actively 
support, the measure. President Roosevelt signed the bill into law on December 17, 1943. 
Confirming its critics’ worst fears, the passage of the Magnuson bill ushered a 
flurry of legislation proposing similar legal gains for other excluded Asian groups. No 
longer compelled to be discreet, Indian and Korean American advocates began lobbying 
openly on behalf of their communities. Encouraged by the Chinese victory to envision 
success, community representatives including Mubarek Ali Khan, Kilsoo Haan, and 
others looked to the tactics and strategies modeled by the Citizens Committee to Repeal 
Chinese Exclusion to guide their own efforts. But the Citizens Committee’s 
discouragement of conspicuous involvement by Chinese and other Asian Americans, 
offered little guidance. Moreover, as Indian and Korean Americans and their allies sought 
to adapt the language of geopolitics to make their case, fundamental differences 
distinguishing India and Korea from China soon became apparent. Chief among these 
was the problem of colonialism. 
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82 Quoted in Oyen, 89. For more on the role of the White House in the campaign, see Karen Leong, 
“Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Citizenship: The Roosevelt White House and the Expediency of 
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Part II 
 
The Colonial Cases:  
Repeal as an Anti-Colonial Imperative, 1943-1946 
 
If concerns associated with the Sino-American alliance facilitated the successful 
repeal of Chinese exclusion, pressures related to imminent decolonization in Asia drove 
the next episode of Asian exclusion repeal between 1944 and 1946. Enacted in July 1946, 
the Luce-Celler Act granted immigration and naturalization rights to Indians and 
Filipinos upon the national independence of their homelands.1 While at least one scholar 
has described the act as a “sequel” to Chinese Exclusion repeal, the problem of 
colonialism made the legislation fundamentally different in kind from the Chinese 
measure that preceded it.2 Not simply a matter of negotiation between sovereign states, 
repeal campaigns for Asian colonial groups became embedded within anti-colonial 
struggles for homeland independence, with ramifications that went beyond the fight for 
domestic inclusion alone.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In July 1946, the Indian legislation was combined with a Filipino naturalization bill due to a technicality. 
The Filipino bill made all natives of the Philippines eligible for U.S. citizenship upon the islands’ 
independence on July 4. Many Washington observers described the merging of the two measures as fitting 
insofar as both stemmed from a common desire by Washington to affirm America’s commitment to the 
self-determination of Asian peoples. The U.S. Congress quietly extended natives of Pakistan the same 
eligibility to immigrate and naturalize upon the nation’s creation in 1947. 
 
2 Fred Riggs, Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King’s 
Crown Press, 1950), 41. As a U.S. territory and, later, protectorate, the Philippines never came under 
exclusion in the same way as other Asian powers. Moreover, because of their special status as American 
“nationals,” Filipinos followed a different path to U.S. citizenship eligibility. Due to these essential 
differences, this study does not treat Filipinos at length, although Washington’s granting of Philippines 
independence in 1946 marks an important moment in the U.S. relationship to Asian decolonization. For 
more on the racial politics of Philippines independence, see Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, 
Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 
Chapter 6.  
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The Problem of Colonialism Within Asian American History 
Colonialism left a lasting imprint on migrant communities in America, and Asian 
colonial groups were no exception. According to historian Sucheng Chan, immigrants 
from colonized lands differed from their sovereign counterparts in at least two key 
respects. First, their “nationalist concerns for the homeland” helped “preserve their ethnic 
identity” to a greater extent than for other, non-colonized immigrant groups. They 
expressed their persistent ties to the Old World, in part, by remaining active in anti-
colonial movements for their homelands’ independence. Second, they were “more likely 
to be mistreated than those from sovereign nations because they do not have a homeland 
government to defend their interests.”3 Asian colonial groups in the United States 
experienced these disadvantages with particular acuteness, and their racial ineligibility to 
naturalize as U.S. citizens intensified the defenseless that accompanied their repudiation 
of colonial subjecthood. European colonials, who only had to wait a few years to apply 
for American citizenship, experienced only temporary disenfranchisement in contrast to 
the permanent plight of Asian colonials.  
The fight for homeland independence defined the community-based activism and 
politics of Indian and Korean Americans in a way that fundamentally distinguished their 
struggles for rights from those of Chinese and Japanese Americans. Unlike their 
sovereign counterparts, Asian colonial groups came to the cause of repeal with decades of 
experience in lobbying Washington on behalf of their homelands. Not only did this give 
them an added level of familiarity with both the limits and possibilities of the American 
political system, these previous experiences gave their activism a different political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Sucheng Chan, “European and Asian Immigration into the United States in Comparative Perspective, 
1820s to 1920s,” in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed., Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 39. 
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valence, raising the stakes of the legal rights for which they fought. More than simply a 
matter of incorporation into America, colonial advocates maintained that the extension of 
immigration and naturalization rights to Indians and Koreans would reaffirm 
Washington’s professed commitment to Asian powers on the verge of independence and 
to the principle of self-determination on the international stage. Furthermore, as one of 
the world’s preeminent powers, America’s recognition of Indians and Koreans would 
bring prestige and uphold the sovereignty of two historically oppressed peoples.  
A symbiotic relationship developed between the goals of repeal and homeland 
independence during World War II and the immediate postwar years. On the one hand, 
the issue of repeal offered Asian colonial groups in the United States a platform from 
which to renew attention to the plight of their colonized homelands and escalate calls for 
Washington’s assistance to advance their compatriots’ struggles for independence. On the 
other hand, diasporic involvement in anti-colonial independence movements laid an 
organizational infrastructure that supporters of repeal remobilized in service of their 
cause. Within both communities, groups originally formed to support the cause of 
homeland independence became prime vehicles of activism for repeal. 
 
Bridging Asian and Asian American Freedom Struggles 
To bring the story of exclusion repeal for colonial groups into the same 
framework of analysis as anti-colonial independence struggles changes the way we think 
about Asian American activism for repeal as more than a linear pursuit of inclusion or 
incorporation. Rather, the approach situates the colonial campaigns as part of what 
Thomas Borstelmann has called the twentieth-century’s “global movement toward racial 
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equality and self-determination.” According to Borstelmann, the “African and African 
American freedom movements encouraged and reinforced each other” in various ways. I 
argue that a similar dynamic applied to the Asian and Asian American freedom 
movements during the same period.4 
Existing literature frequently poses the pre-1965 Asian American struggle for 
U.S. citizenship as an exemplar of the American immigrant paradigm, in which reformers 
and immigrants themselves seek citizenship and incorporation into the nation.5 While 
scholars have nuanced the forms that this incorporation may take, they generally envision 
the trajectory for Asian American activism within this schema as one oriented, uni-
directionally if not uninterruptedly, toward U.S. citizenship and all of its associated 
benefits as the desired end.6 The Indian and Korean repeal campaigns of the mid-1940s 
unsettle this understanding. Describing American citizenship as an instrumental 
achievement, they suggest how, for many Asian colonial advocates in America, the effort 
to secure legal recognition from the U.S. government became embedded in and structured 
by a set of transnational discourses and political projects.  
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4 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1, 5. 
 
5 To be clear, this was the express goal of many early scholars writing on Asian immigration to the United 
States. Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1995); 
Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1998); H. Brett Melendy, Asians in America: Filipinos, Koreans, and East Indians (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1977). For a more recent and specific example, see K. Scott Wong, Americans First: 
Chinese Americans and the Second World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). Chinese and 
Japanese Americans were distinct cases. The major factors that distinguished them from Indians, Koreans, 
and Filipinos included the much larger size of their communities, their longer migration history to the 
United States, and as this discussion highlights, the sovereign status of their homelands before World War 
II.  
 
6 Joan Jensen, the most prolific historian of Indians in America, has also expressed this view, even 
suggesting that the existence of these legal restrictions encouraged Indians’ permanent U.S. settlement in 
ethnic enclaves. Joan Jensen, Passage from India: Asian Indian Immigrants in North America (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 270. 
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*  *  *  *  * 
The chapters in this section explore how Indian and Korean Americans and their 
allies played on U.S. officials’ anxieties regarding imminent decolonization to push for 
repeal. Advocates argued that the passage of repeal measures would invite the loyalties of 
the soon-to-be independent peoples of India and Korea to the United States and uphold 
America’s claims to support the self-determination of all peoples, as reflected in the 
Atlantic Charter. But the specter of Asian independence proved a precarious basis for 
reform. As the two cases demonstrate, in the lobby for rights, colonial status could 
alternately help or hinder legislative progress, and legislative success was ultimately tied 
to the resolution of their homeland’s sovereignty. The success of an Indian immigration 
bill in 1946 and the failure of a concurrent Korean measure tracked the divergent paths of 
India and Korea from colony to (formal) independence during and immediately after 
World War II. In the case of legislation for India, the prospect of the subcontinent 
moving toward full independence by 1947 and the logic of anti-colonialism proved 
compelling. By contrast, the protracted failure of a joint Soviet-American occupation to 
agree on the terms of Korean independence and self-government helps explain why a 
measure providing similar gains for Koreans did not pass.  
Chapter 2 ties the success of the Luce-Celler bill ending Indian exclusion in the 
United States to India’s path toward independence from Great Britain. In so doing, it also 
assesses the Luce-Celler campaign in the context of the longer-standing movement for 
Indian independence. Using the case studies of two Indian American organizations, the 
chapter demonstrates how the U.S.-based legislative contest for Indian American rights 
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became an unlikely forum in which the Indian national debate over Pakistan and the 
partition of the subcontinent were rearticulated in a distinctly (Indian) American context.  
Chapter 3 demonstrates the limits of Washington’s professed commitment to self-
determination in the failure of a Korean Immigration and Naturalization Bill (KINB) 
between 1943 and 1946. Presented as a counterpoint to the success of the Indian 
campaign, the KINB lobby speaks to the limits of geopolitics and international pressures 
as compelling drivers for repeal. If the granting of immigration and naturalization rights 
to Indians anticipated the subcontinent’s transition from colony to sovereign nation, the 
vicissitudes of the Korean American campaign for rights tracked the inability of the 
United States and Allied powers to resolve the question of Korean independence during 
and immediately after World War II.  
 
!
Chapter 2 
  
A Tale of Two Leagues:  
Entwining Indian Independence and Immigration Reform 
 
 
In April 1942, J.J. Singh, a Sikh businessman living in New York, wrote Indian 
National Congress (INC) leader Jawaharlal Nehru to offer some advice. He had heard 
that the Indian Congress was considering the selection of a spokesman to rally support for 
the INC’s goal of Indian independence in the United States. Singh wished to share his 
knowledge of Americans, gleaned from sixteen years of living in New York and 
Philadelphia, with the Indian leader. Whoever was chosen as spokesman should not have 
“too dark a complexion,” he cautioned, because of the “Negro problem in this country.” 
If the representative – who should certainly be male – had a wife, she should be “of the 
type who could readily and easily mix with the American social circles” because 
“[w]omen in this country play a vital role.”1 Singh expressed a “burning” desire to 
counteract what he perceived as a pro-British bent in U.S. coverage of India but cited the 
small number of Indians living in America as a hindrance to this goal. Nevertheless, he 
insisted that change was imminent. “I know Americans,” Singh wrote, “They admire 
strength, even in their opponents. India will have to show guts to win admiration and 
understanding in this country. And I feel somehow that the coming mass Civil 
Disobedience movement will prove not only to America, but to the whole world, we have 
the guts.”2  
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1 J.J. Singh to Jawaharlal Nehru, April 10, 1942, J.J. Singh papers, Nehru Museum & Memorial Library 
(NMML), Delhi, India.  
 
2 J.J. Singh to Jawaharlal Nehru, August 4, 1942, NMML, Delhi, India. 
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Nehru had little time to act on Singh’s letter. On August 8, 1942, the All India 
Congress Committee, the central decision-making assembly of the Indian National 
Congress, passed a resolution calling for India’s immediate independence and an orderly 
British withdrawal from the subcontinent. In his Quit India speech later that same day, 
Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi declared the beginning of a non-violent Civil 
Disobedience movement, including non-cooperation with the Allied war effort, in the 
event that the British did not comply. Reprisal came swiftly. Hours later, British 
authorities arrested Nehru, along with Gandhi and the entire Indian National Congress 
working committee, and put them in jail, where most would remain for the duration of 
the war.3 As he later recalled, “something snapped” inside of J.J. Singh when he heard 
the news, and he “vowed not to rest” until Nehru and the other Congress leaders were 
released.4  
Singh made good on his pledge. As president of the India League of America 
(ILA), a New York-based organization created in 1937 “to interpret India and America to 
each other,” J.J. Singh emerged as one of the most prominent voices for Indian 
independence in the United States. His name appeared regularly in the New York Times 
and other American media outlets as an expert on Indian affairs, and in 1944, a writer for 
Time magazine dubbed him a “one-man lobby” for India.5 Under his leadership, the ILA 
became a prominent voice for Indian independence in the United States. Its lavish 
fundraisers and prominent white American advocates attracted both the ire of British !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Nehru remained imprisoned until June 15, 1945. Gandhi was released earlier due to his severe health 
issues.  
 
4 J.J. Singh to Nehru, November 2, 1945, J.J. Singh papers, NMML, Delhi, India. ! 
 
5 The moniker “one-man lobby” was first used in “Mr. Singh Goes to Washington,” Time, February 28, 
1944, 19.!
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officials and the support of a small but dedicated Indian American community to the 
independence of their homeland.  
Using the Citizens Committee’s wartime campaign for Chinese exclusion repeal 
as a model, the ILA publicly took up the fight for an Indian immigration and 
naturalization bill in early 1944. Modeled after the Magnuson Act that repealed Chinese 
exclusion, the Celler bill had two main provisions: an immigration quota for India of 100 
persons per year, and citizenship eligibility for all natives of India.6 Between 1944 and 
1946, J.J. Singh and other supporters of the ILA lobbied for Congressional passage of the 
Celler bill as a symbolic measure instrumental to the ultimate goal of India’s 
independence. If India’s future lay in achieving equal status and recognition in the 
international community, they maintained, an American bill granting Indians nominal 
parity with European peoples under U.S. immigration and naturalization advanced the 
goal of Indian independence as a goodwill gesture affirming the nationalist aspirations of 
Indians everywhere. Writing to J.J. Singh in 1944, ILA supporters Mumtaz Kitchlew and 
Tarani P. Sinha expressed joy at the “great international prestige that will come to our 
people by having lifted from our brows the present stigma [about]!our ineligibility for 
American citizenship.” Such “prestige,” they asserted, would be of “immense value” to 
India’s struggle to secure independence from the British.7  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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7 Mumtaz Kitchlew and Tarani P. Sinha to J.J. Singh, March 9, 1944; quoted in Premdatta Varma, Indian 
Immigrants in USA: Struggle for Equality (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1995), 272. Historian Varma 
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years. Varma, 273.  
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Not all Indians in the United States agreed with the ILA’s emphasis on the 
legislation’s symbolic and global significance. At least not at first. Even as ILA 
supporters hailed the promise of U.S. legislation to advance the diasporic fight for Indian 
independence, members of the India Welfare League, a community relief group also 
based in New York, underscored the immediate material needs of Indians already living 
in the United States, particularly those who considered America to be their permanent 
home.8 Far from representing mere symbolism, Welfare League president Mubarek Ali 
Khan, a Muslim living in New York, protested that the right to U.S. citizenship had 
practical value for thousands of Indian farmers and workers who struggled to secure 
relief as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” In his telling, Indians’ primary need for the 
legislation was pragmatic rather than ideological. The conflict shifted in nature over the 
next few years, as the New York-based Welfare League developed closer ties with Indian 
Muslim leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the India Muslim League headquartered in 
Bombay. Through Khan’s growing collaboration with Jinnah, the Welfare League 
increasingly came to serve as a diasporic arm of the India Muslim League’s religious 
crusade for Pakistan. Drawing from U.S. and Indian sources, this chapter traces the 
transformation of the wartime Indian immigration campaign from an internal conflict 
centered around class difference to a forum where competing visions of Indian 
independence were rearticulated in a U.S. diasporic context. 
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8 Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, To Permit the Naturalization of Approximately Three Thousand 
Natives of India: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Immigration, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, 52-3; 
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A History of Indian Immigration and Independence 
Relative to other Asian groups, Indians had only a brief period of legal migration 
– roughly ten years – before they, too, came under exclusion. Indians began arriving in 
the U.S. in larger numbers after 1908, when the legal restriction of Chinese and Japanese 
workers left West Coast agriculture looking for an alternative source of inexpensive 
labor.9 As the population grew, peaking at 6,000 during World War I, Indians 
increasingly became a target of West Coast exclusionists who lamented the threat posed 
by the “tide of turbans” to American society; among the most common grievances were 
that Indian workers displaced white labor and resisted assimilation into American 
society.10 Indian farmers in California, who made up the largest U.S. Indian community, 
bore the brunt of the harrasment. With the restriction of Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans 
now successfully complete, the San Francisco-based Asiatic Exclusion League (formerly 
the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League) joined with California officials and local 
media to stop the “tide of turbans” flowing into the U.S. West Coast. They found little 
support in Washington, however. Before World War I, East Coast lawmakers were more 
interested in limiting the entry of the less desirable eastern and southern peoples of 
Europe than they were in the “Oriental problem.”  
This changed with the rise of revolutionary activity among Indians in America 
during World War I. Probably the best-known episode in Indian American history, the 
“Hindu-German Conspiracy” of 1917 implicated hundreds of Indians along the West 
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9 The restrictions on Chinese and Japanese immigration were due to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and 
the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907, respectively. 
 
10 For a more detailed history of Indians’ legislative exclusion in the U.S., see Joan M. Jensen, Passage 
from India: Asian Indian immigrants in North America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 
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! 89 
Coast United States in a German-supported plot to overthrow the British colonial 
government in India.11 Although it was tried in a U.S. court, the case was notably 
prosecuted at British prompting and facilitated with the help of intelligence collected and 
supplied to the prosecution by British agents. The defendants were charged with using the 
U.S. as a base for plotting to overthrow British rule in India during a time when America 
was still formally neutral. The seventeen Indian leaders on trial were found guilty of 
violating America’s neutrality laws in a highly dramatic and sensational San Francisco 
trial that ended in the murder of one Indian witness by another as an entire courtroom 
looked on. The ensuing media frenzy coincided with Congressional debates over an 
Asian exclusion bill known as the Immigration Act of 1917. Media depictions of Indians 
as revolutionary and violent bolstered the exclusionists’ cause, and helped cement 
Congressional support for broad Asiatic exclusion. The first in a series of three pieces of 
legislation (1917, 1921, 1924), the Immigration Act of 1917 created the “Asiatic Barred 
Zone.” As a geographical designation that included the Asian subcontinent, the “Barred 
Zone” cut off migration from India for the first time in American history, prompting one 
scholar to dub it the “Indian Exclusion Act.”12 
Formal exclusion from U.S. citizenship soon followed. In Thind v. U.S. (1923), 
the Supreme Court ruled that, even if “Caucasian,” Indians were not “white” according to 
the commonsense understanding of the term and therefore did not qualify to naturalize 
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under the “free white persons” provision of the 1790 Nationality Act.13 The Johnson-
Reed Act, or Immigration Act of 1924, marked the final step that completed Asiatic 
exclusion. The legislation consolidated the broad legal exclusion of Asians by conjoining 
immigration and naturalization policy, or more specifically, by making the ability to 
immigrate to the U.S. contingent upon a person’s eligibility for American citizenship. 
Indians and other natives of Asia were “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” and consequently 
barred. Two efforts by Indians in America to overturn the 1924 restrictions met 
resounding defeat.14 The interwar years marked a general closing to immigrants by U.S. 
lawmakers, and Asians, long perceived as racially inassimilable, were especially 
unwanted. The next serious challenge to exclusion brought by Indians would not come 
until 1939. 
 
A Tale of Two Leagues: The Legislative Battle Takes Shape  
The fight for Indian citizenship during World War II began humbly, with five 
Indians from New York on a bus to Washington, DC. All were members of the India 
Welfare League, a support organization for unemployed Indians. The five men were on 
their way to Capitol Hill to find a sponsor to introduce a bill giving Indians in America 
the right to citizenship. Their strategy for winning a Congressional audience was simple: 
knock on doors until someone agreed to hear them. Their efforts paid off on June 21, 
1939. Upon their fourth visit to the New York Democrat’s office, the five Welfare !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
13 The 1924 Act also added Japan to the list of excluded nations. As a U.S. territory, the Philippines was 
exempted from the restrictions.  
 
14 These campaigns were led by two Indian nationalists in the U.S., Sailendra Ghose of the Friends for the 
Freedom of India, and Taraknath Das, who founded the Free Hindustan newspaper in 1908.  
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League representatives were ushered in to meet Samuel Dickstein, chair of the House 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee. According to Welfare League leader Haridas 
Muzumdar, a “ten-minute interview stretched out, at the Congressman’s initiative, into an 
hour-long conference.”15 Persuaded by their appeals, Dickstein granted the League’s 
citizenship petition a hearing in June 1939, and another the following January.  
Over the two hearings, representatives of the Welfare League argued for Indian 
citizenship on a variety of grounds. The core of the India Welfare League’s case called 
for response to the material needs of long-time Indian residents of the U.S. Three of the 
organization’s representatives testified to the economic concerns plaguing Indians in 
America: League president Mubarek Ali Khan, co-founder Professor Haridas Muzumdar, 
and chairman Ramlal Bajpai. In their telling, Indians’ ineligibility to citizenship imposed 
two primary material harms. For Indian farmers, alien land laws in many Western states 
prevented them from owning or leasing agricultural land. Farmers had devised schemes 
to circumvent those laws, but tightening restrictions during the Depression years had 
made that increasingly difficult to do. In urban areas, the bar to citizenship prevented 
Indians from participating in New Deal employment and relief programs reserved for 
U.S. citizens. Furthermore, exclusion from citizenship also left them subject to undue 
exploitation by employers: as aliens with few legal protections, Khan remarked, Indians 
were always among the “last to be hired and the first to be fired.”16 To redress these 
grievances, the India Welfare League’s bill proposed that the approximately 3,000 
Indians who had entered the United States before the 1924 Immigration Act be made !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Haridas Muzumdar, America’s Contribution to India’s Freedom (Allahabad, India: Central Book Depot, 
1962), 36. 
 
16 U.S. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Naturalization of India-Born Immigrants: 
Hearing on H.R. 7110, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 1940. 
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eligible for citizenship. The measure’s circumscribed provisions were strategic. 
Restricting the act to benefit those who had entered the country before 1924 ensured that 
the measure only applied to Indians who had entered the U.S. legally. And by limiting 
eligibility to Indians already in the United States, the Welfare League sidestepped 
questions of foreign policy that an immigration quota or a general dispensation of 
citizenship might have raised.  
The Welfare League bill had three distinctive features, all of which reflected the 
importance of economic concerns in the depression era. First, the bill treated Indians in 
the United States as an economically disadvantaged group; according to Khan, “95 
percent of Indians” then living in America belonged to the “laboring class.” Second, the 
legislation was intended to benefit Indians who planned to stay in the United States 
indefinitely. As Dr. Muzumdar argued: “These people are here. They intend to remain 
here the rest of their lives . . . shall we let them remain as permanent aliens or almost in 
the status of refugees who are not permitted to avail themselves of the various advantages 
that the American Government agencies extend to citizens, or shall we incorporate 
them?” Third, the bill was purely domestic in scope, not intended “in any way [to] open 
up the question of immigration from the Orient, from the barred zone” or any such issue 
of “foreign relations,” whether between Delhi and Washington, or between Washington 
and the British imperial government at Whitehall.17  
Nevertheless, reflecting the racial tensions and isolationist views of the interwar 
years, Indians’ domestic claims to citizenship met an unreceptive Congressional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, India-Born Residents of the U.S. Request for 
Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, 15-19, 34-36.  
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audience.18 The testimony of House immigration committee, Paul Scharrenberg of the 
American Federation of Labor encapsulated the restrictionist and racist attitudes of the 
Southern lawmakers who comprised the bill’s main opposition. In one of his more 
memorable lines, the labor representative castigated committee members for their 
apparent willingness to welcome “another brown race. . . We do not have enough 
negroes. They want to give us some more.” Nevertheless, by far the greatest danger, 
Scharrenberg argued, was the threat of a precedent; if Congress gave citizenship rights to 
Indians, it would then be obliged to grant the demands of other Asian groups for similar 
gains, which would surely come.19 The Southern lawmakers who dominated both 
committees readily agreed, and tabled the proposal indefinitely.  
The repeal campaign reflected a constant consciousness of the Magnuson Act as a 
model for success. As advocates were quick to point out, of all the Asian powers, India 
was most similar to China in that both were Allied powers in World War II even if India 
fought with the Allies as merely a British colony.20 Embolded by this similarity, Khan 
and the Welfare League launched efforts to secure a bill for Indians immediately after 
Madame Chiang Kaishek’s speech before the U.S. Congress in February 1943. In the fall !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18!The emphasis on Indians’ need for public aid invited particular scrutiny, attesting to how the citizenship 
restrictions on federal relief programs had been very deliberate.!What limited state aid there was to 
disperse, critics countered, should be given to U.S. citizens first. !
 
19  The logic of Scharrenberg’s statement attested to the broader tendency among critical observers to see 
immigration and citizenship law as a continuum notwithstanding careful attempts – like this one – to 
disentangle the two. Citing a precedent, Khan implored the committee “not to permit the smallest loophole . 
. . so far as orientals [were] concerned.” U.S. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Naturalization of India-Born Immigrants: Hearing on H.R. 7110. 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 1940, 16, 33-34. 
The objection to setting a precedent was one of the key tactics used by the opposition in later campaigns to 
repeal Asian exclusion. 
 
20 Notably, India was brought into the war by British decree, without the formal consent of the popularly 
elected Indian National Congress. This was one of the main grievances outlined in the Quit India resolution 
issued by the Indian National Congress in 1942.  
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of 1943, Khan and the Welfare League revived a measure for Indian citizenship under the 
sponsorship of North Dakota Senator William Langer (R-ND), who remained one of 
Khan’s closest allies during his time in Washington.21 The Langer bill proposed 
citizenship for all Indians who entered the country before the 1924 Immigration Act took 
effect.22 Over the months that followed, Khan devoted himself to gathering support for 
the bill, sleeping “many a night in Washington, DC, on the Union Station Bench” in the 
hope of overturning the permanent alien status to which Indians in America had long 
been relegated.23 But he would soon encounter unexpected interference from J.J. Singh 
and the India League of America.  
 
Entwining Immigration and Independence: The India League of America  
Within months of the Langer bill’s introduction to Congress, the work of the ILA 
under J.J. Singh began to overshadow it. Indian businessman N.R. Checker had 
established the organization in 1937 as a loose analogue to a London-based group led by 
Indian nationalist (and close friend and colleague of Nehru) V.K. Krishna Menon. Under 
Singh’s leadership, the ILA rose to prominence as a voice in the United States for purna 
swaraj, or complete Indian independence from Britain. The organization had an 
executive board of prominent white Americans with an interest in Indian independence. 
By 1944, the ILA’s leadership included New York publisher (and head of the Citizens 
Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion) Richard Walsh, who served as the League’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Langer, a well known and controversial isolationist, served in the U.S. Senate from 1940 until his death 
in 1959.!!
 
22 S. 1595 (1943). 
 
23 Khan to Richard Russell, April 17, 1946, Senate Immigration Committee, file on S. 236, 79th Cong., 2nd 
sess. (1946), Legislative Records Office (NARA I), Washington, DC.  
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chairman; Nobel Prize-winning author (and Walsh’s wife) Pearl Buck; writer Louis 
Fischer; and ACLU founder Roger Baldwin. Lin Yutang, the renowned Chinese author, 
and Buck were appointed the ILA’s two honorary presidents in September 1943 and 
1944, respectively.24 
The ILA campaign began in March 1944 with the introduction of legislation by 
Reps. Clare Boothe Luce (R-CT) and Emmanuel Celler (D-NY), two Congressional 
supporters of both the ILA and of the Indian independence cause.25 Like the recently 
enacted Chinese measure, the Luce-Celler bills had two main provisions: an immigration 
quota for India of 100 persons, and citizenship eligibility for all natives of India.26 In 
crafting the measure, ILA leaders specifically sought to redress what they perceived to be 
the two main deficiencies of the Welfare League bill. First, by limiting citizenship 
eligibility to long-time U.S. Indian residents, it did not address the general problem of the 
racial discrimination formalized by the 1923 Thind decision that blocked all Indians from 
seeking citizenship. Second, its narrow focus on naturalization made no provisions to 
place Indian immigration on a quota basis. On a more personal level, Singh expressed 
serious misgivings about Khan, who was known among Indians as a “shady sort of 
fellow” whose entry into the United States was itself of dubious legality.27 On a similar 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Varma, 202-203. 
 
25 In a congratulatory letter upon her election to the U.S. House of Representatives that fall, Singh had 
expressed his hope that she might use her office to become “India’s Pearl Buck,” and champion India’s 
cause as Buck had done for China. During Luce’s trip, she met and began a personal correspondence with 
Nehru. Varma, 309. !
 
26 Unlike the Langer bill, the Luce-Celler naturalization provisions imposed no temporal restrictions for 
citizenship eligibility based upon date of entry.  
 
27 Among other things, Khan was suspected of blackmailing recent Indian arrivals and collecting funds 
from California Sikh communities under false pretenses. For more on the tens of thousands of South Asian 
seamen, mostly Muslim, who entered the United States through similar means and created multiracial lives 
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note, Senator William Langer of North Dakota was notorious for a history of corruption 
and graft. As Agent-General Sir Bajpai, the Indian Government’s representative to 
Washington, wrote in one of his official reports to Delhi, Langer was an “unwelcome 
champion of Indian rights” who might have to “be tolerated but ought not to be wooed.”28  
Emanuel Celler (D-NY), who co-sponsored the first set of immigration and 
naturalization bills in March 1944 at the ILA’s request, was controversial in his own 
right; the Brooklyn Democrat known for his liberal views on immigration and, as one 
Delhi official put it, his “left-wing Zionist sympathies.”29 Recognizing this, the ILA 
recruited the additional sponsorship of Clare Boothe Luce, a conservative Connecticut 
Republican (and the wife of Time-Life founder-editor Henry Luce) fairly new to the 
House, as a counterbalancing, bipartisan force. 
The Celler bill quickly trumped the Langer measure in attracting official, media, 
and popular support. Toward this end, the ILA’s ties to the Citizens Committee campaign 
for Chinese repeal in the prior year carried several advantages for the Celler bill. As 
founder-chairman of the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, ILA chairman 
Richard Walsh had personally overseen the successful campaign for Chinese repeal 
legislation.30 Having run an effective lobby once, he now brought the benefit of his 
experience to the Indian cause. Noting how the Magnuson Act had boosted China’s 
prestige and affirmed its equal status with other Allied powers on the world stage, Walsh 
and other ILA advocates called on Washington lawmakers to do the same for India. At !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in America, see Vivek Bald’s excellent study, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).   
 
28 File 205(2)-X: Agent General Bajpai’s Report for February 1944, 38, INC, Delhi, India.  
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 See Chapter 1. 
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ILA rallies in New York City and Washington, DC, Walsh, J.J. Singh, and the bill’s 
Congressional sponsors, Reps. Luce and Celler described Indians as the next logical 
beneficiary of rights after the Chinese.31 Echoing the Citizens Committee’s logic of 
expediency, they underscored Indians’ contributions to the Allied war effort and India’s 
status as an ally of both the U.S. and China.  
The intended message was clear: just like the Magnuson Act, the Celler bill 
should be understood primarily as a wartime gesture to bolster goodwill with a military 
partner in the war against Japan. Within a few months of their introduction to Congress, 
the ILA-endorsed legislation received the editorial endorsements of the New York Times, 
New Republic, and Los Angeles Times, among other prominent periodicals; writers 
uniformly stressed India’s similarity to China as the Asian power only second in 
importance, and elaborated on the military contributions that made Indians especially 
deserving of recognition.32  
But, as would soon become clear, India’s colonial predicament made negotiating 
the Luce-Celler bill significantly more complicated than the Chinese legislation after 
which it was modeled. Never simply a matter of negotiations with a sovereign state, the 
comprehensive immigration and naturalization measure implicated not only 
Washington’s relations with Indian officials in Delhi but also America’s wartime alliance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
31 Rally speakers echoed the war-related arguments featured in the previous campaign, which Clare Luce 
maintained “applied with equal measure to India.” In more individualized appeals, J.J. Singh, a merchant, 
remarked on the “great handicap” that exclusion posed to improved trade relations between India and the 
United States, while Rep. Celler stressed the need for America to “fight racial arrogance” on principle. 
Ibid., 24. 
32 Not limited to the U.S. alone, the Indian National Congress (INC) passed a resolution in April 1944 
expressing its support for the legislation on the grounds that India deserved a place in America’s national 
quota system for its contributions to the Pacific War. “1944 Motilal Statement on Proposed Indian 
Immigration Bills,” File 776(3)-X (1944), Indian National Archives (INA), Delhi, India; “India Bids 
America Naturalize People,” New York Times, April 3, 1944, 11. 
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with Great Britain. The INC’s independence demands leading to the imprisonment of 
Jawaharlal, Mahatma Ghandi, and other INC leaders in 1942 caused a quandary for U.S. 
officials.33 Unable to convince Churchill of the need for decolonization, and unwilling to 
risk a rift in America’s special relationship with Britain, Roosevelt and his advisors 
became spectators to the steady deterioration of the British-India relationship. For the 
duration of World War II, Washington officials rhetorically distanced themselves from 
the colonialism of Britain, while acting to protect the Anglo-American relationship on the 
other.  
U.S. officials were reluctant to support Indian repeal if doing so might be read as 
an indirect endorsement of Indian independence. When a group primarily focused on 
Indian independence, the ILA, championed the Luce-Celler immigration bill, this 
prompted some speculation that the bill could ruin the Anglo-American relationship. 
Charles Colby of the University of Chicago wrote Senator Richard Russell of the 
immigration committee insisting that Congress must reject the bill, lest its passage “put 
the U.S. on record as officially favoring the establishment of India as a commonwealth.” 
America, he insisted, “should not take sides.”34 Adopting the opposite view, but 
nonetheless believing in a foreign policy impact, Edward Manice of Yale wrote to the 
same committee expressing hope that the measure’s passage would “better the Indian 
faith in America’s great democratic principles,” which Washington had long forfeited to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Gary Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 
ix.!For more on the U.S. predicament regarding India, see Sarah Ellen Graham, “American Propaganda, the 
Anglo-American Alliance, and the ‘Delicate Question’ of Indian Self-Determination,” Diplomatic History 
33 (2009): 223-259.!
 
34 Charles Colby of the University of Chicago to U.S. Senator Richard Russell, June 7, 1944, Senate 
Immigration Committee, File on S. 1595, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, Box 57, RG 46, NARA I, 
Washington, DC.  
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“Great Britain’s continued control of India for her own economic advantage.”35 Both 
scholars argued that the Luce-Celler bill would be read as an implicit gauge of 
Washington’s views on the independence question, and it was on these grounds that they 
urged U.S. officials to craft all India-related policy carefully.  
Privately, Indian supporters of the Luce-Celler bill expressed similar logic. Two 
ILA supporters from Chicago, Mumtaz Kitchlew and Dr. Tarani Sinha, articulated the 
link between the bill and Indian independence. Writing to J.J. Singh in March 1944, 
Kitchlew and Sinha frankly stated that they had “no intention whatsoever of ever 
becoming American citizens” but rather, “wish[ed] to remain & die Indians.” However, 
they welcomed the “great international prestige” that the Luce-Celler measure promised 
to give the Indian people by lifting from their “brows the present stigma” of ineligibility 
for American citizenship. The immigration bill promised “immense value” to Indians’ 
“immediate struggle with the english [sic] to get our Independence of and from them.” 36 
If India’s future lay in achieving equal status and recognition in the international 
community, they reasoned, then surely an American bill granting Indians nominal parity 
with European peoples under U.S. immigration and naturalization laws served Indian 
nationalists’ cause. In this emphasis on the symbolic value of victory, and on the 
importance of India instead of America, ILA differed sharply from the Welfare League’s 
practical view. 
 
Conflict and Communal Critique: Adopting the Lens of Religion  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Edward Manice, Yale University Christian Association, Dwight Hall, to Russell, July 31, 1944, Senate 
Immigration Committee, file on S. 1595, 78th Cong., 2 sess. (1944), Box 57, RG 46, NARA I, Washington, 
DC.  
 
36 Mumtaz Kitchlew and Dr. Tarani Sinha to J.J. Singh, March 9, 1944; quoted in Varma, 272. 
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At a Senate subcommittee hearing in the fall of 1944, the practical campaign 
represented by the Welfare League came into conflict with the more symbolic campaign 
represented by the ILA. Mubarek Ali Khan addressed the subcommittee to say that little 
had changed since the Welfare League last addressed a Congressional committee four 
years earlier. The problem, as he described it, was still a fundamentally “domestic” issue 
of incorporation: would Indians in America be left to live as “men without a country” and 
suffer because of their permanent alien status or would they be allowed to become an 
“asset” to the society in which they planned to “spend their lives and die”? Emphasizing 
how their Indian constituents saw their future in America, not India, Khan deliberately 
and repeatedly distanced the petition from India and its troubles with Great Britain, 
emphasizing instead their constituents’ commitment to America. Unrelated to matters of 
“foreign policy,” the intention of the citizenship bill was to “take care of those people 
who are in the country now.”37  
What was intended to be an opportunity for the Welfare League to restate the 
merits of their limited citizenship bill quickly became a losing battle to defend it. J.J. 
Singh, speaking for the India League, took the opposite position. He downplayed the 
domestic implications of any citizenship provision with a variation of the instrumental 
view articulated in Kitchlew and Sinha’s March letter. Insofar as the exclusion laws 
represented a “slur and stigma” against Indians everywhere, he called for their removal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, To Permit the Naturalization of Approximately Three Thousand 
Natives of India: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Immigration, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, 52-3; 
Varma, 288. !
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on principles of equity and justice, in keeping with the larger goals of “India’s freedom” 
and the “freedom of the world . . . [and] of mankind” as a whole.38  
Disagreement erupted in vitriolic confrontation during the testimony of ILA 
supporter Dr. Krishnanal Shridlani, as he listed the advantages of the broader Luce-Celler 
immigration bill to “inspire Indians toward greater collaboration with the United States” 
and to uphold America’s moral claims to “world leadership.” Khan interjected, accusing 
the sociologist and other Indian “newcomers” of co-opting an effort into which he and 
other long-time residents had invested five years of struggle. He then went on to deride 
the ILA contingent as a group of “lecturers, emotional blackmailers, businessmen, and 
other claimed ‘authorities’ on India” who came to the United States for “transient and 
propaganda purposes,” and as such, utterly failed to understand the “experience of their 
[fellow] country brothers” while being “only interested in themselves.”39  
Several participants asked Khan when the Welfare League could not support the 
Luce-Celler bill, which encompassed the Langer bill’s narrower citizenship provisions. 
Fuming, Khan declared his unwillingness to “risk winning half the loaf by asking for the 
whole one.” He claimed to have little faith that Congress would pass a bill that included 
provisions for both immigration and naturalization, saying that the 3,000-plus Indians 
already living in the United States should forego their chance at citizenship on account of 
the ”selfish” actions of an upstart group.40  
The conflict reflected a number of divergences between the two Leagues. Most 
immediately, it reflected the divergent projects pursued by the two groups, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 To Permit the Naturalization of Approximately Three Thousand Natives of India, 52-3. !
39 Ibid., 45, 49-50, 54. 
 
40 Ibid., 45, 50, 54. 
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correlated closely with basic differences in class.41 For Khan and the Welfare League, the 
proposed citizenship gains had an immediate material purpose to improve the livelihood 
and daily welfare of Indian laborers already living in the United States. Described in one 
Indian Government report as “seamen, laborers, and poor Indians,” Welfare League 
members were long-time residents of Ameica who had built lives in their adopted land 
and planned to remain there.42 Khan often described himself as one of them, having spent 
his first decade in America as a farmer in Arizona and his second as an auto mechanic in 
New York City. The Welfare League desired the long-term incorporation of Indians into 
America.  
J.J. Singh and the India League were a more elite and transient group, with 
migration experiences very different from the West Coast farmers who made up the 
majority of the U.S. Indian population. The majority of the ILA had come to the United 
States as students. J.J. Singh often joked that he was the least educated among the ILA’s 
so-called “Indian brain trust,” a “lowly merchant rather than a Ph.D.”43 Even as a lowly 
merchant, Singh had what few Welfare League constituents had—a steady job and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
41 In a recent study of South Asian Muslims during this period, scholar Vivek Bald suggests that class 
difference, rather than sectarian divisions of nation or religion, were at the center of the community’s 
internecine conflicts. I would argue that class and religious identities among Indians in the United States 
during this period were mutually overlapping and cannot be neatly separated. That a large percentage of 
Muslim Indians living in the United States by World War II entered the United States as deserting seamen 
already meant that they were drawn from a particular class of persons. At the same time, the 
disproportionately intellectual nature of the New York-based India League of America leadership meant 
that they included a large number of upper-caste Hindus (although at least one India League “brain trust” 
member, Anup Singh, was Sikh). Vivek Bald, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 184. !
42 Report on India League, File 379-X/43 (1943), 57, INA, Delhi, India.   
 
43 Robert Shaplen, “One-Man Lobby,” New Yorker, March 24, 1951, 37-8. It is notable that other members 
of the ILA’s “brain trust” also drew distinctions between themselves and J.J. Singh. For more on the 
tensions between Singh and the ILA elites, including the formation of a rival group called the National 
Committee for India’s Freedom, see Varma, 212-213.  
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comfortable income, with or without citizenship. India League members like Dr. Anup 
Singh, who edited the League’s monthly bulletin India Today, and Dr. Krishnanal 
Shridlani, a sociologist and lecturer, epitomized the group’s ideological approach, a 
luxury of their position. They wanted India to have symbolic parity with China under 
American law. Anything less than full citizenship extension and the establishment of an 
annual immigration quota only reaffirmed India’s second-class status and thereby 
undercut India’s international standing as a power in its own right.  
 The conflict between the two Leagues also reflected religious differences. This 
exchange marked the first time that religion featured centrally in the wartime discussion 
of Indian American rights.44 Since before World War II, Khan had been a loyal follower 
of the Bombay-based All India Muslim League, which was also the INC’s main political 
rival in the Indian national sphere and advocated for a separate Muslim Indian state.45The 
Welfare League, founded by two Hindus in New York City, had not begun as a Muslim 
organization, but Khan’s partisan leadership had accelerated a shift toward an explicitly 
Muslim identity. By 1944, the organization actively described itself as the Muslim 
League’s unofficial voice in the United States, complete with an all-Muslim membership 
and the insignia of a Muslim flag emblazoned on its letterhead. By contrast, the India 
League of America and its mostly Hindu affiliates in the Luce-Celler campaign continued 
to follow the INC, including the Congress’ policy of secular nationalism that embraced 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 The Indian American community included Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus. The majority were Sikh. R. 
Narayanan, “Indian Immigration & the India League of America,” Indian Journal of American Studies 2:1 
(1969): 3. 
 
45 Hindu-Muslim tensions within the U.S. Indian community were not new. Indeed, communal relations 
had become so strained by August 1944 that Richard Walsh insisted on including a provision in an India 
League document that called for members to make “special efforts for relations with Muslims in New York 
and elsewhere.” Varma, 289. 
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Indians of all faiths – Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and others.46 President J.J. Singh was 
himself a non-observant Sikh who made the decision early on to discard the distinctive 
turban, beard, and long hair traditionally worn by Sikh males because of the inconvenient 
attention they invited in daily life.47 
 Having concluded that there was greater support for the broader Indian measure, 
the Senate subcommittee unanimously voted to table the Langer bill. This decision 
cleared the path for the Luce-Celler measure to have its first hearing early the following 
year. A furious Khan vented his anger in a letter to Anup Singh, editor of the India 
League’s monthly bulletin. Khan’s anger remained strong when in early 1945, he, 
echoing Singh, framed the burgeoning legislative contest between the two Leagues in 
Washington explicitly in terms of the larger Indian independence struggle. However, the 
two men’s opposing visions for Indian independence resulted in different interpretations. 
In Khan’s telling, the legislative contest between the Langer and Luce-Celler bills not 
only tracked the divergent class-based priorities of the Welfare League and the ILA in the 
United States. Rather, the roots of the conflict could be traced back to the communal 
struggle in India pitting the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress against the All 
India Muslim League.  
 To illustrate this point, Khan used the example of his own personal shift in 
allegiance from the Indian Congress to the Muslim League at the beginning of World 
War II. Once a devoted “follower of Gandhi,” his “change of heart” came after hearing 
news of Congress leader Nehru’s goodwill travels through Europe and China. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
46 Varma, 180.  !
47 Singh complained about the “awful mental strain” he experienced as a “6-ft. Sikh” in New York City 
“stopping traffic at every corner” as a “cynosure of all eyes.” Shaplen, “One-Man Lobby,” 38, 40.!
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Disillusioned with the Congress leader for going on international bids to “buy friendship” 
while ignoring his “own poor countrymen . . . women and children starving” at home, 
Khan condemned the INC’s Hindu elites for consistently “fail[ing] to place the needs of 
the Indian people first.”48 Khan argued that it was Hindus’ common neglect for the poor 
and suffering that had caused millions of Indian Muslims to reject the INC and embrace 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the All India Muslim League in its place. Through their 
interference at the Langer bill’s September hearing, the “two Sikhs and one Hindu” – 
here he referred to J.J. Singh, Anup Singh, and Shridlani – had followed in the INC’s 
same elitist tradition. By neglecting the “3,000 people who are in the United States 
NOW” to press for the Luce-Celler measure, they had sacrificed Indians’ livelihood to 
take up a “dream” measure which they “should know will never come true.” Extending 
his communalist critique into Koranic exegesis, Khan went on to explain the Welfare 
League’s Indian citizenship bill as an expression of the Islamic imperative to “translate” 
the “‘Golden Rule’ into deeds, to “clothe the naked and feed the hungry” throughout the 
“Muslim world.”49 A statement of support from All India Muslim League leader 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah himself, in which he expressed “warm sympathy” for the Langer 
legislation, powerfully reaffirmed Khan’s claim to represent the communal view.50   
 Non-Indian observers probably weren’t aware of the debt Khan’s position owed 
to Jinnah’s letter of support. It established a basis for Khan’s later claims to speak as a 
diasporic representative of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League in India. In 
this way, Khan’s supposed ties to the Indian political group bolstered his legitimacy in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Mubarek Ali Khan to Anup Singh, November 4, 1944, File on S. 236, NARA I, Washington, DC. 
 
49 New India Bulletin, August-September 1945, 2-3. 
 
50 Reprinted in the New India Bulletin, November 1944, 3-4. 
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Washington. He spoke as more than the figurehead of an obscure Indian American group, 
but rather as an overseas spokesman for the one of the most powerful Muslim politicians 
in India. And as Jinnah’s international profile grew, so did Khan’s.  
* * * * * * 
Wartime developments over the first half of 1945 bolstered Washington’s interest 
in the Luce-Celler bill, culminating with its first victory in the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee that June. The American-British relationship had deteriorated, 
and after a year of setback due to infighting within the Indian American community the 
ILA’s position benefited.51 With Whitehall officials insisting that Britain’s plan was still 
Indian self-government within a British system, not independence, and U.S. officials 
under growing pressure to demonstrate their commitment to Indian independence, Acting 
Secretary of State Joseph Grew issued a statement in late January 1945 affirming 
America’s sympathetic commitment to help settle the India question. While far from 
explicit, his statement renewed hope among some Indian observers of Washington’s 
growing willingness to intercede on India’s behalf. Expectations for passage ran high, 
bolstered by official nods from the U.S. Attorney General, U.S. State Department, and 
the White House – first under Roosevelt and then under Truman – calling for passage as 
vital to help “win the war and to establish a secure peace.”52 Recalling how the 
President’s endorsement had come just before the Chinese repeal bill passed Congress in 
the fall of 1943, advocates optimistically predicted that victory would come just as 
swiftly in India’s case. The outpouring of official support was accompanied by popular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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52 Reprinted in India Today, March 1945, 2.!
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mobilization among religious groups, organized labor, and Indian American groups in 
California that claimed to represent the the “overwhelming majority of East Indian 
residents” in America in their “whole-hearted” support for the Luce-Celler bill.53  
Testimony by ILA representatives at the Luce-Celler bill’s first Congressional 
hearing in March 1945 reflects how the independence movement not only created the 
organizational infrastructure and networks of support subsequently remobilized in service 
of repeal. The immigration issue also gave Indian independence activists in the United 
States a high-profile platform to renew attention to the plight of their colonized 
homelands and revive long-standing calls for American intervention – if largely 
unheeded – in the British-Indian impasse. Continuing the Chinese campaign’s strategy of 
expediency, ILA representatives at the hearing focused their arguments for the Luce-
Celler bill’s passage on U.S. wartime and postwar interests in India. One recurring theme 
was the measure’s promise to improve America’s image among Indians. Singh reported 
that the bill was already “front-page news” in India, where it was widely touted as a “test 
case” of America’s “professions of democracy and equality.” Citing reports of 
Communism’s growing popularity on the subcontinent, Rep. Luce warned that a 
legislative defeat would only push Indians further toward the Kremlin. Further 
underscoring the urgency of passage, America needed a strong position at the upcoming 
San Francisco Conference from which to pressure its European allies – here she 
presumably meant Great Britain – to relinquish their colonial possessions. If Congress !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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! 108 
refused to pass this bill, she warned, American criticisms of European imperialism would 
suffer” from a “certain degree of hypocrisy” insofar as America “cannot successfully 
deplore a policy which we practice.”54  
Singh was more direct in his criticisms of the British. In fact, he strategically 
appealed to America’s interest in distancing itself from its British ally by emphasizing 
how the measure’s enactment would not only increase Indians’ already “tremendous 
amount of friendly feeling toward the people of the United States,” but also distinguish 
more sharply the “line of demarcation” between the two Allied powers. The second 
argument was economic. If passed, Singh argued, the commercial benefits for Americans 
would be substantial. In his signature forthright style, the India League president counted 
off the many things India would need to industrialize after the war –“technicians...capital, 
machinery, machine tools,” among others. “Give me any other country that will be able 
to supply us to fill all our needs excepting you,” he declared. Rep. Celler took up the 
argument in his subsequent statement, reiterating the bill’s purpose to foster goodwill 
between the two powers “primarily” for the “enlargement of [America’s] foreign trade.”55  
J.J. Singh took advantage of the forum to present a scathing critique of British 
wartime policies in India. With his anti-British testimony, Singh effectively transformed 
the House Immigration Committee hearing into a dual forum for Indian independence. 
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Addressing previous criticisms of the Indian war effort as “half-hearted,” the India 
League president maintained that if any Americans “found fault” with India’s “lack of 
war effort,” the responsibility lay “at the door of the British imperialists and not on the 
Indians.” If the British had really wanted to mobilize a popular war in India and 
mobilized the people’s sentiments, he contended, they would not have put a “great 
disciple of democracy” like Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru in prison; even today a 
“great man who should be sitting in the conferences at Yalta and San Francisco, is rotting 
in jail in India.”56 In a bold calculation, he maintained that, were it not for British 
intransigence on the Indian independence issue, the Indian volunteer army would have 
seen at least five times the number of current Indian enlistees join the fight against Japan. 
Upon hearing Singh’s statement, Noah Mason of Illinois (R-IL) declared Singh’s the 
“most spectacular” presentation at the hearing, which had done more to sway him in 
favor of the bill than those of “all the other witnesses put together.”57  
The bill’s Southern Democratic opponents were not so easily persuaded. Both 
Rep. Allen of Louisiana and Ed Gossett of Texas argued that Congress had gone far 
enough in breaking down our immigration laws. Allen specifically objected to witnesses’ 
use of war-related arguments as “ridiculous”; Indians’ desire to defend themselves and 
their country from Japanese attack had “nothing to do with the U.S.,” he countered, but 
arose out of their desire to “defend their own homes.” Furthermore, so long as India 
remained under British control, he anticipated that any future increase in trade would 
benefit Great Britain more than it did the United States. Revisiting the colonial question, 
Rep. Gossett of Texas objected that the British might interpret passage of the act as an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Nehru was released from prison in June 1945. 
 
57 To Grant a Quota to Eastern Hemisphere Indians, 82-86.  
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American attempt to “alienate the affections of some of their oppressed Empire people” 
against them. Others echoed his concern, questioning the likely impact on Anglo-
American relations.58 The endorsements of Delhi and the White House may have 
tempered their concerns, but short of a formal statement from Whitehall, Southern critics 
insisted that they could not vote for the Luce-Celler measure in good conscience. In 
reality, the argument was a ruse, and passage a game of numbers. Restrictionists, 
Southern lawmakers opposed any proposal to liberalize immigration on principle, but the 
colonial issue offered a reasonable grounds for objection. Sensing that the bill was poised 
for passage, Georgia Democrat Robert Ramspeck discreetly recruited several absentee 
members of the committee – Southern Democrats and isolationist Republicans – to show 
up on the last day of the hearing and vote against the measure; the simultaneous absence 
of three lawmakers who supported the bill cinched its defeat.  
Rep. Celler promptly wrote the White House and State Department soliciting their 
intervention to keep the legislation alive. He pointed to the outpouring of negative press 
in the Indian media and grumbling in official Delhi circles as proof of the resentment 
unleashed by the committee’s negative vote. Indians in America expressed similar 
disappointment. A Sikh farmer in California’s Imperial Valley, Rattan Singh conveyed 
the “great shock” of the local Indian community and growing dismay at what the 
legislative defeat might mean for Indian farmers like himself. If nothing was done, the 
farmer lamented, Indians in the area would soon “lose their lands or ranches” at the hands 
of racist judges looking to disenfranchise Indians on the grounds of their ineligibility to 
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citizenship.59 But the appeals were in vain. Roosevelt’s death a few weeks later, coupled 
with Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s unwillingness to get involved, 
precluded any immediate action for relief by the executive branch. 
At this juncture, official intervention by the Government of India at Delhi brought 
the bill back into contention later that spring. Sir Girja Bajpai, the official Indian 
representative to Washington, had first approached the U.S. State Department two years 
earlier to ask about the possibility of a similar bill to affirm India’s “equality with the 
Chinese.” The proposal, Bajpai reported back to Delhi, was favorably received, but at 
Berle’s request, Indian officials limited their efforts to private forums lest the perception 
of foreign meddling evoke a backlash among the restrictionist bloc of Southern 
lawmakers who dominated the House and Senate Immigration Committees.60 The Luce-
Celler bill’s defeat in the House Immigration Committee spurred him to action – this 
time, to secure Whitehall’s approval and thereby neutralize Southern fears of British 
reprisal. The effort was timely. Germany’s surrender that May shifted the Allied focus to 
India as a vital military partner in the remaining Pacific battle against Japan. Recognizing 
its own need to curry Indians’ goodwill and ameliorate tensions with the INC, Whitehall 
gave its endorsement for the Luce-Celler measure in May 1945 as a “gesture of 
friendship” honoring India’s past military contributions and anticipating its future role in 
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finishing the fight.61  Whitehall’s approval was the lynchpin. With British support 
assured, the India League and its advocates moved quickly to expedite another hearing on 
the Luce-Celler bill before the Congressional session ended. Truman pre-empted further 
deadlock in the House by meeting personally with Rep. Robert Ramspeck of Georgia 
who agreed not to interfere with the bill’s progress. The entire House Immigration 
Committee convened within weeks and reported the measure out favorably in late June 
1945, to await a vote by the full House of Representatives that fall.   
 
“What Does Iowa Know of India?”: Translating Indian Communal Struggle to an 
American Audience 
Khan watched the rapid progress of the Luce-Celler bill with dismay and alarm, 
as the ILA’s campaign discredited more than five years of his personal toil. As the 
Langer bill’s prospects continued to diminish, Khan increasingly drew from India’s long 
history of Hindu-Muslim communal conflict to bolster flagging interest in the Welfare 
League’s more limited citizenship bill. If, as he framed it, the battle between the two 
Leagues was a diasporic manifestation of the historical Hindu-Muslim conflict, it was 
also a prime arena for redress; framed differently, the Langer bill was important as a 
corrective to the global and longstanding Hindu domination of Indian Muslim 
populations. During a time when such rhetoric had become commonplace among Muslim 
leaders in India, Khan’s turn to religious themes was not without precedent. But he soon 
found himself facing another challenge to reformulate the Hindu-Muslim conflict in 
terms comprehensible to an American audience whose limited knowledge of the conflict !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 The British Ambassador formally notified the U.S. State Department of British government support for 
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presented both an opportunity and a hindrance to the Welfare League’s final bids for 
support.  
By all indications, few Americans were familiar with India’s pluralistic tradition, 
much less its central place in political debates over independence. Even by World War II, 
American experts on Asia were mostly limited to policymaking, religious, and academic 
circles.62 The general dearth of reporting on Asian topics by many mainstream media 
outlets did little to remedy the situation.63 A poll taken shortly before the Simla 
Conference revealed most Americans’ rudimentary understanding of the negotiations 
over India’s independence as being only between Indian leaders and the British; few 
Americans, the figures showed, were aware of any other factors in the debate beyond the 
colonial relationship. Of the approximately fifty Midwest counties surveyed, 70 percent 
of respondents had never heard of Muslim League leader Jinnah; of the remaining 30 
percent, 2/3 could not name the party he headed. Eighty-five per cent had never heard of 
Pakistan, and of those who had, most could not explain what it was.64 Congressional 
transcripts indicated that the situation among American lawmakers was similar. Primers 
on India’s diverse religious traditions were a staple at every India-related hearing 
between 1939 and 1945; these usually featured an Indian witness trying to explain why 
the terms “Indian” and “Hindu” were not, in fact, synonymous. When lawmakers invoked !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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religion in the discussion – usually in the form of an objection – they often did so 
vaguely, their statements suggesting only a dim awareness of what religious strife in 
India actually involved.65 
Khan’s embrace of communal themes benefited from American media coverage 
of the Simla Conference in June 1945, which brought British and Indian leaders together 
to negotiate the terms of an Indian transitional government leading toward self-
government. The meeting signaled a turning point in the political debates over Indian 
independence. According to INC President and Muslim leader Maulana Azad, Simla 
marked the first time that “the communal issue dividing different Indian groups” derailed 
progress toward independence rather than the politics between India and Britain.66 
Nehru’s remarks after the conference registered the hardening of Congress-League 
factional lines in the conference’s wake. In a statement widely reprinted in U.S. 
periodicals, the Pandit went on the offensive, deriding Muslim League demands for a 
separate Muslim state as “absurd” and untenable, and communalism itself as a “product 
of medieval . .  .pre-modern urges.”67 Echoing Nehru’s stance, virtually all the major 
American media outlets attributed the conference’s failure directly to Jinnah’s 
unwillingness to compromise. In so doing they cemented Jinnah’s standing as an 
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important actor in Indian politics while introducing many Americans to the Muslim 
League leader for the first time in a highly unflattering light.68  
The hardening division between the INC and Muslim League in India led to a 
corresponding polarization between the Langer and Luce-Celler lobbies in the United 
States. Reversing its long record of condemning the British first, the India League of 
America joined Nehru and other INC leaders to blame Jinnah for hindering India’s 
progress toward independence.69 Coverage in the India League newsletter amplified the 
case against the Muslim League leader, in particular, challenging his claim to represent, 
under the exaggerated banner of the All India Moslem League, “90% of the 90 million 
Moslems of India.”70  
Khan, for his part, dismissed such claims as “false rumors.” In a July 1945 speech 
before the New York-based All Nations’ Association, the Welfare League leader invoked 
his other title as New York secretary of the India Muslim League of America to reassure 
the audience that all of India’s Muslims looked to Jinnah as a “symbol of freedom” as the 
guarantor of their dream for Pakistan. Using his earlier analogy of the legislative contest 
as a microcosm for the INC-Muslim League struggle, Khan painted a different portrait of 
Jinnah than the American press had reported. Rather than a power-hungry villain, Khan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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described Jinnah as a victim of Hindu oppression and himself as Jinnah’s analogue in the 
American context. Just as the “Hindu leaders” of the other camp had repeatedly 
“undermined” him at multiple Congressional hearings, so had uncompromising Hindu 
INC leaders undermined Indian Muslims like Jinnah and other religious minorities in the 
Indian political arena. Misunderstood and alienated, with his efforts blocked at every turn 
by power-hungry Hindu leaders, Khan claimed that he had “as much experience with the 
Hindu leading parties here in the U.S. as Mr. Jinnah had in India.” Based on their 
experiences, he concluded, “Mr. Jinnah and I know it is impossible for us to get any 
cooperation from the Hindu PHD’s.”71  
But Khan’s deployment of communal rhetoric in the American context was never 
simply an extension of the rivalry between the INC and Muslim League. Even as he 
interpolated common communal discourses from the subcontinent, Khan recast his 
arguments to appeal to an American public with limited knowledge of Indian culture and 
history. Khan was deliberate, tailoring his petitions to resonate with deeply held 
American values. In one example, he invoked Americans’ dedication to religious liberty 
to advocate for Pakistan as a safeguard against religious oppression to protect Indian 
Muslims then living in a “state of religious oppression.72 Before Muslims accepted the 
terms of British dominion status for India, Hindus needed to stop forcing their faith 
practices upon their Muslim counterparts. Otherwise, a separate Muslim state was the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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72 New India, May 1945, p. 2. The appeal was also consistent with the imperative to protect minority rights, 
which emerged as an important theme underwriting both the Welfare League’s support for Indians’ 
citizenship rights and for a separate Muslim state. Writing in the Welfare League’s regular newsletter, India 
News Bulletin, Khan regularly called attention to Indians’ plight as an oppressed minority group in the 
U.S., the vast majority of which shared the “social and economic segregation” suffered by African 
Americans. Not limited to America alone, he maintained that the plight of Indians in the U.S. was part of a 
global phenomenon in which the Indian national is “unrecognized and unwanted in many parts of the 
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only viable solution to protect India’s beleaguered Muslim communities.73 Lamenting the 
poor job that the U.S. media had done to explain the rationale for the proposed Muslim 
state, Khan attempted to convey, in terms comprehensible to Americans, what the state 
meant to Muslims like himself. In one of his more striking analogies, Khan again drew on 
America’s own history to liken the Pakistan ideal to the original thirteen American 
colonies; in the same way that the American colonies formed the original core from 
which the present-day United States had developed, he explained, Pakistan marked a 
restoration of the subcontinent to the way things once were. Using historical references 
foreign to most Americans – citing the “great Mogul Empire” and its “great Muslim 
king” – Khan concluded his explanation by affirming Pakistan’s symbolic importance as 
Indian Muslims’ guarantee of “freedom and sovereignty.”74  
In a separate appeal, Khan revisited familiar territory when he invoked the India-
related trope best known to American audiences – the Hindu caste system – to blame 
Hindu caste consciousness, instead of Muslim demands, for keeping the Indian people 
divided and fighting among themselves. It was not Americans’ fault if they all they knew 
of India were Hinduism, Gandhi, and Nehru, he prefaced; that was what the “lecturing 
PHD’s” and “Mr. Gandhi’s propaganda ministers” in the United States – presumably, J.J. 
Singh and other likeminded pro-Congress Indians – had misled them to think. But 
Americans’ misunderstanding of Indian affairs had made them blind to the injustices !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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carried out by Hindu leaders in the name of caste divisions. To illustrate his point, he 
drew a sharp contrast between the high-caste Brahmins who regularly treated India’s “42 
million untouchables” as “outcastes,” and Muslims like Jinnah and himself, practitioners 
instead of “one caste, which is brotherhood.”75 No wonder internal divisions were so 
rampant in India, he maintained; under a majority Hindu Congress leadership, how could 
it be otherwise? Khan echoed the argument of wartime resolutions passed by the All 
India Muslim League, which frequently decried the Hindu caste system’s “creation of 
barriers between man and man” as violently opposed to Islam’s celebration of 
“nationalism, equality, [and] democracy.”76  
Deployed in an American context, the trope took on a different resonance. In 
criticizing the Hindu adherence to caste differences, Khan followed in a long tradition of 
American denunciations of caste as antithetical to liberal, Western values and as a 
synecdoche for “all the elements in Hindu society” perceived to “retard” India’s 
advancement.77 As early as the 1850s, American missionary writers in India had singled 
out caste as the both the “heart of Hinduism, and hence of Indian society,” and the main 
obstacle to their project of conversion and civilization.78 Seventy years later, Chief 
Justice Sutherland invoked caste to justify the Supreme Court’s decision to deny self-
described “Brahmin” Bhagat Singh Thind his claim to American citizenship; even if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Brahmins were classified as Caucasian, Sutherland had argued, caste was the marker of 
an alien mindset not in keeping with the “white civilization.”79 Khan’s use of the same 
trope twenty years after Thind as part of a campaign to reclaim that lost citizenship was 
both ironic and tragic, revealing the extent of his desperation to shore up the Welfare 
League’s failing campaign.  
In the absence of additional sources, it is unclear how many Americans heard or 
read Khan’s speeches and petitions, but clear that the All Nations’ Association’s had a 
limited audience. Even so, Khan’s embrace of communal language attracted a few 
likeminded supporters to the Welfare League’s waning cause. In its final days, the lobby 
for the Langer bill became an inter-organizational effort, as the newly created India 
Muslim League of America and the All Nations Association joined Khan to rally support 
on its behalf.80 According to Welfare League records, one person who did read and 
respond to Khan’s appeals was All India Muslim League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah 
himself. Khan had been in contact with Jinnah since at least 1941, when the Welfare 
League president initiated correspondence to solicit Jinnah’s endorsement for the 
citizenship bill.81 But Jinnah’s letters to Khan grew decidedly warmer and frequent, as 
the Muslim leader came to recognize the importance of international opinion to the 
Pakistan question. He said as much in a September 1945 letter to Khan. Citing the “need” 
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for the “American public to understand the creed . . . policy and program” of the All India 
Muslim League as well as its “goal of Pakistan,” Jinnah requested regular 
correspondence with the New York Indian leader and enclosed literature for the Welfare 
League to use in rallying support for partition among American audiences.82  
Khan readily obliged. In stark contrast with its early petitions for citizenship, the 
Welfare League’s later appeals emphasized communal difference. These appeals ignored 
the 3,000 Indian residents, most of them Sikh farmers neither Hindu nor Muslim, on 
whose behalf the citizenship bill had first been drafted. Perhaps the starkest testament to 
their erasure from the campaign came during a speech Khan gave at an All Nations’ 
Association rally in New York City. Narrating the migration history of Indians to the 
U.S., he described how early Indian immigrants – in his words, the “majority of them 
Hindus” – had traveled to America “eager to spread the word of Hindu Domination in 
this part of the world.” Nowhere in the long address did he mention the Hindus’ much 
larger Sikh cohort; by the 1940s, Sikhs made up 70 percent of the Indian American 
community compared with the Hindus’ 5 percent.83 Spoken by someone who had lived 
and worked with Indians on both coasts for over two decades, this could be nothing short 
of a deliberate misrepresentation. In order to make his arguments pitting a weak and 
oppressed Muslim India against a domineering “Hindu India” suffice, Khan ultimately 
used American ignorance in service to the Muslim League’s political agenda. Khan’s 
statement further reflected one of the wartime campaign’s greatest ironies: how, in the 
battle for Indian rights, the most disenfranchised voices were arguably those of the West 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Montague A. Machell, Muslim Valley Forge: An Introduction to Mubarek Ali Khan (1949), 22. 
 
83 R. Narayanan, “Indian Immigration & the India League of America,” 3. 
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Coast farmers who made up the majority of the Indian American community and stood to 
benefit most directly from the proposed legislation. 
By the end of 1945, the focus on communalism had thus transformed the Welfare 
League campaign from a community-based campaign for material relief to an overseas 
extension of the Muslim League effort to raise international support for Partition. The 
partnership culminated in a great honor for Khan one year later, when he and the New 
York-based Welfare League accompanied two representatives of the All-India Moslem 
League on a U.S. speaking tour intended to publicize the case for Pakistan before 
American and international audiences.84 In this way, the relationship ultimately came full 
circle. Even as Khan drew upon his homeland ties to Jinnah and the All India Muslim 
League to shore up his and the Welfare League’s legitimacy in American circles, Jinnah 
looked to Khan and the U.S. Indian community to bolster the Muslim League’s case for 
Pakistan on a wider world stage. All would see their dream realized within the year, 
resulting in such violent upheaval and loss of life that few could have imagined would be 
the legacy of their efforts. 
 
The Victory of Luce-Celler  
While Indian American activism (and infighting) largely defined the first year and 
a half of the Luce-Celler campaign, inter-branch politics in Washington, coupled with 
pressure from both Delhi and Whitehall dominated the final year. As such, the eventual 
passage of the Luce-Celler bill in July 1946 was as much a testament to Congressional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Madame Shah Nawaz of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and Mr. M.A.H. Ispahani of the Bengal 
Legislation Assembly were handpicked by Jinnah himself. “Back India Opposition,” New York Times, 
November 26, 1946, 24. M.A.H. Ispahani would return to the U.S. three years later as Pakistan’s first 
official Ambassador to the United States. !
! 122 
lobbying by an executive branch anxious to court the sympathies of Indians on the verge 
of independence, as it was the culmination of efforts by Indian American lobbyists like 
J.J. Singh and groups like the India League of America.  
Four months after an intervention by Delhi revived the bill in the House 
committee, the Luce-Celler bill passed the full U.S. House of Representatives by a vote 
of nearly three to one. Belying the wide margin of the final vote, the floor debate was a 
long and contentious one; the many vitriolic statements made over the four-hour 
discussion indexed the significant opposition that remained among Southern Democrat 
opponents. Only the staunchest House opponent of repeal, Representative Allen of 
Louisiana raised the issue of communalism, and just once. Citing recent reports of 
Hindus and Muslims “killing each other on the streets,” he questioned the wisdom of 
“transport[ing] to America” an “internal quarrel” that had been “going on for ages over 
there.” But with so many lawmakers already committed to passage on the strength of 
U.S. security and commercial interests in India, his warnings passed unremarked.85 
Subsequent reports of increasing violence on the subcontinent facilitated direct 
intervention by the Truman Administration after the bill hit a roadblock in the Senate 
Immigration Committee. As growing disillusionment over American policies on 
decolonization manifested in public condemnations and displays of violence, Truman 
personally persuaded committee chairman and Southern Democrat Richard Russell of 
Georgia to allow the measure to proceed.! A Senate subcommittee led by freshman 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Statements by sponsors Emanuel Celler and Clare Boothe Luce reiterated the expedient motivations 
behind its passage. Celler harped on the promise of the Indian market for American goods, while Luce 
focused on the legislation’s “political expediency” during a time when “Asiatic colonial peoples” were 
“shopping for political ideologies” and, in another allusion to the rising Communist threat, were “inclined” 
to do so “in Moscow.” Congressional Record, October 10, 1945, 9526-7. 
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Senator J. William Fulbright issued a favorable report in April 1946. The full committee 
sent it to the Senate floor for a vote, where like its companion bill in the House, it passed 
easily that June.  
* * * * * 
On July 2, 1946, President Truman signed the Luce-Celler bill into law.86 Its 
passage unleashed a wave of congratulatory and jubilant reports in the United States and 
Indian media. Not unexpectedly, Singh received wide praise for his role in the process. 
Having watched the progress of the campaign from Delhi, Nehru noted the “striking 
tenacity” behind Singh’s “single-handed piloting” of the Indian immigration bill. A note 
from Gandhi to American writer Louis Fischer called the ILA president’s lobbying work 
“solely responsible” for its successful enactment.87 The Time reporter covering the bill’s 
passage described Singh’s efforts in great detail, noting the letters, phone calls, and hours 
that the “handsome, swarthy . . . 6-ft. Sikh from Kashmir” had spent “tirelessly stalk[ing] 
Capitol Hill hallways” in order to secure passage.88 The statement ignored Mubarek Ali 
Khan and the other Indian advocates who pioneered the strategy in 1939.  
The goal of Pakistan realized, Khan returned to his home in Phoenix, where he 
continued to support the Indian Muslim community through the work of the Pakistan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
86 Due to a technicality, the Indian legislation was combined with the recently passed Filipino naturalization 
bill, which made all natives of the Philippines eligible for U.S. citizenship upon the islands’ independence. 
An event originally scheduled to take effect earlier, but delayed by war, formal Philippine independence 
from U.S. colonial rule was completed two days later on July 4. The conjoining of the two bills was 
described by many Washington observers as fitting, insofar as both bills stemmed from a common impetus 
to affirm America’s commitment to the self-determination of Asian peoples. The U.S. Congress quietly 
extended natives of Pakistan the same eligibility to immigrate and naturalize upon the nation’s creation in 
1947. 
 
87 Both quoted in Varma, 299. 
  
88 “100 Indians,” Time, June 17, 1946. Indeed, Singh tried in the fall of 1946, but after a series of frustrated 
inquiries with U.S. immigration officials, he abandoned the idea as too complicated. 
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Welfare League, so renamed to reflect the new state of affairs on the subcontinent.89 
After the legislative victory, all but one of Singh’s fellow Indian lobbyists in the Luce-
Celler campaign returned to India, fulfilling Khan’s predictions (if not his 
condemnations) of their essential transiency.90 J.J. Singh stayed in the United States for 
another twelve years, continuing to lead the ILA until he, too, left for India in 1959.91 
After four decades as a bachelor, Singh married and had a son, and he claimed he 
returned for his son’s sake. Spoken by the individual dubbed a “one-man lobby” for 
Indian American rights, Singh’s words encompass the diverse motivations animating the 
drive to repeal Indian exclusion in the years leading up to independence.92 Anticipating 
the difficulties the next generation of Indians in America would have growing up with 
“dual loyalties – to the country of [their] birth and to the nationality of [their] parents,” 
Singh decided to spare his young son of these “conflicts” by moving back to the 
subcontinent. “Life, as such, is difficult and full of problems,” he concluded. “I did not 
want to add another problem for my son. And that is why I came back to India.” 93  
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89 In subsequent years, the organization played host to Muslim leaders from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, its 
emphasis shifting from minority rights to a pan-Muslim imperative to foster “unity among the Muslims for 
the sake of Peace in the Middle East and Near East and Peace in the World.” For example, Amir Saud, the 
Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, was the Arizona Indian Muslim community’s guest in January 1947; 
Machell, Muslim Valley Forge, 13-15. Also see Bald, 184-188. 
 
90 Dr. Shridlani, Khan’s antagonist at the 1944 hearing, settled in Delhi as a journalist. Dr. Anup Singh, the 
former editor of the India League newsletter, served several terms in the Upper House of the Parliament in 
Delhi and later as an Indian representative to the United Nations Commission on Korea. Several others 
returned to take up academic posts at Indian universities.!
 
91 Without the unifying goal of Indian independence, the organization floundered over many years for a 
new focus, which it never found. 
 
92 Robert Shaplen, “One-Man Lobby,” New Yorker, March 24, 1951, 35-55.!
 
93 J.J. Singh, “Why I Came Back to India,” Times of India, January 26, 1969, 5. 
Chapter 3 
The Limits of Reform: 
 Korean Americans and the Problem of Korean Independence 
 
 
In view of this uncertain situation of Korea’s future status could it be humanly 
possible for you to introduce an amendment to the H.R. 3070 to include the 
Koreans too?1 
 
 
Indians were not the only colonial group to seize upon the Chinese repeal 
campaign to demand rights of their own. During World War II, Koreans in the United 
States launched a parallel campaign invoking America’s anti-colonial imperative to 
justify similar gains for Koreans. Between 1943 and 1946, Hawaii-based activist Kilsoo 
Haan and other Korean community leaders worked closely with Joseph Farrington (R-
HI), Hawaii’s territorial delegate to Congress, to make a case for a Korean immigration 
quota and Koreans’ citizenship eligibility. Advocates of the Farrington bill, or Korean 
Immigration and Naturalization Bill (KINB), seized upon Korea’s geographical position 
between America’s Chinese ally and its Japanese enemy to justify the extension of 
legislative gains to Koreans. In so doing, they claimed for Korea common enmity with 
the United States against the Japanese on the one hand, while playing up their solidarity 
with America’s Chinese allies on the other. Following the success of the Indian 
immigration campaign after 1945, KINB advocates invoked Korea’s similarity to India as 
a decolonizing power. They advocated for the KINB as an anti-colonial measure that 
would shore up goodwill for U.S. wartime and postwar projects in the Pacific and serve 
as proof of America’s commitment to self-determination for all peoples. Unlike the 
Indian immigration campaign, however, their efforts did not result in legislation. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Haan to Senator Guy Gillette, October 21, 1943, Box 1, Folder 33, Kilsoo Haan papers, University of  
California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), Santa Cruz, CA. 
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This failure reflected America’s divergent relationships with Korea and India’s 
respective colonial masters, Japan and Great Britain. In the minds of many U.S. officials, 
Korea’s relationship with Japan created the suspicion that Koreans would be loyal to 
America’s wartime enemy – and Koreans’ perceived racial similarity to their Japanese 
masters heightened the suspicion. Migrants’ relationship to the fight for independence 
also damaged the Korean case for repeal in contrast to India’s. The KINB campaign’s 
failure suggests the importance of migrants’ long-standing struggles for homeland 
independence on Congress’ reception of the movement for exclusion repeal. Like their 
Indian counterparts, Korean Americans claimed a connection between their campaigns 
for immigration and naturalization rights in the United States as connected and their 
diasporic struggle for homeland independence. Unlike their Indian counterparts, U.S. 
Koreans played a central role in the fight for their homeland’s independence. This central 
role invested their activism with greater significance over the long term; it also affected 
Korea’s course after its liberation at the end of World War II.  
This chapter argues that the United States’ conflicted relationship to Korean 
independence primarily caused the legislative failure of the KINB. If granting 
immigration and naturalization rights to Indians anticipated the subcontinent’s transition 
from colony to sovereign nation, the vicissitudes of the KINB campaign between 1943 
and 1946 reflected the struggles of the United States and other Allied powers to resolve 
the question of Korean independence during and immediately after World War II. In the 
same season that Chinese exclusion repeal passed, the United States, Britain, and China, 
jointly issued the Cairo Declaration, which anticipated the ambiguities of Korea’s 
transition from a Japanese colony during World War II to a site of Allied tutelage in 
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preparation for independence after 1945. The Allies, “mindful of the enslavement of the 
people of Korea,” agreed to uphold Korea’s right to independence and self-government 
after its liberation from Japan “in due course.” The ambiguity of “in due course,” set the 
stage for conflict in and about Korea. 
This chapter further highlights the World War II campaign for the KINB as a 
point of meaningful intersection between the repeal movement and the debate over 
Hawaiian statehood. Hawaii represented the one place in 1940s America where persons 
of Asian descent constituted a meaningful political force. The receptivity that Hawaii 
delegate Joseph Farrington showed to the Korean community’s demands reflected their 
local influence. In general, however, the wartime roots of the KINB campaign in Hawaii 
weakened its political viability at the national level, because the marginalization of 
Hawaii mimicked the marginalized status of Koreans in the United States. 
 
A History of Korean Immigration and Independence  
Japanese expansion into Korea shaped the early history of Koreans in America. 
Through the joint efforts of American Protestant missionaries working with Hawaii sugar 
planters, the first waves of Koreans came to the islands as laborers between 1903 and 
1907. Young, male, and unmarried, most migrants planned to stay in America for only a 
few years, accumulate savings, and return to Korea. But escalating Japanese aggression 
after 1905 precluded the possibility of safe return. The peninsula’s formal annexation by 
Japan in 1910 left Koreans in America without a homeland to claim as their own, and 
many decided that they would rather stay in a foreign land than return to Korea and live 
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under Japanese rule.2 Korea’s colonization transformed this early group of Korean 
migrants from sojourners to long-term exiles. It also effectively curtailed future Korean 
migration, as Koreans – reclassified as Japanese subjects under U.S. law – came under, 
first, the terms of the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement ending the flow of Japanese laborers 
into the U.S., and later the Immigration Act of 1924 which excluded Japanese altogether. 
These first waves of immigrants and their children formed the foundation of the World 
War II Korean American community, which numbered approximately 8,600 in Hawaii, 
and 1,500 in the mainland United States (mostly California) by 1940.3  
Home to one of the largest Korean populations outside the peninsula, the U.S. 
territory of Hawaii quickly emerged as an important site within the diasporic movement 
for Korean independence. Korean Americans’ activism to liberate their homeland from 
Japanese rule sustained a strong sense of Korean nationalism and ethnic identity, as 
migrants established organizations and published newspapers dedicated to the cause.4 
Established in 1908, the Korean National Association (KNA, or Kungminhoe) was the 
most important and far-reaching of these; by World War I, KNA chapters were active in 
Honolulu, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, among other U.S. cities. China served as the 
seat of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in exile after 1919, but Hawaii 
remained the homebase of many of the movement’s most important nationalist leaders as 
well as the primary source of the movement’s funds.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
2 Korean picture brides and a limited number of Korean students were the main exceptions to the Korean 
immigration ban in effect from the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 until the McCarran-Walter Act of 
1952.  
 
3 Bong-Youn Choy, Koreans in America (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979), 143.  
 
4 Richard Kim, “Managing the "Foreign" and "Domestic": Kilsoo Haan, Korean Diasporic Nationalism and 
the U.S. Liberal State, 1931-1945,” Seoul Journal of Korea Studies 19:1 (December 2006): 15-60.  
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The best known Korean American of the pre-World War II period, Syngman 
Rhee exemplified the diplomatic approach that defined the early Korean independence 
movement. He was well-suited to the task, having studied at Harvard and Princeton, 
where he purportedly gained an acquaintance with the future U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson.5 Born in 1875 in the Korean city of Kaesong, Rhee earned his nationalist 
credentials early, serving several years in prison for his anti-Japanese activities before 
immigrating to the United States. Once in the United States, Rhee capitalized on his 
reputation in both Washington and within Korean community circles to become the chief 
spokesman for Korean independence to American and international audiences. He 
figured prominently in the events of 1919, which culminated in the KPG’s formation as 
the representative governing body of a sovereign Korean nation in exile. After being 
unanimously elected the KPG’s first president, Rhee was impeached six years later for 
abusing his authority and subsequently withdrew from public life.  
Rhee’s marginalization cleared the way for Korean Hawaii activist Kilsoo Haan 
to take on a more visible role in the movement after 1933.6 Twenty-five years Rhee’s 
junior and of humbler background, Haan migrated to the islands in 1905, the son of 
plantation workers. Educated in Hawaii and San Francisco, he received his Captain’s """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 For more on Rhee’s early life, see Chong-Sik Lee, Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical 
(Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 2001); Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth 
(New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1960). Especially in light of his later position as president of the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) from 1948 to 1960, Rhee continues to dominate U.S. scholarship on the Korean 
Independence Movement and its aftermath.  
 
6 A figure long overlooked, Kilsoo Haan features prominently in several recent studies about the Korean 
independence movement in America and about Korean Americans during World War II. These include 
Richard S. Kim, "Managing the "Foreign" and "Domestic": Kilsoo Haan, Korean Diasporic Nationalism 
and the U.S. Liberal State, 1931-1945," Seoul Journal of Korea Studies 19, no. 1 (2006) and Lili M.  Kim, 
Resisting the Orientalization of the Enemy: Korean Americans, World War II, and the Transnational 
Struggle for Justice on the Homefront (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). Also see 
Wayne Patterson, The Ilse: First-generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaiʻi, 1903-1973  (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2000). 
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commission with the Salvation Army in 1920 but resigned after several years, citing 
irreconcilable theological differences. He then began a career in real estate, but never 
achieving much success, he drifted from job to job for the rest of his life. Haan began his 
public advocacy in the early 1930s, joining the KNA to fight for Korean liberation from 
Japan. After a brief stint as an officer in the Hawaii KNA, Haan resigned, citing personal 
disagreements with Rhee. The rivalry between the two men would persist into the World 
War II years. As part of the “in-between” or haksaeng (student) generation of Korean 
American leaders to come of age during the interwar years, Haan was representative of 
the shift away from the conservative, old-guard diplomacy embodied by Rhee, and 
toward the more direct-action, militant approach that gained ground after 1930. While 
this more radical strain did not become dominant among Korean nationalists in America 
until after World War II, left-leaning groups like the Korean National Revolutionary 
Party gained a steady following among Korean Americans through the 1930s, and set the 
stage for the postwar turn described later in the chapter.7 
In 1933, Haan co-founded the Sino-Korean Peoples League (SKPL) of Hawaii, 
the organization with which he would remain most closely associated. Formed as a U.S. 
chapter of the Shanghai-based organization, the Hawaii SKPL called for Koreans across 
the United States, China, and Korea to support direct military action against Japan. The 
mission of the Hawaii branch of the League was to enlist U.S. military aid in Korea’s 
battle against Japanese militarism. Younger activists like Haan not only diverged from 
their elders in their approach to Korean independence. Having grown up and spent most 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7 This growth tracked the rising militancy of Korean nationalist leaders and communities in China, which 
received the material support of Chinese Nationalist officials after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 
1931.  
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of their lives in the United States, many explicitly desired to improve life for Koreans 
living in America, especially those who had made it their permanent home and did not 
plan to return to Korea even after independence.8 This distinction fueled the prominence 
of younger activists in the 1940s campaigns for a Korean immigration and naturalization 
bill. Over the next decade, Haan carried out his lobbying efforts for both Korean 
independence and immigration under the SKPL banner, making its dual emphases on 
Sino-Korean solidarity and shared enmity against Japan on the Pacific front features 
common to both wartime campaigns.9  
Haan’s early career as a lobbyist was defined by his indictment of the Japanese. 
He first gained wide notice in Hawaii for a 1933 pamphlet in which he described an 
official plot by Tokyo to “Japanize” the islands in preparation for an eventual takeover by 
Japanese forces. Haan’s writings complemented the official warnings against Japanese 
subversion and “menace” that dominated U.S. military assessments of Hawaii, among 
other state reports, throughout the 1920s and 1930s (well before Japan’s 1941 attack on 
Pearl Harbor).10 Yet even federal officials and other local island leaders criticized Haan’s 
writings as “bitterly anti-Japanese” and “alarmist.”11 Undeterred, Haan escalated his 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8 See Anne Soon Choi, "'Unity for What? Unity for Whom?' The United Korean Committee of North 
America, 1941-1945.," in From the Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawai`i, 1903-1950, ed. Yong-ho Ch'oe 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2007). 
 
9 For more on the SKPL, see Richard Kim, “Managing the "Foreign" and "Domestic": Kilsoo Haan, Korean 
Diasporic Nationalism and the U.S. Liberal State, 1931-1945,” Seoul Journal of Korea Studies 19:1 
(December 2006), 16.   
 
10 Gary Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945 (Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 1992), Chapters 6-8. Okihiro frames the anti-Japanese movement in Hawaii as a 
longer phenomenon that spanned from the beginning of Japanese migration to the islands through the 
World War II years and after.  
 
11 OSS confidential memo re: Haan, 28 April 1942, RG 165, Box 2267, Folder 1, NARA II, College Park, 
MD. 
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admonitions a few years later in a statement before a specially appointed Joint 
Congressional committee on Hawaiian statehood. His appearance at the 1937 hearing 
marked his introduction to an official audience; it would be the first of Haan’s five 
appearances over the next few years. Haan confirmed rumors of a Japanese plot to “unite 
the peoples of oriental descent as a unit” in a race war against island residents of “white 
racial origin.” Citing his time in the Japanese consulate’s employ, he claimed to have 
seen official pamphlets with instructions for Japanese domestic servants employed in 
American homes to “poison white children” in the event that war broke out between the 
United States and Japan.12 Verifiable or not, Haan’s self-described “secret evidence from 
the Japanese Consul" won him the ear of Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa (D-IA). As a 
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Gillette took great interest in these 
reports, and all the more so as Japanese propaganda advertising a “co-prosperity sphere” 
for “Greater East Asia” heightened Washington’s fears of an impending race war.13  
Haan’s circle of influence expanded steadily after 1937, benefiting from U.S. 
policymakers’ growing interest in Japanese aggression across Asia. Speaking at a House 
Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in 1939, Haan foretold a Japanese attack on 
American soil and preached the dangers of appeasement and passivity in the face of 
Japanese expansionism. In a nod to his distinctly Korean heritage, Haan offered his 
colonized homeland as a cautionary tale and prime example of “Japanese fascistic 
ambition,” of which China had recently become victim. Chinese and Koreans alike now """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 U.S. Joint Congressional Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., 1937, p. 
467. 
 
13 For more on the Pacific War as a “race war,” see John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in 
the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). For more on Guy M. Gillette and his work in U.S. 
foreign affairs, see “Guy Mark Gillette,” in The Biographical Dictionary of Iowa, eds. David Hudson, 
Marvin Bergman, Loren Horton (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2008).  
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looked to America as their “only hope” to maintain “security and peace” in Hawaii and in 
the Far East.”14 In a statement that would later be cited to presage Pearl Harbor, Haan 
warned that if the United States did not take definitive action, Japanese militarists would 
gradually encroach on U.S. territory “starting with Hawaii, Alaska and Guam, moving 
down to the Panama Canal.” While largely dismissed at the time, U.S. officials would 
later reference his warnings as missed opportunities for preemptive action.15  
These comments set the stage for Haan’s brief rise to local media celebrity as a 
“prophet” of Pearl Harbor after December 1941. In the months following the Japanese 
attack on Hawaii, Haan capitalized on Americans’ antipathy for Japanese to expand his 
influence to the mainland. In a speaking tour of the Pacific Northwest, Haan foretold a 
second wave of Japanese attacks programmed to target the West Coast United States 
early that summer. Imploring U.S. lawmakers to see Japanese American for the “menace” 
that they were, Haan called for more comprehensive security measures than detention 
alone.16 With anti-Japanese sentiment at its peak, his diatribes found receptive ears.17 At 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, 76th Cong., 2nd sess., 1939, p. 513, 516, 
520. 
 
15 Haan buttressed his oral testimony with a written piece titled, “Japanization: A Threat to Hawaii.” While 
reiterating his general argument that “indecisive policy” by the U.S. would encourage Japanese aggression, 
the pamphlet singled out the subversive influence of Japanese-language schools in Hawaii. According to 
Haan, because the schools promoted “Japanism” to the hindrance of “Americanism,” they ultimately 
produced Japanese American youth who “retain[ed] Japanese traits and culture” and therefore could never 
become “100 percent American citizens.” RG 165, Box 2266, Folder 5: Propaganda Releases for 1939-41, 
NARA II, College Park, MD.  
 
16 In one of his more memorable claims, Haan described Japanese plans to have 100 first-generation 
Japanese set forest fires across the Pacific Northwest, to be timed in conjunction with a larger Japanese 
invasion of the West Coast. To prevent such a scenario, Haan called for additional measures to protect 
against Japanese American treachery, including the liquidation and confiscation of Japanese aliens’ funds 
and assets for government use and the conscription of all males of Japanese descent between 18 and 44 
years of age into a special U.S. army Agricultural Division charged with growing vegetables for the 
fighting men. “Propaganda Releases for 1942,” April 3, 1942, Regional File: Box 2266, p. 1, 3, 6, RG 165, 
NARA I, College Park, MD. Haan later claimed that his travels had been commissioned by the OSS, 
though officials denied any involvement. Charles Crittenden, Chief of Map Information Section at the OSS, 
to Haan, September 21, 1943, Box 1, Folder 33, Kilsoo Haan papers, UCSC, Santa Cruz, CA. 
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Haan’s urging, local groups wrote their state representatives and local newspapers to 
demand harsher surveillance of Japanese American communities. But these were 
arguably redundant; by early 1942, federal plans for the internment of West Coast 
Japanese and Japanese Americans were already underway.  
To be sure, not everyone believed Haan was what he claimed. FBI head J. Edgar 
Hoover, for example, described Haan as a “man whose loyalties [we]re for sale.”18 So 
long as American interests dictated greater attention to the Pacific front, however, U.S. 
officials were reluctant to dismiss Haan altogether. And all the more after the Japanese 
attack at Pearl Harbor seemed to bear out the truth of his warnings. Yet, Haan reached the 
height of his influence during World War II. Struck by the Korean American lobbyist’s 
apparent success, U.S. military officer Elizabeth Ito of Hawaii attempted to explain how 
an otherwise obscure Korean from Hawaii had been able to attract a significant following 
among U.S. media and official circles. In a December 1943 report, Ito described how 
Haan had successfully exploited the public’s ignorance of Asian affairs to pass himself 
off as a “Korean leader” who spoke “authoritatively for the 26,000,000 Koreans in Asia.” 
She singled out two factors as the key to Haan’s success: first, his “ability to convince 
these groups that he has far more prestige in Korean affairs and knowledge of the Far 
East than he actually has; and second, his flexible technique of identifying himself with 
the groups whose support he seeks.” Although his fellow Koreans might know better, Ito 
noted how, in the “consciousness of the American public,” Haan was being widely """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
17 Local rotaries and newspapers reprinted Haan’s lectures in sensational front-page features that catered to 
indignant American audiences.   
  
18 Writing in a July 1942 report to the State Department, Hoover also charged the Korean activist with 
aiding Japan by "deliberately trying to divide the Koreans” and of being open to play “a puppet for either 
the Japanese or for Russia.” “Government Reports Concerning Haan,” RG 165, Box 2267, Folder 1, NARA 
II, College Park, MD. "
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celebrated as an “anti-Japanese agitator motivated by patriotic, pro-American principles” 
with special “access to secret information” that helped the U.S. war effort. Shifting from 
Haan to a broader statement about the ignorance of white Americans, Ito stressed that the 
real danger lay in Haan’s influence among Americans who “either know so little about 
the Far East that they are apt to believe hearsay and unconfirmed reports or who agree 
with Haan’s viewpoint and see in him a useful exponent of their common attitude.” 
Already, she reported how in certain circles, Haan had a greater following than did the 
older and more established statesman, Syngman Rhee. In Ito’s estimation this was a 
dangerous situation, insofar as Haan posed a “considerable” threat to U.S. wartime 
interests as a “mercenary and political opportunist” who sought “support or furtherance 
of his personal and political prestige through any channels” available.19 The logic of the 
1943 military report suggests how Americans’ lack of familiarity with Asia created 
opportunities for ambitious and, in some cases, unscrupulous Asian Americans like Haan 
to represent themselves as valuable experts on Asian affairs.  
 
The Korean American Predicament During World War II   
Korean independence activists agitated in vain before World War II. America’s 
long-standing practice of subordinating its Korea policy to other interests continued to 
undercut Koreans’ attempts to marshal Washington’s support toward their nationalist 
goals.20 Years of protests and petitions to the U.S. government by Syngman Rhee, Kilsoo """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
19 “Military Intelligence Division Regional file (Korea) 1922-44,” p. 1, 2, 8, 11, RG 165, Box 2260, File 
2030, NARA II, College Park, MD. 
 
20 The declaration of Korean independence during the March First movement followed by the establishment 
of the KPG after World War I briefly renewed hope that Washington would finally take up the Korean 
independence cause in line with America’s claims to support self-determination. But, as historian Erez 
Manela has shown, the promise of the “Wilsonian Moment” ended instead in the widespread 
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Haan, and others from across the Korean diaspora were met with ambivalence. Reluctant 
to offend a rising Japanese imperialist power or jeopardize America’s colonial interests in 
the Philippines, U.S. policymakers refused to intervene on Korea’s behalf. In the words 
of one Korean American writer, Washington’s inaction represented a “betrayal of 
American claims to support the freedom of all colonial peoples to decide their own 
future.”21  
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 ended America’s 
appeasement policy, formally bringing the United States into the Allied War against 
Japan on the Pacific front. Koreans in America unanimously welcomed America’s formal 
entry into the war, hopeful that U.S. involvement would help them achieve the long-
awaited independence of their homeland. They joined in the domestic war mobilization 
with gusto, their patriotic displays and declarations offered as proof of their commitment 
to the goal of Allied victory not only as Koreans eager to see a Japanese defeat, but as 
patriotic Americans seeking to advance U.S. democratic ideals and influence abroad.22 As 
the San Francisco-based New Korea newspaper noted in response to news of the 
bombing,  the community’s task now was to “convince and show our fellow American 
citizens that although we are Koreans by descent, we are first and last true loyal 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
disillusionment of colonial peoples. For more on the March First movement and the other events of 1919, 
see Erez Manela, Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For more on the U.S. and its ambivalent relationship 
with anti-colonial nationalist movements in Asia, see David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds., The United 
States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom (New York: Palgrave, 2000), especially the introduction.  
 
21 New Korea, June 13, 1937. 
 
22 Among other things, Koreans in Hawaii and California bought war bonds in sums disproportionate to 
their community’s modest size and formed civilian “Tiger Brigades” made up of Korean aliens to 
demonstrate their martial spirit and military commitment to the war despite their ineligibility to serve 
formally in the U.S. army. Choy, 173-4. 
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American[s] in our ways of living, thinking and ideals.”23 In Hawaii, where Korean 
loyalties came under greatest scrutiny by the military government that took control of the 
islands following the attack, Korean community leaders issued proclamations along 
similar lines. As historian Lili M. Kim has argued, by using the language of “American 
democracy, Korean Americans framed their “devotion to Korean independence as an 
extension of American democratic ideals, and themselves as products of American 
democracy.”24  
But Koreans in America often found that their contributions were unwelcome.25 
Their physical resemblance to the Japanese made them easy targets of racial violence 
carried out in the name of patriotism. The anti-Japanese backlash evoked by Pearl Harbor 
placed Korean Americans in an awkward position, as citizens and aliens alike suffered 
harassment and even physical harm at the hands of their fellow Americans. A second-
generation Korean American, Mary Paik Lee described the constant danger she and her 
family members faced during the World War II years, including stories of Korean 
American friends arbitrarily stopped on the highway by authorities, dragged out of their 
cars, and beaten.26 The problem of anti-Japanese vigilantes became so pronounced that 
some Koreans on the West Coast and in Hawaii wore “I am Korean” badges.27 In tragic """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
23 “Our Stand,” The New Korea, December 11, 1941.  
 
24 Lili Kim, “In Pursuit of Imperfect Justice: The Predicament of Koreans and Korean Americans on the 
Homefront during World War II” (PhD diss., University of Rochester, 2001), 174, 176, 188-189.  
 
25 Mistaken identity, classification issues, and vigilante violence were all part of what Lili Kim has 
described as Korean Americans’ “wartime predicament.” Lili M. Kim, Resisting the Orientalization of the 
Enemy: Korean Americans, World War II, and the Transnational Struggle for Justice on the Homefront 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). 
 
26 Mary Paik Lee, Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1990). For more on the everyday experiences of Koreans during World War II see Lili Kim, “In 
Pursuit of Imperfect Justice,” Chapter 3.  
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episodes of mistaken identity, Korean Americans became targets of violence carried out 
in the name of an American allegiance to which they likewise subscribed.  
Wartime debates over Koreans’ legal classification reflected the difficulty 
Korea’s colonial status posed for U.S. officials. Because Korea was a Japanese colony, 
War Department officials initially grouped Koreans on the home front with Japanese as 
“enemy aliens” under the 1940 Registration Act. Extensive lobbying and repeated 
petitions from Haan and other outraged community representatives eventually persuaded 
federal officials to re-classify Koreans as non-hostile in January 1942.28 While Korean 
American leaders commended the U.S. government for correcting its error, this small 
victory by no means resolved the identity issue. Confusion would persist for the duration 
of the war, undermining Koreans’ professions of loyalty and allegiance to the U.S. cause. 
The revival of the Korean independence movement in America after 1940 
compounded the official ambivalence. Emboldened by the anti-colonial language of the 
Atlantic Charter, Koreans were one of several migrant groups to renew their activism on 
behalf of oppressed homelands in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack. In early 1942, nine 
Korean organizations came together to form the United Korean Committee (UKC) as a 
coalition that spoke for the Korean community as a whole. The UKC’s goals were """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
27 The appearance of Time magazine’s informational piece, “How to Tell a Jap” speaks to the severity of 
the issue, though it focused on Chinese. “How to Tell a Jap,” Time, 21 December 1941, 33. Historian Lili 
Kim has documented some of the myriad ways that Koreans in Hawaii and California attempted to 
differentiate themselves from not only their Japanese colonizers but the Japanese Americans around them. 
Lili M. Kim, “In Pursuit of Imperfect Justice,” Chapter 6. Confronted with the problem of Japanese 
internment, Kim argued that Koreans in the U.S. made the morally problematic choice to support the unjust 
policy, contributing to their own racialization with the Japanese enemy to their own detriment. 
 
28 Koreans’ status took longer to resolve in Hawaii, where Military Governor General Robert Richardson, 
Jr. continued staunchly to oppose any change in policy. See Lili M. Kim, "How Koreans Repealed Their 
`Enemy Alien' Status: Korean Americans' Identity, Culture, and National Pride in Wartime Hawai`i," in 
From the Land of Hibiscus: Koreans in Hawai`i, 1903-1950, ed. Yong-ho Ch'oe (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai`i Press, 2007). 
 
 " 139 
twofold: Washington’s support for an independent Korea, and its formal recognition of 
the Korean Provisional Government based in Chungking as Korea’s representative 
governing body. But Koreans’ fanatical engagement with independence activities posed a 
dilemma for Washington officials, who tended to view such diasporic activism on behalf 
of a homeland as inconsistent with full-fledged loyalty to the United States, whether the 
homeland was Asian or European.29  
In a memorandum on diasporic activism issued immediately after the Japanese 
attack at Pearl Harbor, U.S. State Department officials underscored the importance of 
unequivocal loyalty to the American war effort, noting that the “first concern of the 
United States must always be the unity of the country.” The department understood that 
Americans might be “sympathetic to the national aspirations of their country of racial 
origin.” Nevertheless, it drew a sharp distinction between the responsibilities of U.S. 
citizens and of aliens living in America during a time of war. Specifically, the State 
Department expressed its disapproval of “any attempt to enlist the support of American 
citizens of like racial background on the theory that they are ‘fellow nationals.’” 
Specifically, it reasserted its opposition to “any activities designed to divide the 
allegiance of any group of American residents between the United States and any foreign 
government, in existence or prospect.”30 The demands of war, it concluded, required that 
Americans’ loyalty be to the United States first. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
29 Lili Kim, “In Pursuit of Imperfect Justice,” 188-189. "
30 “Policy Regarding ‘Free Movements’ in the United States,” Department of State Bulletin 5 (December 
13, 1941): 519-520. The memorandum was primarily directed at exiled European political figures, and only 
secondarily at smaller Asian colonial populations like Koreans and Indians in the United States. See 
Lorraine Lees, “National Security and Ethnicity: Contrasting Views during World War II,” Diplomatic 
History 11:2 (May 2007), 118. 
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Korean Americans attempted to negotiate these wartime demands in various 
ways. As historian Lili Kim has described, community leaders consciously adopted the 
language of Americanism to frame their commitment to Korean independence as an 
“extension of their appreciation for American democracy and freedom.”31 But this 
approach did little to further the cause of repeal. U.S. officials continued to view Korean 
American professions of patriotism and dedication to the American war effort with 
suspicion, as expedient and superficial instruments in the desire for Korean 
independence. Non-Korean observers in Hawaii and California fed these doubts. In the 
words of one Hawaii resident quoted in a March 1942 government report, “As long as 
helping America will help Korea, [Koreans] will do what they can.”32 An advisor to the 
Public Morale Section, a civilian organization in Hawaii interested in race relations, was 
more blunt. In a letter to the Hawaii territorial government sent right after Pearl Harbor, 
he described how Koreans were “taking advantage of the present emergency to harp on 
the desire for independence.” And yet, he continued, “We do not want Korean-Americans 
to act as Koreans. We want them to act as Americans and to be sympathetic with all 
peoples and nations which are under enemy domination. If American-Koreans are to 
segregate themselves as Koreans instead of aligning themselves with Americans, a 
problem of rift in solidarity toward a common goal will arise.”33 In short, American 
patriotism in wartime left no room for dual commitments or identities.  
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
31 Lili Kim, "The Limits of Americanism and Democracy: Korean Americans, Transnational Allegiance, 
and the Question of Loyalty on the Homefront During World War II," Amerasia Journal 29:3 (2003–2004), 
87. 
 
32 Quoted in Ibid., 85. 
 
33 Quoted in Ibid., 86. 
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Entwining Korean Immigration and Independence 
Two developments in 1943 set the stage for the formal introduction in Congress 
of the Farrington bill, or Korean Immigration and Naturalization Bill (KINB). The 1943 
campaign for Chinese exclusion repeal prompted similar demands from members of the 
Korean American community for commensurate gains, just as it had for Indians. In their 
appeals, Koreans explicitly positioned themselves in relation to their Chinese 
counterparts. The second development was the Cairo Declaration, whereby the United 
States, Great Britain, and China jointly pledged to support Korea’s independence after its 
liberation from Japan “in due course.” Announced in November 1943, the international 
statement was intended to address widespread uncertainty regarding the Allied powers’ 
intentions for Korea once Japan was defeated and the peninsula was free of colonial rule. 
In practice, however, the Declaration complicated more than it clarified, and these 
complications would undercut the progress of the KINB for years to come. 
*  *  *  *  * 
Writing in April 1943, one month before the House Committee hearings on 
proposals to repeal Chinese exclusion were slated to begin, Kilsoo Haan asked Reps. 
Warren Magnuson and Martin Kennedy to amend their legislation for Chinese gains to 
name Koreans the co-beneficiaries of immigration quotas and citizenship eligibility.34 To 
make his case, he adopted the logic of triangulated identity, invoking Koreans’ solidarity 
with China on the one hand and their enmity with Japan on the other. Korean nationalist 
leaders had a long history of emphasizing their homeland’s similarity with China to 
bolster Korea’s significance by association. Even before America formally entered the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
34 Haan to Warren Magnuson and Martin Kennedy, April 3, 1943, Box 1, Folder 33, Kilsoo Haan papers, 
UC-Santa Cruz (UCSC), Santa Cruz, CA.  
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Pacific War, Korean community newspapers regularly carried images of Korean soldiers 
training with the Chinese National Army as visual proofs of Sino-Korean military unity 
against Japan.35 In an editorial published in the Los Angeles-based Korean community 
newspaper New Korea, Korean businessman in Hawaii Ilhan New used similar reasoning. 
In New’s words, it was not the size of the immigration quotas granted that mattered so 
much as the necessity that policy treat Koreans and Chinese “equitably.” The recognition 
of Koreans along with Chinese, he maintained, would have “great bearing on future 
international relations.”36 At the same time, Koreans played on the torrent of anti-
Japanese sentiment unleashed by the Pearl Harbor attack in order to shore up their own 
inclusion on the American home front.37 In one of his appeals, Haan cited Koreans’ 
centuries of conflict with Japan as its “number one enemy” to argue that their suffering at 
the hands of Japanese imperialists had earned them the same rights under U.S. 
immigration policy as Chinese. 
As a colonial people, however, Koreans had a status more similar to Indians than 
to Chinese or Japanese. Like their Indian American counterparts, Korean American 
community leaders explicitly connected their legislative appeals to the longer-standing 
struggle for their homeland’s independence. India League of America members had 
described U.S. legislation for Indian rights as a symbolic boon to the goal of Indian 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
35 One such photograph, which appeared in a 1941 issue of a San Francisco-based Korean immigrant 
newspaper, was captioned accordingly, “Brethren of the Same Fate.” Korean troops in China began 
receiving aid from the Chinese Nationalist Government following the Marco Polo incident in 1937 and 
continued to receive assistance throughout the war. Korean Independence, May 24, 1941. 
 
36 Ilhan New, “Four and One-Half Koreans,” New Korea, October 21, 1943. 
 
37 Lili Kim, “The Pursuit of Imperfect Justice: The Predicament of Koreans and Korean Americans on the 
Homefront during World War II” (PhD diss., University of Rochester, 2001). Chinese Americans made 
similar efforts. See K. Scott Wong, Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 81-85, 124. 
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independence; similarly, Kilsoo Haan and other Korean American activists framed 
Korean rights in America as supporting Korea’s cause by bringing prestige to Koreans as 
a sovereign and independent people on the international stage. On October 22, the day 
after the Magnuson bill passed in the House of Representatives, Kilsoo pled for a Korean 
amendment. His appeal, addressed to long-time ally and U.S. Senator Guy Gillette (D-
IA), contended that in light of the “uncertain situation of Korea’s future status,” a Korean 
immigration measure promised to secure Asian goodwill and cement Koreans’ allegiance 
to the Allied cause. Good intentions and words could only go so far; ultimately, the 
failure of U.S. and British officials to provide “tangible assurance” of Korea’s 
independence after the war imperiled American interests in Asia by undermining the 
spirit of the Atlantic Charter.38 The granting of Korean legislative rights, Haan 
maintained, would offer valuable reassurance for Koreans wary of America’s intentions 
toward their homeland.  
Haan’s appeal for an amendment failed, but Senator Gilette used the Senate floor 
debate over the Magnuson bill as an opportunity both to prime the stage for a Korean 
effort and to raise the issue of Korean independence before an official audience. His 
November 1943 speech marked an early instance of a repeal campaign serving as a 
platform for Asian American lobbyists to express their support for anti-colonial 
movements in Asia. In what was likely feigned curiosity, Gillette asked for clarification 
on whether the Chinese bill would extend to the Korean people, whom he described as 
not only “closely related to the Chinese but “probably originally from the same stock.” In 
response to the speaker’s objection that Koreans were under Japanese rule, Gillette """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
38 Haan to Senator Guy Gillette, October 21, 1943, Box 1, Folder 33, Kilsoo Haan papers, University of 
California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), Santa Cruz, CA. 
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conceded that this was the case. But he made a point to identify the Korean Provisional 
Government (KPG) based in China as the true representative of the Korean people in 
exile. Andrews concluded by expressing his hope for the restoration of Koreans’ 
freedom, a sentiment that Gillette hastened to echo.39 Gillette’s speech represents a 
concrete example of how the Chinese campaign set the stage for the Korean efforts that 
followed. Haan acknowledged as much in a December 1943 note thanking Gillette for his 
remarks establishing the “foundation for future action.”40 
The Cairo Declaration was issued a few days later to quell uncertainty regarding 
Allied plans for Korea after the war. However, the phrase ‘in due course’ fueled 
speculation that the Allied powers’ intended to set up a trusteeship in Korea. In a letter to 
Gillette responding to the news, Haan expressed the ambivalence of many Korean 
American observers to the pledge’s language. On the one hand, Haan expressed gratitude 
for the recognition of Koreans’ suffering under years of Japanese “enslavement.”41 At the 
same time, he cautioned that the use of “half measures,” stalling tactics, and other 
methods of potentially “teasing the Koreans” was “against the best interests of the U.N.” 
as fodder for “Japanese propagandists” to cast doubt on the Allied Powers’ intentions. To 
spare as many lives as possible, Haan contended, the United States and other powers 
should “not hesitate to let the Koreans in Korea, Japan, Manchuria, and occupied China 
know that after victory Korea will be given complete and full independence.”42 Behind 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
39 Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 89 (November 26, 
1943): S 9992-9993. 
 
40 Haan to Gillette, November 23, 1943, Box 1, Folder 30, Haan papers, UCSC, Santa Cruz, CA.  
 
41 The actual text of the Cairo Declaration reads: “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories 
which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement 
of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” 
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the scenes, high-level assessments of the Korean situation told a different story. Soviet 
leader Josef Stalin estimated that at least a 40-year tutelage period would be necessary to 
prepare Koreans for self-government, a sentiment echoed by British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill.43 Under no circumstances did any Allied power, including the United 
States, describe immediate independence for Korea as viable.  
Reactions within the Korean American community were mixed. Claiming to 
speak for all Korean Americans, Jacob Dunn of the United Korean Committee (UKC) 
issued a statement accepting the “in due course” qualification as a necessary step toward 
Korean independence. He defended the restriction as pragmatic and even beneficial in 
light of Korea’s history of subjugation and organizational weakness under Japanese 
colonial rule, and urged his fellow Koreans to see the clause “not [as] an impediment but 
rather an encouragement after thirty-three years of national servitude.” Dunn concluded 
by asserting Koreans’ determination to achieve self-government under America’s 
“counsel and guidance.”44 Not everyone was inclined to agree. Writers for left-wing 
Korean Independence newspaper in Los Angeles likewise expressed “profound gratitude” 
to the three Allied leaders for reaffirming Korea’s future independence.45 But they also 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
42 Mindful as always of his own reputation within official circles, Haan also petitioned Gillette, in his 
capacity as a member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, to publicize the SKPL’s successful 
espionage schemes against the Japanese enemy. He cited the group’s decade-long success in “placing 
189,000 anti-Jap Koreans in strategic war plants”; from this strategic vantage point, they provided the 
SKPL network, in turn, with inside intelligence on Japanese mobilization plans. In this way, Haan made 
attempts to leverage the Senator’s long-time support for himself and the SKPL into an endorsement that 
would raise his profile and standing within Washington circles – presumably above that of his rival Rhee 
and the other entities that were actively claiming to represent Korea by the beginning of 1944. Haan to 
Gillette, December 2, 1943, Box 1, Folder 30, Haan papers, UCSC, Santa Cruz, CA.  
 
43 According to the 1944 British report, nothing in Koreans’ history suggested a capacity “favorable to the 
establishment of a democratic form of government.” Timothy Savage, “The American Response to the 
Korean Independence Movement, 1910-1945,” Korean Studies 20-21 (1996): 217-219. 
 
44 J. Kyuang Dunn, “In Due Course,” Korean National Herald Pacific Weekly, December 29, 1943. 
 
 " 146 
noted their misgivings. In the words of one skeptic, the Cairo Declaration “arouses the 
inevitable suspicion that perhaps, after all, the independence of Korea will conform only 
to the pattern of the postwar arrangement of big powers,” and in so doing, it “places a 
great question mark upon the Allies’ basic concept of the freedom and equality of men 
and nations.”46 
 
Launching the KINB Campaign, 1944-1945  
The formal campaign for a Korean immigration and naturalization bill (KINB) 
began in earnest in 1944. Two lawmakers with ties to the Korean community, Joseph 
Farrington (R-HI), territorial delegate from Hawaii, and Minnesota Congressman Walter 
Judd (R-MN) introduced the first measures to the House in June 1944. Like the 
Magnuson bill passed the previous year, the Judd and Farrington bills proposed to make 
Koreans eligible for U.S. citizenship and to grant Korea an annual immigration quota of 
100, upon its independence from Japan. The legislation was consistent with Judd’s long-
term goal to end exclusion for all Asian groups. As an elected official from Hawaii, 
Farrington was one of the few lawmakers with a political interest in courting second-
generation Korean American voters.47 Moreover, Farrington had personal relationships 
with local Korean community leaders, at whose urging he introduced the measure to 
Congress.   
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
45 “In Due Course,” Korean Independence, December 8, 1943. 
 
46 Peter Hyun, “How Far Is ‘In Due Course?’” Korean Independence, March 1, 1944.  
 
47 In 1940, there were 6,851 persons of Korean descent in the territory of Hawaii. They made up only 
0.016% of the total population but their concentration in a handful of districts made them a significant 
factor in some local elections. 1940 Census (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).  
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Based on the logic that their best chance of success lay in emulating the Chinese 
campaign’s tactics, proponents of the KINB adapted the war-centered arguments of the 
Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion to build an analagous case for Korean 
gains. In a June 1944 telegram, President Joon Tai Whang of the Hawaii Korean 
University Club went so far as to parrot the language of President Roosevelt’s 
endorsement of the Magnuson bill months earlier. He maintained that a successful 
Korean measure would boost military morale in Asia by cutting off the “tail of Japanese 
propaganda” and otherwise “quicken Allied victory on the Pacific front.”48 Farrington 
used similar language in his office press releases and official statements, explaining his 
decision to sponsor the measure in terms of U.S. geostrategic and wartime imperatives in 
the Pacific.  
KINB advocates could only take these arguments so far, however. Key 
differences between China and Korea undercut their case. Relative to the central role 
played by Chinese troops, who bore the brunt of Allied losses on the Pacific front, 
Korea’s value as a military ally against its Japanese colonial master was weak at best. 
The Japanese prohibition against firearm ownership precluded any real potential for a 
Korean uprising on the peninsula to help the Allied cause.49 There was also the basic 
difference of where each country sat within America’s hierarchy of geopolitical priorities 
in Asia. As Japan’s power rose, the U.S. responded by seeking ways to elevate China’s 
international status from a semicolonial state to one of the world’s “Four Policemen,” a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
48 Assorted letters to Joseph Farrington, Jr., Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii; 
Riggs, 57, 79, 104-107. Whang, quoted in New Korea, December 4, 1943.  
 
49 The scarcity of American resources led officials like U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kermit Roosevelt, 
Jr. to argue that priority should be given to China, which could, in turn, allocate some of its aid to Korean 
military units under Chinese command. For a more comprehensive discussion of Korea’s military value to 
the Pacific front, see Savage, 206, 209, 215. 
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measure Roosevelt described as the only means of achieving balance of power in the 
region. Washington policymakers had no similarly compelling reason to court Koreans’ 
goodwill. As a small power with few natural resources and minimal American presence 
consisting largely of missionaries, Korea was a secondary concern; U.S. officials only 
considered Korea’s importance occasionally, and then only in relation to its powerful 
neighbors China and Japan.50  
Americans’ consciousness of Japan and China had influenced the Chinese cause 
for repeal; Americans’ ignorance of Korea made the Korean campaign more difficult. As 
one journalist noted in the wake of Pearl Harbor, “[a]bout the only people who know 
Koreans in the U.S. are other Koreans.”51 Consequently, neither the independence nor the 
KINB campaigns ever commanded the popularity or media attention of the Chinese 
exclusion repeal campaign, and the staunchest supporters of the KINB remained Koreans 
themselves.52 Not surprisingly, a disproportionate number of the endorsements for the 
Farrington and Judd bills came from Korean community organizations in Hawaii, where 
a majority of Koreans lived. These included the Hawaii Korean Christian Church, the 
Korean Women’s Relief Society, the Dongjihwe, the Korean American Council of 
Hawaii, the Korean Mission Board, the UKC, the Korean Civic Club, and the Korean 
Delta Fraternity and Sorority of Honolulu. This geographical and ethnic concentration of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
50 According to historian Timothy Savage, the “one constant” of America’s Korea policy over the first half 
of the twentieth century was the “tendency to subordinate its Korean policy to other foreign policy 
concerns.” In the context of World War II, these larger issues were U.S. interests in Korea’s regional 
neighbors: China and Japan. Savage, 189. 
 
51 “Aliens: Japanese Obsession,” Time, February 2, 1942. 
 
52 As in the Chinese repeal campaign, missionaries formed a significant force for legislative passage in the 
KINB campaigns. As some of the only Americans with firsthand experience in Korea and East Asia more 
generally, former missionaries like George McCune came to fill an intelligence gap as advisors to the OSS, 
U.S. military, and other intelligence agencies during the 1940s. 
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support gave the KINB little political clout; not only were Koreans a negligible political 
force, but Hawaii’s territorial status meant that its residents and representatives, KINB 
sponsor Farrington included, had no voting power on the federal level.53 While several 
mainstays from the Chinese and Indian campaign lent their names to the KINB cause – 
Congressional co-sponsor Rep. Walter Judd (R-MN) and Pearl Buck were the most 
prominent – their support for Korean gains was ultimately derivative, motivated by their 
desire for general Asian immigration reform rather than a specific commitment to Korea.  
The anti-colonial argument was Koreans’ best hope. Recognizing this, supporters 
of the KINB focused their appeals on the importance of Korea’s imminent liberation 
from Japanese control. In an editorial titled “Why Korea Should Be Put on a Quota Basis 
along with China,” Hawaii Korean community leader Henry Chung explained how the 
legal recognition of Koreans by the U.S. government could advance the cause of Korean 
independence.54 His editorial resonated closely with the logic used by India League of 
America activists in their concurrent bid for gains. For the U.S. government formally to 
grant Koreans immigration and naturalization rights was, indirectly, to have the most 
powerful nation in the world recognize Korea as an independent and sovereign power 
distinct from Japan. Consequently, he suggested, the KINB’s potential to advance the 
longer-standing independence cause should not be underestimated. The KINB’s first 
sponsor and Hawaii delegate to Congress Joseph Farrington articulated a similar 
argument in a 1944 press release, noting how “friends of Korean freedom” welcomed """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
53 Richard Kim discusses the implications of this “clientalist” model of politics for Korean American 
nationalist mobilization in The Quest for Statehood: Korean Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 
1905-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
 
54 The trope of America as Korea’s guardian and liberator had a long and prominent place in U.S.-Korea 
relations. Henry Chung, “Why Korea Should Be Put on a Quota Basis along with China,” [undated], Box 1, 
Folder 17, Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, HI.  
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“favorable action on this legislation” as an “assurance” of American support for the 
Korean “fight to throw off the yoke of Japan and reestablish Korea as a free country.” He 
concluded his appeal by reiterating the bill’s promise to “inspire the people of Korea to 
continue resistance to the cruel aggression of the Japanese.”55  
But even as Korea’s colonial dilemma created the potential for political leverage, 
its status as a Japanese colony led to problems as well. For as long as the war continued, 
Korean American advocates found they could not escape Koreans’ internationally 
recognized identity as Japanese subjects, with all the suspicion it engendered. A February 
1945 report by the American Legion’s Americanism Committee spoke to Koreans’ 
colonial dilemma with particular force. Citing the “thousands of Korean men” married to 
Japanese women, the authors expressed concern that the intimacy of the ties forged 
between Koreans and their Japanese colonizers over thirty years of colonial rule bound 
Koreans’ first allegiance to Japan and the Axis powers rather than to the United States 
and the Allies.56 They were especially vehement in their opposition to the passage of a 
Korean immigration bill; so long as Korea was technically under Japanese rule, they 
protested, allowing “Koreans [in]to the United States . . . would be [like] admitting 
Japanese” – a completely unacceptable proposal when Japanese troops were slaughtering 
American troops on the Pacific battle front. This second objection reflected a 
misunderstanding of when the immigration quota would take effect – after Korea’s 
liberation, not immediately – but it nonetheless attested to how Korea’s colonial ties to 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
55 Press Release, Joseph Farrington, June 2, 1944, Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, HI.  
 
56 H.L. Chaillaux, Director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion, to Francis 
Sullivan, Executive Director of the National Legislative Committee, American Legion, February 5, 1945, 
Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii.  
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Japan undercut efforts to rally broader popular support for any Korea-related cause. In 
government circles, any sense of being soft on Japan was political anathema. So long as 
Korea remained a part of the Japanese Empire, many Congressional lawmakers refused to 
review, much less take action on, a Korean immigration bill.57 
As a colony of America’s wartime enemy Japan, at first glance, Korea’s colonial 
dilemma seemed more straightforward than that of India, which British Prime Minister 
and key American ally Winston Churchill had already declared his unwillingness to 
relinquish.58 The question of a formal U.S. statement of support for Korean 
independence, however, raised a distinct set of issues that international proclamations 
like the Cairo Declaration left unresolved. One ongoing subject of debate was whether 
the U.S. should formally recognize the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) based in 
China as Korea’s legitimate governing body in exile. U.S. officials, in discussion with the 
Chinese Nationalist Government, vacillated on the question throughout World War II. In 
the end, they remained true to America’s general policy of not recognizing governments 
in exile. American missionaries who had spent time on the peninsula also convinced them 
that the Korean exile movement, centered around the KPG in China, was virtually """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
57 Around the time the first round of bills was introduced in mid-1944, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service official and frequent advisor to Congressional Immigration Committees, Edward Shaughnessy 
penned a note to Farrington: “Just to remind you that the drafting of this measure in no way commits us. It 
is entirely yours. We will, of course, make a regular report on the bill if and when called upon.” Edward 
Shaughnessy to Joseph Farrington, Jr., May 31, 1944, Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, 
Hawaii. 
 
58 For more on the dilemma created by Churchill’s intransigence on India (and the British Empire, more 
generally) for Washington, see Gary Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971) and Sarah Ellen Graham, “American Propaganda, the Anglo-American 
Alliance, and the ‘Delicate Question’ of Indian Self-Determination,” Diplomatic History 33 (2009): 223-
259. U.S. government reports reflected connections between India and Korea in policymakers’ minds. In 
April 1942, U.S. Secretary of State Sumner Welles told Roosevelt that, had the Cripps mission to India 
been successful, he would have recommended a formal White House statement in support of Korean 
independence. As it was, the failure of negotiations between the British imperial government and Indian 
National Congress foreclosed such a move. Savage, 212. 
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unknown to Koreans in Korea, in spite of claims by Rhee and other U.S.-based Koreans 
to the contrary.59  
Reports of disunity within the U.S.-based Korean independence movement only 
added to Washington’s distrust of the Korean American community. Based on his well 
known record of corruption and powermongering, Syngman Rhee remained the most 
divisive figure, but Haan proved troublesome in his own right.60 Dissension within the 
Korean American community grew sufficiently serious that U.S. officials including 
Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa intervened to act as intermediaries promoting cooperation 
among the warring factions.61 By 1943, infighting within the Korean American 
community had became so widely known that U.S. military officials in Hawaii concluded 
that the “existing intra-Korean friction, jealousy and political maneuvering ma[d]e it 
impossible for Americans to use Koreans in the war with any degree of safety.”62 By the 
following year, four different offices in Washington, DC claimed to speak for Koreans 
worldwide. One was led by Syngman Rhee acting on behalf of the China-based KPG, one 
by Kilsoo Haan for the Sino-Korean People’s League, and one each by the Korean 
National Association based in Hawaii and the UKC umbrella group.63 Against this """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
59 Savage, 214."
 
60 For more on Rhee’s early career and the circumstances leading to his 1925 impeachment by the Korean 
Provisional Government in exile, see Richard Kim, Quest for Statehood, Chapter 4.   "
61 In a letter to UKC secretary J. Kyuang Dunn, Gillette vouched for the “sincerity and dependability” of 
Kilsoo Haan based on his years of collaboration with the Korean Hawaiian lobbyist. Gillette to Dunn, 
December 2, 1942, Box 2, Folder 1, Kilsoo Haan papers, UCSC, Santa Cruz, CA. 
 
62 Memo by Robert Kinney of U.S. Military Intelligence Service to Chief of the Japan Branch, June 9, 
1943, RG 165, Box 2266, Folder 1, NARA II, College Park, MD. "
63 For more on factionalism within the Korean American community during World War II, see Richard 
Kim, Quest for Statehood, Chapter 7, and Kingsley Lyu, “Korean Nationalist Activities in Hawaii and the 
Continental United States, 1900-1945, Part II: 1919-1945,” Amerasia 4:2 (1977): 53-100. 
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backdrop of disarray within the movement, a lengthy endorsement sent by KPG Foreign 
Minister T. Joso Wang, calling for the KINB as a “first step” toward the restoration of the 
1882 Korean-American Treaty of Amity, registered as little more than a rhetorical 
gesture from an exilic government that Washington refused to recognize.64  
Following the defeat of the 1944 measures, African American Congressman 
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (NY-D) and Hawaii’s Joseph Farrington in the House, and 
Claude Pepper (R-FL) in the Senate introduced a second set of Korean immigration and 
naturalization bills.65 Powell supported the legislation on principle, out of his support for 
racial equality. In early 1943, he had introduced one of the first measures for 
comprehensive Asian exclusion repeal, which the House Immigration Committee quickly 
tabled. Pepper became familiar with the Korean independence issue as a member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and came to sponsor the KINB in that way.66 In a 
statement accompanying the Senate bill, Pepper explicitly linked the Korean 
independence and immigration causes, noting his desire to recognize Koreans in light of 
their unparalleled  suffering under the “Japanese yoke” and their cooperation with the 
Allies in a “magnificent fight against Japanese militarism.”67   
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
64 By referring to the 1882 diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and Korea, Wang positioned the KPG as 
the legitimate successor to the Chosen regime that signed it. As the first treaty Korea ever made with a 
Western power, the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation became an important symbol 
and theme frequently invoked by Korean nationalists seeking Washington’s support against the Japanese. 
Text of radiogram from T. Joso Wang of KPG to Farrington, July 8, 1944, Farrington papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, HI.  
 
65 H.R. 1901 was introduced on January 31, 1945; a companion bill, S. 730, was introduced to the Senate 
on March 12, 1945. 
 
66 See Chapter 1."
 
67 Pepper to Haan, March 14, 1945, Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, HI. 
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In this second effort, the United Korean Committee (UKC) chapter in Hawaii 
spearheaded lobbying for the KINB under the leadership of UKC and Honolulu-KNA 
leader Jacob Dunn. Born in Korea, Dunn had immigrated to Hawaii as a young child.  
Like Kilsoo Haan, Dunn was educated on the U.S. mainland, conversant in both English 
and Korean, and well versed in the American political process. Dunn began by calling 
upon “leading Koreans in Washington” to coordinate a mobilization plan for the KINB. 
Taking its cue from the highly successful Chinese campaign’s Citizens Committee, the 
effort would coordinate campaign efforts under a central KINB “advisory committee” of 
white Americans. Unlike the all-white Citizens Committee, the 25-member KINB council 
reserved three slots for Americans of Korean ancestry. The structure reflected both the 
founders’ desire to retain some level of community control over the campaign, and a 
concession to the greater difficulty Korean Americans faced in recruiting white 
Americans to the obscure Korean cause.68  
The KINB received support from many of the figures who had featured 
prominently in the Chinese and Indian repeal campaigns. The C.I.O. labor union had 
broken with the AFL to endorse the Magnuson bill in 1943, citing the injustice of 
America’s discriminatory immigration laws; its endorsement of the KINB in early 1945 
followed in the same vein. A conference of 150 West Coast Jewish organizations also 
expressed approval of the measure as a “welcome step toward racial equality in 
America.”69 The elder statesman, Syngman Rhee, remained active in reaching out to the 
American missionary and religious community, successfully soliciting support from local """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
68 J. Kuang Dunn of United Korean Committee in America, March 17, 1945, Farrington papers, Hawaii 
State Archives, Honolulu, HI.  
 
69 Marine Simpson, Los Angeles, to Joseph Farrington, Jr., March 1945, Farrington papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
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presbyteries and church leaders.70 Protestant groups including the Board of Foreign 
Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., the Synods of California and Nevada 
of the Presbyterian Church, and individual churches across the United States likewise 
endorsed the bill. Humanitarian organizations like the Chicago-based Protective 
Immigrants’ Rights League also offered their assistance for the cause.  
In the meantime, Korean American activists focused on securing an international 
pledge promising Korea’s immediate independence upon war’s end.71 The end of the war 
in Europe in May 1945 added urgency; the unconditional German surrender shifted all 
eyes to Asia and the remaining conflict with Japan. A de facto Korean delegation 
consisting of Kilsoo Haan, Henry Chung, and the elder statesman Syngman Rhee 
attended the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945 in an unofficial capacity to 
present Korea’s case for international recognition before the nascent United Nations 
organization. A formal petition undersigned by the KPG in Chungking spelled out their 
two main demands. In light of Korea’s “strategic importance” as the “bridge to the 
Asiatic mainland” and the “sacrifices Korea ha[d] made in the cause of human freedom,” 
it read, the Korean Provisional Government at Chungking requested Korea’s admission to 
the United Nations and formal recognition of the provisional body as the sole “agency” """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
70 For example, in a May 1945 letter to Reverend Bonham of Rockford, IL, Rhee thanked the presbytery for 
supporting the KINB. Looking ahead to the war’s imminent end and Korea’s imminent liberation, Rhee 
underscored how much the measure meant to “Koreans at home to have an opportunity to come to this 
country and have all the facilities to prepare themselves for their prospective positions at home.” His 
implication was clear: the measure would allow Koreans to come to the U.S. temporarily for educational 
training and then return home to Korea, where they could use what they had learned for the benefit of their 
new nation. Most Koreans would not stay in the U.S. permanently. The exception would be those Koreans 
already in the U.S., many of whose children had “gone along with the American soldiers to the battlefront” 
and even “given their lives for the cause of democracy.” Speaking the language of what Gary Gerstle has 
called “martial citizenship,” he contended that rewarding Koreans’ sacrifice with greater rights would be 
“only just and fair.” Rhee to Bonham, May 17, 1945, Box 1, Folder 17, Farrington papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, HI. 
 
71 Also known as the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO). 
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through which the Allied powers would subsequently deal with the Koreans.72 In a scene 
all too reminiscent of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, however, the Korean delegation 
found its pleas ignored and left San Francisco with no greater clarity on their homeland’s 
future." 
The Celler bill for Indian rights received a boost from the Allies’ heightened 
focus on the Pacific front, where India served as an important military base. The progress 
of the Indian immigration campaign became a rallying point for KINB advocates, who 
saw Indians’ colonial plight as analogous to their own. U.S. State Department officials 
formally recommended the KINB as an indirect statement of American support for 
Korea’s future independence. Invoking the Cairo Declaration, Acting Secretary of State 
Joseph Grew cited the KINB’s promise to provide “evidence of the friendly interest of 
the United States in the emergence of a free and independent Korea” as a compelling 
rationale for Congress to pass the measure. He also noted the bill’s promise to “give 
further encouragement to Koreans in this country and elsewhere” in the Allied war effort 
against Japan.73 The letter came just weeks after the Celler bill benefiting Indians had 
received a favorable report by the House Immigration Committee. As he had previously 
done with the Chinese bill, Haan seized upon official support for the Celler measure to 
push for similar gains for Koreans. Quoting from Roosevelt’s March 1945 endorsement 
of the Indian bill as an anti-colonial measure, he called on Truman to do the same for the 
KINB.74  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
72 “Korean Memorial to the United Nations Conference on International Organization,” Tjo Sowang, KPG 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chungking, China, April 25, 1945, Farrington papers, Hawaii State Archives, 
Honolulu, HI. 
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But problems with the analogy became increasingly apparent as Korea and India’s 
paths toward independence diverged. The Allied powers had a general consensus that 
Korea would require some form of trusteeship following the war.75 But as late as a week 
before Japan’s August 15th surrender, it was unclear what this would actually look like in 
practice.76 In contrast, by the summer of 1945, the question of Indian independence had 
been more or less resolved, settled in the minds of U.S. policymakers as just a matter of 
time. The election of Clement Atlee, who replaced staunch imperialist Winston Churchill 
as British Prime Minister, accelerated the decolonization process. After the deadlock of 
the Simla Conference in June 1945, negotiations over British withdrawal from India were 
revived that fall. Assured of India’s imminent independence, U.S. lawmakers 
overwhelmingly voted to pass the Luce-Celler bill that October. Nothing was so clear in 
the case of Korea, which followed a more circuitous trajectory toward independence after 
World War II’s end.  
 
The KINB Campaign in the Postwar Years 
In the years after World War II, the KINB campaign came under the shadow of a 
faltering U.S. Military Government in Korea. The final weeks of the World War II had 
found the Allied powers almost completely unprepared to govern the peninsula. Records 
later released from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences reveal several brief but 
inconclusive discussions among the Allied powers over the peninsula’s future. U.S. 
policymakers raced to define the terms of the postwar occupation ahead of the Soviet """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
74 Haan to Truman, September 13, 1945, Farrington Papers, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, HI. 
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76 Savage, 220-221, especially fn. 164.  
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forces already landed there. No concrete plans emerged until August 10th, five days 
before the Japanese surrender, when plans emerged based on the proposal created a single 
military planner in the U.S. War Department Operations Division in a frantic ten-hour 
work session. The proposal outlined basic terms to divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th 
parallel undear a joint Allied occupation but left open-ended a host of more specific 
questions.77 In a climate of escalating Soviet-American tensions, the many ambiguities 
left by these postwar plans set the stage for the instability and turmoil that followed.  
While Koreans living on the peninsula bore the brunt of the consequences, 
Korean Americans experienced the effects of the Allies’ hasty postwar planning in other 
ways. The KINB was one casualty. Endorsements for the legislation slowed considerably 
after the war’s end. In July 1945, Farrington had informed the bill’s supporters that 
House Immigration Committee chairman Rep. Dickstein was planning to schedule a 
hearing on the measure for that fall. Upon news of Japan’s August 14th surrender, 
however, the hearing was postponed indefinitely. Until the peace agreement clarified 
Korea’s postwar status, committee lawmakers had agreed, no serious thought should be 
given to Koreans’ status under U.S. immigration and naturalization laws.78 Disappointed 
but not surprised, KINB supporters turned their attention to pressing questions about 
Korea’s future. Key among these was what the Allied powers meant by their pledge to 
give Korea its freedom and independence “in due course.”  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
77 His name was Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel, and he served as Chief of the Policy Section. The initial 
proposal did not even definitively specify whether the occupation would be shared among two, three, or 
four Allied powers. For more on this episode, see James I. Matray, "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision 
to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," Pacific Historical Review 50 (May 1981): 145- 168. 
78 Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 379-381.  
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By August 1945, Washington’s primary objective in Korea was simple: to prevent 
the Soviet Union from exercising sole control over the peninsula. After Roosevelt’s 
sudden death the previous spring, Truman’s confrontational approach to Moscow fueled 
growing antagonism and mutual suspicion between the two standing superpowers. 
Tensions grew over the summer of 1945. As the end of the war approached, U.S. officials 
increasingly questioned whether Moscow would prove cooperative after the war. The 
consensus, based on Soviet actions toward Poland and eastern Europe, was that it would 
not.79 Washington’s growing imperative to counter Soviet influence in Korea underwrote 
the State Department’s decision to send Syngman Rhee back to the peninsula in October 
as the top pick of U.S. military and diplomatic officials to lead the United States of 
America’s Military Government In Korea (USAMGIK).80 In October 1945, Rhee arrived 
in Seoul to great fanfare, his position shored up by his arrival weeks ahead of his 
competitors and by the military backing of U.S. officials.  
The departure of Rhee, who for many years was the Korean community’s most 
vocal advocate of cooperation with Washington, changed the face of postwar Korean 
America. Organizations that had previously favored accommodation with U.S. policies 
now rejected them outright. Just over a month after American forces took control in 
Korea, the UKC openly condemned the U.S. occupation government and its incompetent 
policies as undermining America’s “world leadership in the eyes of millions of Asiatic 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
79 John Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947  (New York: Columbia 
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80 One of the only Korean leaders known to most U.S. officials, Rhee was also one of the two Koreans 
(along with Kim Ku) recommended by Chiang Kaishek’s government to help lead the interim regime of the 
AMG-governed southern part of the peninsula. 
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peoples.”81 Korean American leaders accused Washington policymakers of  treating 
Korea as an instrument to assure its domination over Moscow, callously disregarding the 
country’s desire for self-governance.82 Haan was among the most vocal critics, 
denouncing Allied plans for a long-term trusteeship as a “violation of the spirit of the 
Cairo Declaration.” He warned U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, the “vast majority of 
Koreans [would] consider [trusteeship] as a diplomatic sell-out of Korea to Soviet-Red 
Chinese power and sphere of influence.”83 Haan declared Koreans deserved a “New Deal 
for Korea,” establishing a “free nation with neither political strings nor an economic dog 
collar adorning the [country’s] neck.” Such an action by the United States would show 
“millions of subjugated Orientals in Asia” that America believed in the freedom and self-
determination it had long professed.84 More concerned with counteracting Soviet and 
Chinese threats in the region, U.S. policymakers disregarded Haan’s warnings.  
The growing praise of Koreans in both Korea and the United States for the Soviet 
occupation regime concerned Washington more than Haan’s statements. As American 
prestige eroded over the first year of the occupation, people-pleasing Soviet policies in 
the north won many Korean admirers on the peninsula and across the diaspora.85 U.S. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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Delano Roosevelt, as the ”great friend and leader of common peoples . . . whose lofty ideals of Democracy, 
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news correspondent in Korea Gordon Walker confirmed the shift in a report issued in the 
Christian Monitor shortly after New Year’s Day 1946, in which General MacArthur 
declared Korea not yet ready for independence. “Whereas the Koreans hailed the United 
States as liberators when Japan surrendered,” he wrote, “this feeling has undergone a 
considerable revision.” “[D]ozens of Korean leaders evince suspicion over the American 
intent in Korea.”86 By contrast, General Chistjakoff, commander of the Russian forces in 
North Korea, repeatedly affirmed the U.S.S.R.’s full commitment to Korean 
independence. Koreans, including Haan, praised the Soviet occupation forces for 
immediately disbanding Japanese troops, returning all property usurped by the Japanese 
to private Korean ownership, and establishing a system of popularly elected People’s 
Committees to assume official roles in local government.87 Writing to Soviet Ambassador 
Andrei Gromkyo in October 1945, Haan thanked the Soviets for their “democratic 
policy,” and above all, for their “understanding of Koreans’ aspirations for a free and an 
independent Korea.”88 On June 12, 1946, an editorial in the California-based Korean 
Independence praised the Soviet regime and accused American forces of transforming 
southern Korea into the “worst example of American democracy.”89  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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The surge in pro-Soviet sentiment crystallized a consensus within the U.S. 
policymaking community that, if left to govern themselves, Koreans would certainly elect 
a popular government friendly to Moscow rather than one that leaned toward Washington. 
Fears of growing Soviet influence abroad, in turn, underwrote the expansion of the 
national security state at home.90 At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, U.S. and 
Soviet occupation officials had agreed to three preliminary goals: (1) the creation of a 
unified interim government over all of Korea to prepare the peninsula for self-
government, (2) the formation of a joint Soviet-American Commission to oversee it, and 
(3) the establishment of a four-power trusteeship (under the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China, and Great Britain) of up to five years as a necessary prerequisite to 
Korea’s independence. But efforts to create an interim government with broad support 
from Korean political parties and social organizations met with intransigence and 
deadlock from both sides, leading to the breakdown of formal negotiations between 
American and Soviet occupation forces by May 1946.  
Within the context of an increasingly repressive political climate, their critiques 
brought Korean Americans under greater scrutiny and surveillance by the FBI, INS, and 
other intelligence officials looking to identify and rout out subversives in the United 
States. Over the next few years, more than a dozen Korean Americans would face 
harrassment, detention, and threatened deportation for their alleged Communist 
sympathies.91 Undeterred, proponents of the KINB actively modified their appeals to 
reflect America’s changing security interests in the peninsula. Having received news that """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
 
90 U.S. State Department official George Kennan did not explicitly spell out the containment policy until 
1946, but the idea predated the official term. 
 " 
91 See Chapter 5."
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the House Immigration Committee would move on behalf of the Koreans, co-sponsor 
Farrington began soliciting Korean community leaders in the fall of 1945 to appear as 
witnesses at the future hearing.92 KINB advocates like Haan also pressed forward. Rather 
than sidestep the problem of deteriorating U.S.-Korea relations after the war, Haan 
explicitly reframed campaign arguments for the KINB to reflect occupation-related 
concerns. The following March Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee in charge of immigration matters, named a subcommittee to consider the 
measure.93 In a letter to one of the appointed members, Haan asked him to give the bill 
“humane and just consideration,” invoking the rights Congress had previously given 
China. Invoking the political turmoil Korea under the U.S. military government and 
conditions on the ground in Asia more generally, Haan contended that America could 
recover lost ground by passing the bill in a time of “political confusion.”94 An 
endorsement from one of the USAMGIK’s top commanders echoed these sentiments. 
The Hawaii-based KNA quoted from a statement by Major General Archer Lerch, the 
American military governor of Korea, in which he confirmed his belief that the KINB 
would have a “tremendous effect in cementing Korean-American relations,” both 
“salvaging” U.S. prestige and “checking the growth of Soviet support” among the Korean 
people.95  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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Hoey of North Carolina and William Knowland of California as members. Haan to Robert Lamb, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, March 19, 1946, Box 1, Folder 30, Haan papers, UCSC, Santa Cruz, CA. 
 
94 Haan to Senator William F. Knowland, March 19, 1946, Box 1, Folder 30, Farrington papers, Hawaii 
State Archives, Honolulu. HI. 
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The promised House committee hearing for KINB never materialized, but when 
President Truman signed the Celler bill for Indian immigration and naturalization into 
law on July 2, 1946, Farrington declared the inevitability of a Korean measure. The Act’s 
symbolic timing – two days before the Philippines formally became independent from the 
United States and two days before the American Independence Day celebration – 
suggested U.S. sensitivity to the symbolic nature of immigration policy. However, the 
steady progress of the Philippines and India toward postwar independence contrasted 
sharply with growing uncertainty about Korea’s future.  
Developments over 1946 made the formalization of the division between South 
Korea and North Korea increasingly likely. In June, U.S.-supported leader Syngman 
Rhee began publicly calling for the establishment of a separate government in the south.96 
In July, meetings between the Soviets and Americans stalled over the question of how to 
end the joint occupation. Anti-American sentiment in the South turned violent that fall 
when more than 100,000 Korean workers striked, and attacks broke out against U.S. and 
South Korean troops stationed throughout the countryside. Left-wing forces led by the 
Korean Communist Party responded by announcing their rejection of the U.S. military 
government as a legitimate entity and declaring a new policy of direct action. Popular 
uprisings across the South cemented the deadlock between Korean political factions, 
setting the stage for the final dissolution of the Joint Commission the following year.  """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
95 Lerch’s 1946 endorsement was reprinted in Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee, “Brief in 
Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860 (Superseded by H.R. 2932),” Summer 1947, Joseph Farrington papers, 
Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii.  
 
96 Rhee argued that it was the only recourse available to force the Soviets to withdraw from the north and 
reunite the peninsula under an anti-Communist government. This proclamation became known as the 
Chongup declaration. USAMGIK officials quickly intervened to temper Rhee’s words, but his bluster 
reflected a growing unwillingness to compromise with groups further left along the political spectrum. For 
more on this episode, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), Chapter 7, especially at 249-252. 
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The KINB lobby persisted. In 1947, Korean activists from Hawaii and Los 
Angeles moved the campaign to Washington, DC, where they joined other Asian and 
African American lobbyists as regular fixtures on Capitol Hill. The division of the 
Korean peninsula into separate Soviet- and U.S.-friendly states was a far cry from their 
original vision for Korean independence. Proponents of the KINB thus found themselves 
in a double bind, as U.S. officials began to consider all Korean frustration with 
Washington as pro-Soviet. The peninsula’s circuitous path to national sovereignty 
continued to impact the KINB’s legislative progress. The pattern would continue with the 
crystallization of Cold War tensions and the formal emergence of two Koreas in 1948. 
 
Part III 
 
The Cold War Campaigns:  
Bringing Asian Exclusion Repeal into the Story of Cold War Civil Rights,  
1947-1952 
 
 
In 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, appointed by Truman the 
previous year, issued a report outlining how the U.S. government might strengthen and 
better protect the rights of minority communities in America. Unlike any official 
document written before it, To Secure These Rights condemned injustices facing Asian 
Americans and other groups, extending the agenda of civil rights beyond the purview of 
black Americans. Among its proposals, the Committee called for the restructuring of 
naturalization laws to eliminate restrictions based on “race, color, or national origin.” In a 
related discussion of U.S. immigration policy, the report lamented the use of differences 
between groups as “justification for discrimination.”1 The Committee maintained that 
civil rights reforms were necessary on multiple grounds – moral and economic as well as 
international. On this third point, it articulated the need for reform to advance America’s 
international interests and to ensure its “survival in a threatening world.”2 
The United States is not so strong that it can afford to ignore what the 
world thinks of us or our record. . . . Discrimination against, or 
mistreatment of, any racial, religious or national group in the United States 
is not only seen as our internal problem. The dignity of a country, a 
continent, or even a major portion of the world's population, may be 
outraged by it. A relatively few individuals here may be identified with 
millions of people elsewhere, and the way in which they are treated may 
have world-wide repercussions . . .3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 U.S. President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1947), 13-14. 
 
2 A full list of the Committee’s recommendations can be found in To Secure These Rights, 151-175.  
 
3 To Secure These Rights, 147-148. 
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The report singled Asian Americans out as one such group. Although “citizens of 
Oriental descent” numbered only “in the hundreds of thousands” within the United 
States, the report argued that their poor treatment had potential to turn “hundreds of 
millions” of their Asian “counterparts overseas” against America. The Committee 
identified U.S. exclusion laws barring persons of Asian descent from both immigration 
and citizenship eligibility on racial grounds as a key source of Asian resentment against 
America.4  
During the early Cold War, Japanese and Korean Americans, the two main 
communities still without rights, seized upon arguments to lobby for legislation ending 
Asian exclusion as a whole. Against the backdrop of US military occupations in Japan 
and southern Korea after World War II, Asian American activists and their allies framed 
repeal as a low-cost way for the U.S. to demonstrate goodwill and rehabilitate its 
international image as a racial democracy where all persons could be welcomed and 
incorporated into the nation regardless of race or ethnic background. By tying the issue of 
repeal to America’s containment goals in Asia, they sought to define repeal as a critical 
component of America’s Cold War battle to win Asian hearts and minds in the fight 
against Soviet Communism.  
The strategy worked – to a point. Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter bill in 
1952. Passed at the height of the Korean War on the global stage and the rise of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy on the domestic front,!the 1952 legislation was a hodgepodge of liberal 
and restrictive elements. On the one hand, it formally ended America’s policy of Asian 
exclusion by striking down racial restrictions to U.S. citizenship and opening America to 
small numbers of immigrants from Asia. Even as it did so, however, the law strengthened !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 To Secure These Rights, 147-148. 
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the power of the federal government to deport and denaturalize suspected subversives. 
Moreover, its national security provisions would serve as the legal basis for some of the 
most repressive state practices associated with McCarthyism (the Second Red Scare) in 
the United States.  
Part III considers Japanese and Korean Americans’ engagement with the postwar 
repeal movement to illustrate the paradox of Asian Americans’ use of anticommunism 
and internationalism as strategies for reform. Chapter 4 examines how the Japanese 
American Citizens League (JACL) capitalized on America’s Cold War interests in Japan 
to lobby for passage of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. As the most prominent Asian 
American supporter of the highly controversial measure, the JACL demonstrated the 
political viability of Asian American anticommunism as a Cold War strategy. The JACL 
campaign further reflects how Asian Americans’ singular history of legal exclusion and 
racial alienage in the U.S. resulted in distinct goals and strategies for redress. During the 
Cold War, Japanese American activists and their allies did not simply borrow from the 
language of black civil rights to advance their cause. Rather, they conceptualized a more 
expansive understanding of what “civil rights” meant for Asian Americans, redefining the 
boundaries to include the rights of non-citizens, namely their first-generation Japanese 
American parents. In the success of the JACL’s Washington-based campaign, one can see 
how the Cold War, in the words of historian Mary Dudziak, “gave rise to new 
opportunities for those who could exploit anticommunist anxieties, while yet remaining 
within the bounds of acceptable ‘Americanism.’”5  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 15. 
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By contrast, postwar developments in Korea – specifically, the emergence of two 
separate states in 1948 and the outbreak of civil war on the peninsula after 1950 – 
rendered the status of Korean Americans in early Cold War America ambivalent at best. 
Chapter 5 traces the campaigns launched by two Korean American organizations for 
naturalization rights during the early Cold War years. Shifting the focus from 
policymaking to enforcement, it also considers the ramifications of the 1952 McCarran-
Walter Act’s deportation provisions on Korean American leftists living in Los Angeles. 
The deportation cases of Korean-born radicals suggest how, in practice, ties to an Asian 
homeland (real or perceived) could undermine Asian Americans’ claims to Americanness 
as readily as they advanced them. Taken together, the experiences of Japanese and 
Korean Americans in the early Cold War years illuminate the double-edged nature of 
Asian American internationalism as a political strategy during a time of unprecedented 
U.S. military intervention in Asia.  
 
Chapter 4 
  
Reconceptualizing Civil Rights: 
The Japanese American Citizens League and the Judd Bill 
 
In July 1946, the national leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League 
(JACL) gathered at their annual convention in Denver to discuss the organization’s 
mission after the closing of the internment camps. The state-led evacuation of Japanese 
Americans during World War II had taken a heavy toll, leaving whole communities 
uprooted and scrambling to rebuild their lives. The JACL faced its own uphill battle, 
having entered the postwar years widely reviled by immigrant (Issei) and second-
generation (Nisei) Japanese Americans alike for its decision to cooperate with the U.S. 
government’s internment of West Coast Japanese American communities after Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor.1 In the words of one community critic, the JACL could not be 
trusted, having clearly demonstrated its willingness to “sacrifice members of their 
national group to their own selfish interest.”2 Less than a year after the war’s end, 
community researcher Tom Sasaki noted the utter failure of JACL efforts to attract new 
members among disillusioned Japanese Americans more inclined to denounce the League 
than to join it.3   
With the JACL’s popularity and reputation at a record low, League leaders 
brainstormed ways they might rehabilitate the organization’s sullied reputation to attract 
new recruits from among the Nikkei (Japanese American) community’s second-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Issei refers to first-generation Japanese immigrants, and Nisei to second-generation, U.S.-born Japanese 
Americans. 
 
2 Quoted in a 1942 War Relocation Authority report, Paul Spickard, “The Nisei Assume Power: The 
Japanese American Citizens League, 1941-1942,” Pacific Historical Review 52:2 (1983), 169. 
 
3 Scott Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of 
Multiethnic Los Angeles (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 193-194. 
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generation U.S. citizens.4 One of the best ways, they decided, was to win legal gains for 
the community that would persuade Japanese Americans both of the JACL’s good 
intentions and of its effectiveness as a national representative for the Nikkei community. 
Dr. Thomas Yatabe, one of the JACL’s founders and its first president, specifically called 
for a revival of the campaign to secure American citizenship for Issei, or first-generation 
Japanese immigrants. Nothing would repair the reputation of the League more 
effectively, he argued, than to provide “concrete evidence” of its ability to win for the 
elderly generation their long-desired goal of U.S. citizenship.5 The naturalization plank 
formed the centerpiece of the National Program of Action the JACL national board 
adopted at the 1946 convention, a key part of the League’s goal of promoting racial 
equity in U.S. immigration and naturalization law. To assist the effort, the board created 
the Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) to act as the League’s national lobbying arm 
in Washington, DC, and appointed Mike Masaoka, the JACL’s national secretary during 
World War II, to head the ADC’s new office near Capitol Hill.  
Over the next two years, Mike Masaoka led the ADC to a string of legislative 
victories that earned him the moniker of “Washington’s Most Successful Lobbyist.”6 The 
key to the JACL’s postwar success was its strategy of martial patriotism, or in the words 
of one scholar, its efforts to “construct Japanese Americans as loyal, patriotic members of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 From its creation in 1930, the JACL practiced a policy of restricting membership to U.S. citizens and 
promoted the Americanization of Nisei in order to secure full acceptance in American society. 
 
5 Dr. Thomas Yatabe, quoted in Ellen D. Wu, "Race and Asian American Citizenship: From World War II 
to the Movement," (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2006), 351-352; Bill Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of 
Justice (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1982), 196. 
 
6 Alfred Steinberg, “Washington’s Most Successful Lobbyist,” Reader’s Digest, May 1949, 125-129. The 
piece was condensed from a longer article that originally appeared in the April 1949 issue of the national 
Catholic magazine, The Sign.!!
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the nation.”7 The JACL had effectively used the strategy before World War II to secure 
citizenship eligibility for Asian veterans of the First World War with the Nye-Lea Act, 
passed by Congress in 1935, using arguments that Japanese veterans had purchased the 
right to citizenship with their very blood.8 During World War II and after, the JACL 
redeployed the logic of martial patriotism to great effect, launching aggressive public 
relations campaigns intended to represent Japanese Americans as loyal patriots deserving 
of U.S. citizenship. Their appeals, which focused on both Japanese American soldiers’ 
bodily sacrifices and their rights as American citizens, successfully persuaded U.S. 
lawmakers and officials to make several of the JACL’s legislative goals a reality. In 
1946, the U.S. Congress issued a formal apology for internment. Two years later, it 
passed the Wartime Evacuation Claims Act, the federal government’s first attempt to 
compensate the losses suffered by Japanese internees during the war. The JACL’s efforts 
also helped enact an amendment to the War Brides Act that allowed Japanese military 
brides to enter the United States as exceptions to the exclusion laws. In 1948, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Oyama v. California set the stage for the overturning of 
California’s Alien Land Laws on constitutional grounds.9 The theme of the JACL’s tenth 
annual convention in 1948, “The Japanese American Comeback,” trumpeted the ADC’s 
early record of success.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This is the definition used by historian Ellen Wu. For a longer discussion, see Wu, "Race and Asian 
American Citizenship: From World War II to the Movement,” Chapter 5. Also see Lucy E. Salyer. 
“Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935,” Journal of American 
History 91:3 (2004): 848. For more on martial citizenship, see Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and 
Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 9.  
 
8 This campaign is covered in Lucy Salyer, “Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship 
Policy, 1918–1935,” Journal of American History 91:3 (2004): 847-876. 
 
9 Wu, “Race and Asian American Citizenship,” 385-386. 
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The JACL’s goal of racial equity in immigration and naturalization law proved 
harder to achieve. In 1947, former China missionary and long-time supporter of Asian 
immigration reform Rep. Walter Judd (R-MN) introduced to Congress a measure, which 
came to be known as the Judd bill, that proposed to eliminate all racial restrictions to U.S. 
citizenship and to replace the “Asiatic Barred Zone” of the 1917 Immigration Act with 
the “Asia-Pacific Triangle,” a geographical designation that encompassed all of Asia. 
Under the proposed plan, all countries and colonies that fell within the Triangle would 
receive annual quotas of approximately 100, but as with the Chinese and Indian quotas, 
these would be based on race (country of ancestral origin) rather than nationality (actual 
country of birth).10 While the naturalization provisions received wide support, during a 
time when a majority of Americans favored maintaining or reducing the number of 
immigrants entering the United States, appeals to martial patriotism alone proved 
insufficient to persuade reluctant lawmakers to support the bill’s Asian immigration 
quotas. At the same time, Congressional conservatives and restrictionists seized upon 
what doubts remained over Japanese American loyalties and other stall tactics to block 
the Judd bill from progressing. 
This chapter traces the JACL’s role in the postwar campaign for Asian exclusion 
repeal, from the introduction of the Judd bill in 1947 through the bill’s incorporation into 
the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. The contentiousness of the yearlong McCarran-Walter 
debate, coinciding with the height of McCarthyism and the Korean War, has caused 
scholars to overlook or dismiss the earlier campaign for the Judd bill as a prelude to the 
main event. A longer view of the JACL’s efforts broadens our understanding of postwar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952  (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1957). 
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racial reform in the United States as fundamentally imbricated with American Cold War 
projects in Japan and Korea. During a time marked by Communist victory in China and 
the outbreak of war in Korea, the discussion illuminates how Cold War developments in 
Asia both accelerated and narrowed the terms of legislative reform. A lobbying strategy 
centered around America’s project to contain communism in Asia ultimately proved the 
key to passing Asian exclusion repeal. It was no coincidence that the Judd bill’s 
provisions abolishing race-based restrictions to Asian immigration and naturalization 
were only enacted after their incorporation into the largely draconian McCarran-Walter 
omnibus bill. Change was hard-won, and immigration and naturalization gains for Asians 
continued disproportionately to reflect America’s own geopolitical interests in Asia.  
No figure was more important to the JACL’s Judd campaign than Mike Masaoka, 
who was widely recognized by U.S. and Japanese officials alike as one of the “central” 
forces contributing to the ultimate success of repeal.11 Between 1947 and 1952, Masaoka 
became synonymous with the cause of repeal as the JACL’s Washington representative 
and the most visible Nisei lobbyist on Capitol Hill. Masaoka epitomized the “alien 
citizen,” a U.S. citizen by birth who nevertheless remained perpetually foreign, or “alien 
in the eyes of the nation.”12 Throughout his tenure in Washington, observers frequently 
regarded him as an unofficial spokesman for Japan, notwithstanding his lack of Japanese 
language ability and his own self-identification as American. His experience 
demonstrates how Asian Americans’ racialization as extensions of Asia – in Masaoka’s 
case, Japan – gave rise to a particular dynamic of internationalism that distinguished their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For example, see Richard Akagi to JACL chapter presidents and National Board [marked confidential], 
JACL-ADC Final Report on Passage of the McCarran-Walter Act, July 17, 1952, Box 42, Folder 10, 
Japanese American National Library (JANL), San Francisco, CA. 
 
12 Ngai, 8.  
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campaigns for civil rights from those of African Americans and other communities of 
color in the U.S. Geopolitics operated as an especially powerful strategy for Asian 
American lobbyists due to their widespread racialization as unofficial spokespersons for 
Asia.13 Using Masaoka as a case study, this chapter interrogates the paradox at the heart 
of postwar repeal: namely, that the same racial formation of Asians as “perpetual 
foreigners” that underwrote their historical exclusion as “aliens ineligible to [U.S.] 
citizenship” now served to legitimize and amplify, albeit selectively, the influence of 
Asian American lobbyists in early Cold War Washington. Japanese Americans proved 
particularly compelling voices for repeal during a time when Japan formed the linchpin 
of Washington’s containment project in East Asia. 
By tracing the JACL’s postwar campaign, the chapter further charts points of 
convergence and negotiation between the postwar campaigns for Asian exclusion repeal 
and African American civil rights, two efforts rarely considered in tandem. In launching a 
national campaign for their cause, Masaoka and other JACL leaders joined an already 
crowded field of racial and ethnic lobbyists vying for lawmakers’ support on Capitol Hill. 
Focusing on the Judd campaign as a site of negotiation between multiple civil rights 
struggles – or as one scholar called them, “color lines” – this chapter speaks to the limits 
of inter-ethnic and inter-racial cooperation during the early Cold War years. The highly 
circumscribed terms on which the JACL ultimately achieved its legislative goals in the 
form of the McCarran-Walter Act demonstrates how racial reform in the early Cold War 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 As one scholar has described the contrast, African Americans were historically denigrated as “inferior” 
while Asian Americans were racialized as “foreign” or “alien.” The quest for full citizenship thus took on 
different valences for the two groups. Angelo Ancheta, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998).  
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remained very much a zero-sum game, in which gains for one group invariably came at 
the expense of another.  
 
Japanese Exclusion and the JACL 
The JACL brought mixed credentials to the Judd campaign. Founded in 1929 as a 
second-generation organization, the League exerted little influence within the community 
until World War II, when the mass arrest and detainment of powerful Issei community 
leaders by U.S. government officials following Pearl Harbor paved the way for the 
League to seize unprecedented influence as the officially recognized mouthpiece of 
Japanese America.14 JACL leaders filled the power vacuum left by the older generation, 
inviting the support of U.S. government officials with their declarations of 100% 
Americanism and professed goal to Americanize the Nisei through assimilation and 
model citizenship. The organization’s policy restricting membership to U.S. citizens 
bolstered its claims to American-ness, which ensured that only Nisei and white 
Americans could join the League, while Issei remained ineligible. Their acceptance by 
the U.S. government notwithstanding, challenges from within the Japanese American 
community beset the JACL and its leadership. During the war, individuals known to be 
sympathetic to the League were targets of harassment and even violence at several 
detention camps.15 Little had changed by the war’s end, and the JACL entered the 
postwar period as, at once, one of the most reviled organizations among Japanese !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, approximately 127,000 Japanese Americans lived on 
the U.S. mainland. Of these, roughly 60% were Nisei, or second-generation Japanese Americans who had 
been born in the United States (and were therefore U.S. citizens by birth), and 40% were Issei, or first-
generation Japanese immigrants or non-citizens. 1940 Census figures taken from Roger Daniels, Asian 
America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1988), 156. 
 
15 Spickard, “Nisei Assume Power,” 169-171. 
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Americans yet also the one officially recognized by the U.S. government as the voice of 
the Japanese American community. 
The JACL followed in a longer tradition of activism to overturn laws barring 
Japanese from immigrating to and becoming citizens of the United States on racial 
grounds. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, American religious and business leaders 
launched various private efforts to obtain an annual immigration quota for Japan, but 
deteriorating relations between Washington and Tokyo proved decisive. While 
government officials on both sides considered the exclusion issue significant, neither was 
willing to take concrete action to redress it. Japanese Foreign ministry officials wanted to 
avoid interfering in U.S. domestic affairs, while the U.S. State Department wanted to 
avoid overstep into the domain of the legislative branch. Congress squelched a brief 
attempt by the JACL’s Mike Masaoka to raise the issue during the wartime 
Congressional hearings on Chinese exclusion repeal.16 Eager to claim the protections of 
U.S. citizenship, Japanese immigrants turned to the U.S. courts for relief in the years after 
World War I. But their efforts, too, hit an impasse with the Ozawa v. U.S. (1922) 
decision, in which the Supreme Court declared persons of Japanese descent aliens 
racially ineligible to U.S. citizenship. The ruling hit Japanese immigrant farmers living 
along the West Coast hard by leaving them vulnerable to state-level alien land laws that 
barred “aliens ineligible to citizenship” from owning or leasing agricultural land. The 
wartime evacuation further undermined their already tenuous position, underscoring the 
powerlessness of first-generation Issei while exposing the second-class nature of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Fred W. Riggs, Pressures On Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York: King's 
Crown Press, 1950). 
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birthright citizenship held by their American-born children during a time of national 
crisis.17  
Japanese American prospects improved dramatically after 1945 with the 
reshuffling of U.S. alliances and priorities in Asia. As Japan replaced China as America’s 
favored Asian ally, Japanese Americans, too, supplanted Chinese Americans as a focus of 
approbation by Washington officials and media outlets. In the years after Japan’s 
surrender ended World War II, a U.S.-led Allied occupation government sought to 
reconstruct a defeated Japan into a bastion of democracy; under American oversight, 
Japan drafted and ratified a new constitution, and passed a series of reforms to remake 
Japan in America’s own image.18 By 1947 rising Cold War tensions led the Allied 
occupation government led by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur to abandon its original 
program of demilitarization and democratization in favor of rearming and strengthening 
Japan as America’s prize Asian ally.19 The ouster of Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist 
government by Mao Zedong and his Chinese Communist forces in late 1949 completed 
Japan’s transformation into America’s chief anticommunist ally and bulwark against 
Soviet influence in the Far East. And all the more after June 1950, when Cold War 
tensions erupted in violence on the Korean peninsula and Japan became the regional base 
of defense for U.S. and United Nations joint military operations. Recognizing the close 
correlation between U.S. geopolitical interests in Asia and the status of Asian groups in 
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17 Mae Ngai has called this second-class citizenship “alien citizenship.” Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 8, 81.  
 
18 See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2000). 
 
19 Many scholars refer to this period between 1947 and 1950 as the "reverse course," when U.S. policy 
makers shifted their main goals in Japan from political reform to economic recovery and security.  
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America, JACL leaders would increasingly cite Japan’s centrality to U.S. security 
interests in Cold War Asia to bolster their calls for repeal. 
 
Mechanics of the Judd Campaign 
The JACL-ADC organizational structure closely resembled that of the Citizens 
Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, the catalytic pressure group responsible for 
Chinese exclusion repeal during World War II. From the beginning, leaders of the JACL-
ADC sought to draw lessons from the successes and failures of the earlier repeal 
campaigns. Upon opening a Washington, DC, office, one of the first things they did was 
to undertake a comprehensive study of the Chinese, Filipino, and Indian campaigns in 
search of best strategies and other “clues as to what ought to be done.”20 In early 1947, 
the ADC helped create a national citizens’ organization called the Committee for 
Equality on Naturalization (CEN). Like the Citizens Committee, the CEN was restricted 
to prominent white Americans; as Masaoka explained, this was intended to give the 
impression that a “non-Japanese organ of distinguished Americans” was behind the push 
for repeal, rather than Asian Americans themselves.21 CEN board members included 
several veterans of the Chinese and Indian efforts, who campaigned for the Judd bill as a 
logical extension of their work for repeal. They included publisher Richard Walsh, 
ACLU president Roger Baldwin, novelist Pearl Buck, and Read Lewis of the Common 
Council for American Unity, an immigrant aid group. JACL affiliates Edward Ennis, who 
served as the chairman, and John McCloy, both of whom had worked closely with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Progress Report #1, January 18, 1947, Box 64, Folder 9, Mike Masaoka papers, Marriott Library, 
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
21 Ibid.  
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League during the wartime evacuation, rounded out the CEN leadership. Throughout the 
postwar campaign, the ADC worked closely with the CEN to lobby the Judd bill through 
Congress.22 Similar to the Citizens Committee whose leadership drove the success of 
Chinese exclusion repeal, the CEN promoted the perception that white Americans were 
spearheading the fight for repeal. In practice, however, both the CEN and the JACL’s 
Anti-Discrimination Committee worked under the aegis of the JACL’s national board 
based in California.  
Two figures were especially central to the Judd campaign. Minnesota 
Congressman and veteran of the Chinese and Indian immigration campaigns, Walter 
Judd, served as the legislation’s main sponsor and chief spokesman on Capitol Hill. 
Between July 1947 and 1949, Rep. Judd sponsored multiple bills whose provisions 
proposed formally to end Asian exclusion.23 Testifying before his Congressional peers, 
Judd repeatedly underscored the measure’s role in creating formal equality for Asians, 
despite the fact that it did not increase Asian immigration in any meaningful numerical 
sense. Supporters argued that the Judd bill’s narrow provisions responded to polled 
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22 The CEN was jointly funded by the JACL and the ACLU. The JACL provided the majority of the CEN’s 
initial seed money ($5,000), while Roger Baldwin of the ACLU pledged the remaining amount ($1000). 
 
23 Territorial Delegate to Congress from Hawaii, Joseph Farrington introduced the first two broad-based 
repeal bills to the House (H.R. 7128 in July 1946, H.R. 857 in January 1947) at the request of the JACL-
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Folder 4, Mike Masaoka papers, Salt Lake City, Utah. Vito Marcantonio (D-NY), then of the American 
Labor Party, introduced a similar bill (H.R. 1425) to remove the racial barriers against naturalization. But 
the JACL-ADC did not associate itself with this legislation in order to avoid the taint of Marcantonio’s 
radical reputation. According to Masaoka, Marcantonio’s bill was “not solicited, nor welcome, since he is 
persona non grata to both parties. As little publicity and attention should be given to this bill as possible.” 
Progress Report #4, Feb 9, 1947, Box 64, Folder 9, Mike Masaoka papers, Marriott Library, University of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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American opinion in favor of maintaining or reducing the number of immigrants entering 
the United States.24 
 
Mike Masaoka, “Washington’s Most Successful Lobbyist”25  
Mike Masaoka, the JACL’s Washington representative and head of the JACL’s 
ADC, emerged as another major spokesman for repeal. Few individuals experienced 
more keenly the vagaries of Japanese Americans’ rapid postwar transformation from 
“inscrutable Japs” and “enemy aliens” to sympathetic victims and wartime heroes. Born 
in 1915, Masaoka was only twenty-five years old when the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor and the mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans began along the 
West Coast. As national spokesman for the JACL during the war, he bore the burden of 
association with the organization’s decision to cooperate with the War Relocation 
Authority in carrying out evacuation and internment. Japanese Americans also knew him 
as a major force behind the government’s controversial decision to draft Nisei into the 
U.S. military from within the detention camps. While viewed with skepticism by many 
Japanese Americans, Masaoka had a strong circle of support in Washington as a 
recognized spokesman for the Japanese American community. He benefited early on 
from the help of his mentor, Senator Elbert Thomas (R-UT), a former Mormon 
missionary to Japan and Masaoka’s former professor at the University of Utah. As he 
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24  Taken from a 1946 Gallup poll, in Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 182. 
 
25 The title is taken from an article profiling Masaoka in Reader’s Digest. Alfred Steinberg, “Washington’s 
Most Successful Lobbyist,” Reader’s Digest (May 1949), 125-129. The piece was condensed from a longer 
article that originally appeared in the April 1949 issue of the national Catholic magazine, The Sign.!!
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neared retirement, Thomas introduced Masaoka to several influential colleagues on 
Capitol Hill, including powerful Nevada Senator Pat McCarran.26  
As the JACL’s chief representative in Washington, Masaoka proved an effective 
spokesman with a novel style of “personal lobbying” and eloquent speeches before 
Congress that one media observer described as rhetorical “gems of clarity, logic, and 
delivery.” In 1949, the same writer declared Masaoka “Washington’s Most Successful 
Lobbyist” for his unmatched record of legislative success.27 Stories circulated of the 
JACL lobbyist’s dogged perseverance and remarkable success in winning even the most 
reluctant lawmakers to his side. Unable to secure an appointment with Rep. John Robison 
of Kentucky, a powerful member of the House Judiciary Committee, Masaoka reportedly 
followed the lawmaker to the bathroom. According to JACL writer Bill Hosokawa, the 
result was that Robison soon became a “staunch supporter” of the JACL.28  
Supporters like Robison seemed unaware that Mike “Messiah” Masaoka, a native 
of Fresno, California, was a native-born U.S. citizen. From the start, Masaoka’s Japanese 
heritage indelibly framed his reception in Washington. His experiences exemplified what 
historian Mae Ngai has described as the lot of “alien citizens,” those who lived in 
America legally and possessed the legal rights of citizenship but who nevertheless 
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26 Masaoka’s mentor, Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah remained deeply interested in Japan and greater East 
Asia throughout his academic and Congressional career as a U.S. Senator representing Utah from 1933 to 
1951. For more on Elbert D. Thomas and Japan, see Hayashi Yoshikatsu, “Elbert D. Thomas in the Context 
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27 Alfred Steinberg, “Washington’s Most Successful Lobbyist,” Reader’s Digest, May 1949, 125, 128. The 
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Catholic magazine, The Sign. 
 
28 Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans  (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1969).  
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“remain[ed] alien in the eyes of the nation.”29 Observers’ descriptions betrayed this 
presumptive foreignness. Reporting on one of his first Congressional appearances after 
the war, ACLU staff member Mary Alice Baldinger declared Masaoka the “hit of the 
daylong proceedings.” According to Baldinger, news that a “Jap was making a good 
impression” had spread through the House offices, attracting a crowd to the 
Congressional gallery until the “room was jammed full.” Masaoka’s enthusiastic 
reception had so worried Harry Hayden, Jr. of the American Legion that he rushed over 
to request a last-minute opportunity for the organization to respond in kind.30 At other 
times, the racial overtones were less overt. Upon hearing Masaoka testify at a 
Congressional hearing on deportation, one lawmaker exclaimed, “By God, that little 
fellow really was giving us a lecture on the meaning of democracy.” Suggesting how 
mindsets could change, the same speaker added that after seeing Masaoka speak, he 
“began to see the Japanese Americans for the first time, as people just like anyone 
else.”31 For at least one Washington observer, then, Masaoka’s testimony evoked mixed 
feelings. It humanized him and other Japanese Americans, even as it reinforced the 
apparent irony and sheer spectacle of a Japanese face preaching about the virtues of 
democracy to an audience of white American officials.  
Japan was central to U.S. Cold War interests in the region at the time. As a prized 
American ally, Japan commanded official attention, and Congress valued special 
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29 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 8.!
30 Mary Alice Baldinger of ACLU to JACL National Headquarters, March 20, 1947, reprinted in JACL HQ 
memo, April 18, 1947, Box 16, Folder 12, Japanese American National Library (JANL), San Francisco, 
CA. 
31 Bill Hosokawa, “MASAOKA: Nisei of the Year,” Pacific Citizen, December 23, 1950, 7. 
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knowledge of Japan. In this way, presumptive ties to Japan bolstered the legitimacy of 
Masaoka and others. Moreover, at a time when Japanese Americans made up less than 
1% of the U.S. population and most lawmakers had never seen an Asian American 
firsthand, novelty was power. As Masaoka himself acknowledged, his distinctive ethno-
racial heritage caused him to stand out in a way that could, at times, work in his favor.  
In that era there were no Nisei members of Congress to open doors for me. 
Japanese Americans were virtually unknown on the Hill; I was the first Nisei 
[second-generation Japanese American] that many of the legislators had ever 
seen, and I must have been something of a curiosity. But that was all right if being 
a curiosity helped the cause.32 
 
As Masaoka also recognized, the challenge remained of how to parlay that novelty into 
political influence. While his perceived Japanese heritage might initially persuade others 
to listen to him, it also pigeonholed him in ways that constrained the power of his 
witness. And ultimately, for individual Japanese American lobbyists like Masaoka, any 
attempt to claim greater legal rights in America by playing on their foreign-ness 
ultimately risked being counter-productive. Though it might bolster their message in the 
short-term, on the whole the approach reinforced rather than undercut the perception that 
Japanese Americans could never be fully American but would always be considered 
Japanese first.33  
As someone who for all intents and purposes had known nothing but America 
over the course of his entire life, Masaoka’s experiences as a Washington lobbyist 
illustrated with force the indelible power of the “perpetual foreigner” idea to frame how 
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32 Mike Masaoka and Bill Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka: An American Saga (New York: 
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33 For more on what scholars refer to as the “perpetual foreigner syndrome,” see Frank H. Wu, Yellow: 
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others perceived him despite the actual circumstances of his birth and early life. Born in 
Fresno, California and raised in Utah, Masaoka had never traveled to Japan, did not speak 
the Japanese language, and openly disavowed any meaningful knowledge of Japanese 
culture or history.34 To the contrary, he spoke English fluently and, having been educated 
in the States, was familiar with the American political process. As a JACL leader, for 
years he explicitly claimed to speak for the interests of Japanese Americans, not 
Japanese. Yet Washington never accepted Masaoka as fully American. Indeed, despite 
his many attempts to assert his American-ness and even, at times, to distance himself 
from Tokyo, Masaoka found himself repeatedly playing the role of an unofficial 
spokesperson for Japan and its Japanese people.!In his memoirs, Masaoka reflected upon 
his experiences with the perpetual foreigner idea at work. “For reasons I have never been 
able to fathom,” he wrote, “Japanese Americans are expected to know everything there is 
about Japan.” In response to the many U.S. officials who solicited his opinion on foreign 
policy matters related to Japan, he continued to insist that he had “no special insights into 
Japanese politics or the Japanese mind nor access to any source of information they 
didn’t have.” So strong were others’ presumptions of his native expertise that they 
continued to ask him despite his protestations.35  
Not simply an individual problem, Masaoka’s experiences in Washington 
mirrored on a smaller scale the dilemma the JACL faced during the same period. Despite 
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34 According to Masaoka, it was this “nonsense that makes it difficult for Japanese Americans to be 
accepted as, for want of a better expression, full-fledged Americans” and a “stereotyped view that persists 
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Call Me Moses Masaoka, 239-240.  
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being a group that ostensibly spoke for Japanese Americans, after the war, JACL leaders 
found themselves more frequently thrust into the role of liaison between Washington and 
Tokyo. While the League had readily embraced a level of dualism in the years before 
World War II, when the U.S. and Japan went to war, the League had consciously adopted 
a policy of “100% Americanism” to stave off any suspicions about its loyalties. With 
Japan’s subsequent defeat and metamorphosis into a U.S. ally after the war, the JACL’s 
need to prove its allegiance lessened. This paved the way for a more sweeping 
reevaluation of the League’s position on U.S.-Japan relations and international affairs, 
although this would not happen until the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952 
resolved the immigration and naturalization issues.36 
 
The JACL-ADC Campaign 
As a self-described Japanese American organization, the JACL was in many ways 
an unlikely choice to spearhead the cause of repeal by invoking America’s interests in 
Asia. Before adopting the language of Cold War geopolitics to make the case for repeal, 
Masaoka and the JACL’s Anti-Discrimination Committee established a reputation for 
legislative success using the language of martial patriotism, or entitlement on the basis of 
Japanese Americans’ military service and sacrifices in World War II. The early Judd 
campaign exemplifies the efforts of the JACL to frame the Judd bill as a civil rights 
measure. As part of this strategy, JACL supporters advocated for Issei citizenship as 
derivative of the rights of Japanese American citizens, most notably of U.S.-born Nisei 
soldiers whose wartime sacrifices had established their loyalty to America beyond a 
doubt. In line with this argument, the martial patriotism and bodily sacrifices of U.S.-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 For more on this debate, see Ellen Wu, “Race and Asian American Citizenship,” 392-413. 
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born Japanese Americans not only entitled them to legal rights but had also earned their 
parents, and the older generation more generally, the right to U.S. citizenship. The logic 
of the early Judd campaign toward Issei naturalization thus reflected Japanese 
Americans’ growing recognition that immigrant rights were connected to citizens’ rights, 
inasmuch as Issei citizenship was a Japanese American, and not simply a Japanese 
issue.37 
As scholars have shown, the JACL-ADC’s strategy of “martial patriotism” – that 
is, its efforts to present Japanese Americans as “loyal, patriotic members of the nation” – 
was the key to its immediate postwar success.38 Military service and sacrifice were 
historically one of the most effective grounds for expanding the racial boundaries of 
American citizenship to include otherwise ineligible veterans who had purchased their 
right to citizenship with blood.39 Indeed, the JACL had successfully used the strategy 
before World War II to secure citizenship eligibility for Asian veterans of the First World 
War with the Nye-Lea Act, passed by Congress in 1935.40 Using this strategy, the JACL-
ADC won a string of legislative victories over its first two years that cemented its 
reputation as an effective voice for Nikkei rights. In 1946, Congress issued a formal 
apology for internment. The Wartime Evacuation Claims Act, marking the federal 
government’s first attempt to compensate the losses suffered by Japanese internees !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
37 The author thanks historian Cindy Cheng for this point. Cindy I-Fen Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: 
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during the war, followed two years later. In response to wide-scale pressure, Congress 
passed an amendment to the War Brides Act in 1947 that allowed Japanese military 
brides to enter the United States outside of existing restrictions. One year later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Oyama v. California (1948) set the stage for the repeal of the 
California’s Alien Land Laws several years later.41 All told, the JACL-ADC’s early 
record of lobbying success led League advisor Robert Cullum to call 1948 the year of the 
“Japanese American come-back.”42  
Through statements offered at official hearings and printed in the JACL 
newspaper, the Pacific Citizen, JACL leaders attempted to redeploy the logic of martial 
patriotism to win Congressional passage of the Judd bill and thereby meet their goal of 
securing citizenship rights for all Issei. Rather than appeal to the military service of 
elderly Issei themselves – all of whom were well above the enlistment age by the time 
World War II began – JACL representatives sought to leverage the more recent military 
service of Nisei soldiers to increase official support for the Judd bill’s provisions granting 
Issei eligibility for U.S. citizenship. Accordingly, JACL National Director Masao Satow 
specifically called upon families who had lost Nisei soldiers to write their Congressional 
representatives urging them to vote for the legislation.43 In line with this logic, the bodily 
sacrifice of U.S.-born Japanese Americans not only entitled them to legal rights but had 
earned their parents, and Issei more generally, the right to U.S. citizenship as well. By 
bringing the military sacrifices of Nisei to bear on the rights of their parents and parents’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
41 Wu, “Race and Asian American Citizenship,” 385-386. 
 
42 Robert M. Cullum, “Japanese American Audit-1948,” Common Ground 8-9 (Winter 1949), 88. The 
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43 Cited in Wu, “Race and American Citizenship,” 371. 
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generation, U.S.-born JACL spokespersons thus articulated a connection between 
immigrant rights and citizen rights. Arguing that Issei naturalization eligibility was 
derivative of Nisei’s rights as U.S. citizens, in turn, served their effort to frame the Judd 
bill as a matter of Japanese Americans’ civil rights. 
 A special 1948 Christmas edition of the JACL newspaper Pacific Citizen typified 
the League’s strategic effort to engender public support and awareness of the elderly Issei 
generation’s plight as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” Titled “These Are Our Parents,” 
the headline’s use of the possessive “our” suggested the role that JACL leaders in the 
postwar years assumed as advocates supplicating on behalf of the immigrant generation. 
In a feature piece called “They Pierced the Silken Curtain,” editor Larry Tajiri described 
the earliest Japanese arrivals to America, the discrimination they faced, and the courage 
they had demonstrated to rise above their mistreatment. In “These Are the Issei,” CEN 
chairman Robert Cullum humanized the older generation with vignettes and individual 
profiles of Japanese immigrants, whom he hailed as pioneers “of the stuff that brought 
America out of the wilderness.”44 The publication closed with “Our Next Great Goal,” in 
which Mike Masaoka notably described a law granting naturalization eligibility to Issei 
as the long-cherished “dream of Japanese and Japanese Americans” alike.45 Reports from 
different regions of the country charting Issei citizenship drives and the filing of 
naturalization papers by a growing number of first-generation Japanese Americans 
evinced the desire and intention of Issei to become U.S. citizens.46 Using the Pacific 
Citizen as a forum, the JACL’s postwar campaign for Issei naturalization thus defined the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Pacific Citizen, December 25, 1948. 
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issue as one that concerned the Japanese American community as a whole, and not the 
elderly generation alone.  
Masaoka proved an especially able practitioner of the revived martial strategy, 
regularly drawing on his own family’s losses to amplify the power of his message. In 
addition to being the first Nisei formally to enlist in what later became the highly 
decorated 442nd Regimental Combat Team, Masaoka lost a brother in the war, while 
another brother’s leg injury left him unable to walk. Speaking before official audiences, 
he repeatedly invoked his own family’s wartime sacrifices to decry the injustice of 
exclusionary statutes that prevented his long-suffering mother and other deserving 
Japanese elders from realizing their desire for American citizenship. Masaoka powerfully 
described the patriotism and courage demonstrated by Nisei soldiers who had volunteered 
to fight for America “from behind barbed wire” during World War II.47 He cited 
estimates by one U.S. intelligence officer asserting that the military service of Japanese 
American troops in the Pacific had “shortened the war by months and saved thousands of 
American casualties.”!In his telling, the “Japanese people in the U.S. were the only 
people in its history ever . . . asked to go bankrupt voluntarily and then go to jail.” Yet 
they endured internment because they “believed fundamentally in the American way.”48 
Speaking before the House Judiciary Committee in 1948, Masaoka described Nisei 
soldiers and their parents as having equal claims to American justice.  
. . . here you had a great number of American soldiers of Japanese ancestry who  
so believed in America . . . that even though they were incarcerated in virtual 
prisons they saw behind and beyond the barbed-wire fences…beyond the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Go for Broke actor Van Johnson, quoted in Naoko Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the 
Japanese Enemy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 269.  
 
48 U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 
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watchtowers manned by armed MPs [military police]; they saw America, just and 
fair-minded, willing to give them and their parents a decent break.49 
 
Using such appeals, the JACL secured the support of restrictionist lawmakers who 
nevertheless acknowledged the valuable military contributions of Nisei soldiers during a 
time when a growing number of U.S. officials, including former California governor Earl 
Warren and former Los Angeles mayor Fletcher Bowron, were expressing public remorse 
over the injustice of Japanese Americans’ wartime internment.  
Statements by JACL representatives valorizing the figure of the Nisei citizen-
soldier convinced more than one reluctant Congressional lawmaker to support the Judd 
bill. Representative Ed Gossett of Texas (D-TX) agreed to meet with Masaoka after 
hearing of the 442nd Regimental Combat team’s sacrifice on the European front. A long-
time Texan, Gossett claimed to have been personally persuaded by the Nisei troop’s 
daring rescue of the Lost Battalion, a group of U.S. soldiers from Texas trapped behind 
enemy lines in France. He was not alone. Together with Gossett, a majority of House 
lawmakers voted to pass the Judd bill in March 1949 only to have it stall in the Senate. 
The measure languished under the Judiciary Committee’s powerful chairman Pat 
McCarran and his restrictionist allies, mainly Southern Democrats and conservative 
Republicans. Thus, even as they experienced success in other arenas, JACL-ADC leaders 
found their efforts to lobby the Judd bill ineffective against the opposition of this 
“conservative coalition” in Congress.50 Thwarted, Masaoka and the JACL-ADC soon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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turned to Cold War geopolitical logic and rhetoric to salvage their case, but before doing 
so, they explored the possibility of collective action, and the forging of partnerships 
across ethnic and racial lines.  
 
“There Are No Islands Anymore”: The Judd Bill and the Challenges of Cooperation 
The JACL recognized early on the promise of banding with other groups to 
strengthen their own lobbying power. As a general immigration and naturalization 
measure that applied widely across Asian groups, the Judd bill was fundamentally 
different from the piecemeal bills of previous campaigns. For the first time, more than 
one Asian American group stood to benefit from its provisions. In theory, then, the Judd 
bill offered a common goal around which a coalition of groups could join forces and 
rally. In a similar vein, the JACL, led by Mike Masaoka, embraced the multiracial vision 
of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights’ 1947 report To Secure These Rights, 
seizing upon its discussions as a platform through and upon which to appeal for Japanese 
American rights and redress. But coalition was not easy. Precedents for interracial and 
inter-ethnic cooperation were few. Long-standing historical antagonisms between groups 
also proved difficult to overcome, limiting what partnerships could actually materialize in 
practice.51 In the restrictive political climate of the Cold War, competition, not 
cooperation, remained the norm on the national stage. The efforts of various officials to 
add riders and amendments to the Judd legislation in order to narrow its impact 
complicated matters. The effect of this was to turn the Judd bill increasingly into a point 
of contention, not unity, between Japanese Americans and other groups. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 For a state-level study, see Mark Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity 
Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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* * * * * 
Amity had not characterized interactions between Asian immigrant groups in the 
United States or Asian Americans and other groups in the years before World War II, and 
little changed in the years after the war ended.52 What did change after 1945 was the 
scale in which Washington officials talked about the race problem and civil rights in 
America. Like no document before it, To Secure These Rights (1947) outlined a 
multiracial agenda of American civil rights that addressed injustices facing Asian 
Americans and other groups beyond the purview of black Americans alone. At his own 
request, the JACL’s Mike Masaoka served the President’s Committee as a consultant on 
Japanese American affairs in the writing of the final report, and he had unmistakable 
influence. Along with calls for anti-lynching and desegregation measures for black 
Americans, it notably contained recommendations relevant to Asian American groups, 
including a government review of wartime evacuation and detention policies, the creation 
of a body to process internees’ claims of loss, and the restructuring of naturalization laws 
to eliminate restrictions based on “race, color, or national origin.”53 In a section devoted 
to immigration the report singled out as “one disadvantage” of America’s otherwise 
laudable “diversity” the fact that differences between groups – namely, racial and ethnic 
distinctions – were “too often . . . seized upon as justification for discrimination.”54 The 
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report’s expansive vision of civil rights offered an unprecedented basis for collaboration 
across ethnic and racial lines – at least in theory – although the challenges of 
implementation soon complicated the forging of partnerships in practice.  
Spurred by the broad-based nature of the Judd bill, Masaoka and other JACL-
ADC leaders reached out to representatives of the Korean, Burmese, and Indonesian 
communities early on in the hope of increasing the campaign’s overall chance of success. 
As the next-largest beneficiary of the Judd bill’s immigration and naturalization 
provisions, Korean Americans became a special target of the League’s collaborative 
efforts. Masaoka and Robert Cullum of CEN, the JACL’s all-white pro-naturalization 
affiliate group, set their sights on an ethnic lobby group called the Korean Immigration 
and Naturalization Committee (KINC).55 Koreans from Hawaii had founded the KINC 
after World War II to revive the wartime effort for a Korean immigration and 
naturalization bill. By all indications, it was in the KINC’s best interest to partner with 
the JACL-ADC to lobby for passage of the Judd bill. Not only did the broader 
legislation’s “Asia-Pacific Triangle” encompass Korea and the gains of the narrower 
Farrington bill for Korean rights.56 Basic name recognition, connections, and exposure 
made the JACL-ADC and CEN better positioned than the Hawaii-based KINC to 
command the ear of lawmakers on Capitol Hill.57 The KINC was, by contrast, a small and 
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newly formed group with few official connections. Its Washington, DC, office, which 
opened around the same as that of the ADC in January 1947, consisted of just one man, 
Hawaii-born Walter Jhung. What it lacked in dedicated office staff, however, the KINC 
claimed to make up for in abundant financial resources. According to internal ADC 
reports, in 1947 the Korean group enjoyed an estimated budget “totaling more than ten 
times” that of the ADC.58 The KINC’s deep pockets attracted Masaoka and his cash-
strapped colleagues, for whom funding remained a constant concern and source of 
struggle with California-based first-generation donors. 
Unfortunately for the JACL representatives, history was not on their side. In the 
words of one scholar, “animosity rather than amity” was the “common mode” for 
relations between Asian immigrant groups in California and the western United States 
before World War II, and Japanese Americans and other groups who took umbrage at the 
superior attitudes of Issei community leaders had particularly acrimonious relations.59 
Indeed, it was telling that when Japan was finally brought under exclusion in 1924, Issei 
leaders in the United States protested not only on the grounds Japanese did not merit 
such restrictions; they specifically denounced the law’s suggestion that Japanese ranked 
on the same low level as those other excluded Asian peoples whom they believed to be 
their inferiors.60 In line with Azuma’s observation that “local race relations paralleled the 
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power relations of nation states,” Japanese expansionism in the Pacific after 1930 
polarized Asian American sentiment against Japanese in an American immigrant context 
as well.61 In the late 1930s, Chinese merchants in San Francisco Chinatown organized a 
boycott of their Japanese American competitors on the grounds that they represented 
“Tokyo’s agents.”62 Inter-group relations grew even more strained after the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As anti-Japanese sentiment peaked in the U.S., 
Chinese, Koreans, Filipino Americans and others readily joined in the public vilification 
of Japanese, hoping to bolster their own claims to American patriotism and national 
belonging, even if at Japanese Americans’ expense.63  
Japan’s 1910 colonization of Korea and thirty-five years of colonial rule over the 
peninsula made relations between Korean and Japanese American communities 
especially contentious. Through the 1930s and 1940s, Korean American community 
leaders had made anti-Japanese rhetoric the hallmark of their independence and 
immigration-related activism. Kilsoo Haan, for example, regularly touted Koreans as the 
“number-one enemy of the Japanese” and as such, the people best qualified to fight 
them.64 Indeed, Haan’s patriotic campaigns during World War II targeted Mike Masaoka 
and the JACL. In a February 1942 meeting with FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, the 
Korean Hawaiian activist singled out the Japanese American representative as an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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undercover spy and denounced the JACL as spies and puppets for Tokyo.65 Haan’s anti-
Japanese tirades persisted after the war, but in the aftermath of internment and a climate 
of growing sympathy for Japanese Americans, his warnings of a Japanese threat found 
few supporters. In the postwar years Haan had a diminished role in the KINC.  
Eager to avoid misunderstanding, Masaoka arranged for a non-Japanese – in this 
case, white American CEN board member Robert Cullum – to contact the KINC’s 
executive secretary Jhung about the prospect of joining forces. Writing in July 1947, 
Cullum urged Jhung that the time was “ripe” for an “inclusive bill” and that a “united 
strategy” of “effective coordination” among the JACL’s ADC, the ACLU, and other 
“interested groups” would lead to collective success. Repeating Jhung’s previous 
intimations that the KINC might be interested in making a “substantial donation” to the 
Judd campaign, Cullum assured him that any such contribution would be “well spent.”66 
Jhung responded a few days later with a promise that the KINC would give serious 
thought to the proposal. Cullum’s involvement was strategic for another reason. Namely, 
it avoided any awkwardness around Jhung’s attempt to hire Masaoka away from the 
JACL earlier that spring. Masaoka had cited his personal commitment to the Japanese 
American community to decline the offer of more money, but he was quick to make use 
of the offer in his fundraising appeals to the Nikkei community. If the KINC, a Korean 
group which represented fewer than five thousand Korean Americans in the United 
States, could raise so much money from within the community, he insisted, why should 
the JACL – representing more than ten times that number of Japanese Americans – have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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such a difficult time doing the same? “If the Issei are sincere in their desires for 
citizenship,” they “should be willing to ‘pay’ for it” as their Korean counterparts were 
doing.67 In this way, the ever-resourceful Masaoka tried to play off the KINC’s deep 
pockets as leverage to needle the JACL-ADC’s California-based donors for additional 
funds. However, money would continue to be a source of struggle throughout the 
campaign.  
Although the KINC would eventually decline to partner with the JACL, these 
episodes warrant further attention for the remarkable shift they suggest in Korean-
Japanese American attitudes from the end of World War II to just two years later. Such 
an alliance would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier. Differences in 
generation and geography accounted for the change. As an organization of younger, and 
in many cases U.S. or Hawaii-born Koreans, the KINC emphasized justice for Koreans 
living in America over the welfare of Koreans in Korea. The Korean American groups’ 
roots in Hawaii also made a difference. Having grown up in close proximity with 
Japanese Americans, few younger Koreans in Hawaii shared their parents’ anti-Japanese 
sentiments. Indeed, even during World War II, a Hawaii sociologist found that second-
generation Korean Americans in the islands generally did not share the overt anti-
Japanese antagonism prevalent Koreans on the U.S. mainland.68 Literature issued by the 
KINC reflected an inclusive mindset, with writers acknowledging the interests that they 
as Korean Americans shared with their Nikkei counterparts. In a 1947 brief to Congress, 
one KINC member went so far as to liken the historical injustices faced by Koreans in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the United States with the tragedy of Nisei soldiers liberating prisoners of war abroad 
while their parents were imprisoned in internment camps back in the United States.69 No 
formal partnership between Japanese and Korean Americans materialized during this 
period, but the sentiment reflected in the statement suggested the possibility of future 
cooperation.  
The JACL and Other Asian American Groups 
 Whereas the Judd bill created a situation that lent itself to a Japanese-Korean 
American partnership, it did precisely the opposite for Japanese Americans vis-à-vis 
Chinese and Filipino American groups. Between 1948 and 1949, State Department and 
Senate Judiciary Committee members introduced a series of amendments to the Judd bill 
intended to correct for long-standing loopholes in U.S. immigration law. Savvy 
observers decried their inclusion as an underhanded attempt to capitalize on the 
momentum for Asian exclusion repeal to carry out a larger restrictionist agenda. What 
prospects remained of cooperation across Asian American groups diminished with the 
rise of counter-lobbying efforts by Chinese and Filipino American activists, who took 
issue with amendments to the Judd bill that proposed to benefit Japanese Americans at 
the expense of their own hard-won gains. Chinese Americans had lobbied for years to 
secure a bill allowing the Chinese alien wives of U.S. residents to enter the country 
outside the usual numerical restrictions as non-quota immigrants.70 Thus, when a 
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proposed amendment to the Judd bill threatened to undo these gains, two of the Chinese 
American community’s oldest and most established organizations – the Chinese 
Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA, or Chinese Six Companies) and the 
Chinese American Citizens Alliance (CACA) – rallied a counter-effort demanding its 
removal.71 Filipino American community leaders reacted with similar indignation to 
amendments that threatened to undercut Filipinos’ favored immigration status, which 
they insisted should be preserved in light of the Philippines’ special history as a former 
American colony.72 Their protests highlighted the question that confronted JACL 
leaders: namely, when weighing the interests of one’s own group versus those of a 
broader community, which would take precedence? 
 The ADC’s response registered a wide gap between the organization’s public 
rhetoric and members’ privately held opinion. Publicly ADC leaders affirmed the 
concerns of their Chinese and Filipino American counterparts. At the spring 1949 Senate 
Judiciary committee hearing, Masaoka expanded upon Chinese Americans’ demands, 
calling on Congress to extend the non-quota exemption to not only alien wives but alien 
husbands and children as well.73 He did the same for Filipinos, insisting that they retain 
their special privileges. In private, however, the JACL lobbyist was decidedly less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sympathetic. In an internal ADC memorandum, he blamed Chinese Americans’ own 
actions, namely their well-known “abuses” of the alien wives privilege for having 
prompted the Immigration and Naturalization Service to add the amendments in 
question; continuing the notorious “paper son system” of the Chinese exclusion era, INS 
officials suspected Chinese of trading in paper marriages to bring Chinese women into 
the United States under false pretenses.74 Elsewhere Masaoka called on the JACL to 
keep its distance from Chinese American groups, for fear of becoming associated with 
their long record of “forgery . . . smuggling” and other unethical practices. The JACL 
could not “afford to get involved or mixed up” with Chinese Americans, he warned, “if 
we are to keep our own skirts clean.”75  
With the addition of such amendments, the Judd campaign renewed attention to 
the question of “justifiable selfishness”:  that is, the extent to which the JACL should 
prioritize Japanese American interests versus its responsibilities to address 
discriminations suffered by black Americans and other nonwhite groups in America. 
While the removal of the provisions offensive to Chinese and Filipino Americans from 
the final version of the Judd bill passed by the House on March 1, 1949, simplified the 
issue for the JACL, the final bill included a similar amendment affecting the African !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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American community. The JACL supported the bill in spite of the strong objections of 
black critics, who became more outspoken after 1948.76  
 
Reconciling Asian Exclusion Repeal with Black Civil Rights   
Peaceful co-existence and, in activist circles, a general sense of solidarity had 
marked black-Japanese relations during the 1940s. The World War II years were a 
tumultuous time for both the black and Japanese American communities. Government 
evacuation and internment took an incalculable toll on Japanese Americans uprooted 
from sites across the West Coast, and many of the elderly first- generation Issei would 
never recover from the experience. Preoccupied with the issues facing the Japanese 
American community, the JACL took little active interest in black Americans’ wartime 
calls for military desegregation and fair employment. Black organizations responded to 
Japanese internment with similar ambivalence. Reluctant to jeopardize their own civil 
rights agenda, which relied heavily on maintaining a favorable standing with U.S. 
authorities, most major African American organizations, formally took no position.77 The 
NAACP alone issued what historian Cheryl Greenberg has described as the “most 
forceful” critique of internment of the time, but even it was “muted and . . . oblique.”78  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As anti-Japanese sentiment gave way to official approbation and sympathy for 
Japanese American victims after the war, both sides made at least rhetorical movements 
toward greater solidarity. Believing that it was in their interest to define civil rights in 
broader terms, many black community leaders supported Masaoka’s efforts to define 
racial discrimination in America as an issue involving more than black Americans alone. 
Speaking after Masaoka at a Senate hearing on lynching in early 1948, NAACP chief 
counsel Charles Houston echoed the JACL spokesman in describing the “terror of 
lynching” as more than simply a “Negro problem” but one that “spread much wider” to 
affect other minority groups as well.79 Along similar lines, he noted how “antipathy 
directed first against one minority group tends to generalize itself against all minority 
groups.” Registering his sympathy for the Japanese American plight, in particular, 
Houston expressed his agreement with the arguments of Supreme Court Justice Black 
two days earlier in Oyama v. California denouncing the alien land laws in California as 
an “obstacle to the free accomplishment of [U.S.] policy in the international field.”80 
Similar examples abounded in the years immediately after World War II, as the NAACP 
and other black community leaders came to recognize their interest in working with 
Japanese Americans, whose postwar standing benefited from widespread official remorse 
over their wartime internment.81  
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But tacit agreement on civil rights principles did not readily translate into 
agreement on the best strategies for advancing equality and justice for American minority 
groups.82 Fissures quickly became apparent, recalling a longer history of resentment and 
mutual suspicion between the two communities. In one notable episode, black civil rights 
leader Bayard Rustin charged Nisei with being “overly insular” and “almost totally 
lacking” in active concern for their fellow minority groups. The younger generation of 
Japanese Americans would not “come of age,” he contended, until they showed as much 
interest in the problems of other minorities as they now show in their own.”83 Rustin’s 
public critique evoked a quick response from the JACL’s national president Saburo Kido, 
who took to the pages of the League newspaper, Pacific Citizen, to defend the League’s 
primary commitment to Japanese American causes. Like Rustin, Kido expressed his hope 
that justice would render special racial-ethnic organizations like the JACL obsolete. But 
so long as problems like evacuation claims and citizenship eligibility that specifically 
affected the Japanese American community went unresolved, the League must “take 
leadership” in addressing them.84  
Rustin’s critique of Japanese American insularity and self-interest was not new. 
Well before the 1940s, black leaders had complained about Japanese American 
“clannishness” and the hindrance it posed to their own integration efforts. Similar 
critiques followed after World War II. Amidst media attention to Japanese American 
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resettlement, Rustin’s remarks replayed on a national level common criticisms voiced by 
local African Americans in cities with significant numbers of both groups. Editorialists 
in the black newspaper Los Angeles Tribune, for instance, openly blamed Japanese 
Americans’ “indifference” for the failure of local efforts to form multi-racial coalitions 
to work toward a broader civil rights agenda.85 Local black leaders in both Los Angeles 
and Chicago also complained about Japanese Americans’ poor treatment of their “black 
patrons and neighbors” despite the “loyalty” that local African Americans had shown 
Japanese business-owners as regular customers and their “best friends,” having “stood 
up” and “spoken out” on their behalf during the war.86  
Several JACL affiliates echoed these concerns. In late 1947, JACL advisor and 
Utah anthropology professor Elmer Smith published a public challenge and rebuke of 
Nisei in the Pacific Citizen titled “Civil Liberties – for me!” Smith took to task those 
Nisei storeowners who mistreated black, Mexican, and Filipino patrons in their own 
neighborhoods even as they claimed to support black civil rights. He argued that the time 
had come for Japanese Americans to put aside their “evacuation complex” and 
“cooperate with other community groups” for the “welfare of the total community.”87 
Local JACL leaders like Chicago chapter president, Mari Sabusawa, concurred. Speaking 
at a roundtable at the JACL’s annual convention the following year, Sabusawa called on 
the JACL to censure those Nisei known to practice discrimination against other 
minorities. Sabusawa had worked with local African American leaders as an active !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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member of the NAACP’s Chicago branch. But even she agreed with Kido and a 
consensus of the roundtable’s participants that while the JACL should take an active 
interest in the plight of other oppressed minority groups, it should not do so at the 
expense of Japanese Americans’ own interests as a community.88 
An amendment added to the Judd bill by State Department officials in early 1949 
put the JACL to the test. The “empire quota,” as it came to be known, proposed a 
numerical ceiling of 100 per year on migration from “colonies and other dependent 
areas.”89 The perceived intent of the colonial quota amendment to discriminate against 
blacks from the Caribbean galvanized a wide range of black American organizations and 
community leaders.90 They minced no words, condemning the proposed colonial quota as 
racist. A.A. Austin of the United Caribbean American Council of New York charged U.S. 
State Department officials with devising new strategies aimed at “discouraging and 
deterring peoples of African descent from entering the United States.”91 He and other 
opponents were quick to note the provision’s disproportionate application to British, 
French, and Dutch Caribbean colonies with majority black populations. Jamaica, which 
sent roughly 1,000 black migrants to the United States annually through the 1940s, would 
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be among the most heavily impacted. Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr., 
who led the opposition in Congress, bluntly denouncing the amendment as 
“discrimination of the very rankest type.”92  
Black critics were especially rankled by the notion that gains for one racial 
minority group had to come at the expense of another. During a time of liberalization of 
U.S. immigration policy toward European and Asian peoples, new discriminations should 
not target people of African descent. Writing in a March 1949 NAACP press release, 
Thurgood Marshall noted a “grim irony” in that the “House evidently believes that each 
step forward must be accompanied by a step backward.”93 Lawyer Charles Houston 
editorialized to similar effect in his syndicated newspaper column “Our Civil Rights”; 
while affirming his support for Japanese American rights, he denounced the proposed 
colonial quota as a “dirty sleeper” designed to target “colored peoples in the British 
Empire.” The last thing we want to do is “exchange a yellow discrimination for a black 
one,” he protested. “We want to eradicate both.”94  
Houston’s lament underscored an important reality key to understanding the 
broader political context in which the Judd campaign took place. In late 1940s 
Washington, American minority groups competed for Congressional attention and 
support. As a relative latecomer vying against much more established civil right forces, 
the Judd lobby was at a distinct disadvantage in the race. Recognizing this and yet 
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anxious to avoid direct conflict with the more established African American and Jewish 
civil rights community, Masaoka sought a truce. In late 1948, he met with national 
African American and Jewish community leaders based in New York. At his request, 
they agreed not to block or hinder progress on the Judd bill, though they would maintain 
their respective emphases on other civil rights matters. Masaoka was appeased. A policy 
of non-interference, he concluded, was “all we can ask for.”95  
The détente proved increasingly difficult to maintain over time. Though Masaoka 
lamented the “awkward position” of the ADC, he would not apologize for the JACL’s 
unwavering commitment to Japanese American rights. “Certainly, we do not want either 
rights or privileges taken away from other minority groups,” he insisted. “But, at the 
same time, we do believe that there should be equality in naturalization and immigration 
law,” such that “other sections, if necessary, should be sacrificed in order to gain the 
greater principle.” To this end, objections by other groups should “not be permitted to 
cloud or confuse the issues.”96 As with their position in the Chinese case, in public JACL 
leaders and affiliates continued to voice support for the concerns expressed by black 
critics. But their objections to the bill’s targeting of the black community ultimately did 
not stop them from pushing for its passage, even after the House approved it in March 
1949 with the colonial quota intact.97  
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Even after the Judd bill was no longer in contention, JACL observers continued 
to debate the issue of Japanese Americans’ responsibility to their fellow African 
Americans. Collaboration between JACL chapter leaders and black community activists 
in local sites like Chicago in campaigning for fair employment, as well as providing 
practical help in the areas of job placement and housing assistance, had grown in the 
postwar years. Seeing this led some members to caution that the League was associating 
too closely with African Americans, to its own detriment. Others defended the 
partnerships. Larry Tajiri, editor of the JACL organ Pacific Citizen, called on Japanese 
Americans to do more on behalf of other groups, arguing that the time had come for 
Japanese Americans to seek justice on behalf of other oppressed groups. He explained 
his position in an April 1951 column.  
[T]he JACL has been admonished by obviously well-meaning people, both Nisei 
and non-Nisei, not to become involved in other racial issues, particularly those 
concerning Negroes. The theory is that the Nisei, now that the war crisis is over, 
will be treated as honorary Aryans as long as they do not align themselves with 
groups which are still subject to discrimination. This is a sort of social 
isolationism that is no more logical than isolationism as a matter of national 
policy. There are no islands anymore, whether for racial minorities or for 
nations.98  
 
He argued that blacks’ welfare connected integrally to Japanese Americans’. Going it 
alone was no longer a viable option, Tajiri protested, and the JACL did so at the risk of 
alienating the very groups who should be their friends. But Tajiri was a minority voice 
within the JACL.99 Well after the Judd bill’s immigration and naturalization provisions 
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JACL leaders continued to insist on their importance to the Japanese American 
community, notwithstanding the fact that their support brought them into direct conflict 
with many of the same groups Tajiri pointed to as natural allies.100 
 
To Secure These Rights: Articulating the Framework of Cold War Civil Rights  
Writing to the JACL’s national headquarters in early 1948, Masaoka explained 
that “developments in the field of world politics and American foreign policy” had 
persuaded him and a consensus of ADC leaders and its affiliates that the campaign would 
do better to “shift . . . emphasis [on HR 5004] from that of naturalization and domestic 
influence to immigration and its impact on the world situation, particularly as it affects 
the struggle against the spread of communism.” While he personally claimed to dislike 
such rhetorical pandering, with “time running out on us and with so many other matters 
of interest to the Congress,” he warned that the JACL program would be “lost in the 
legislative rush to do something about Russia” unless it “stress[ed] this angle.”101 
Recognizing the need for anticommunist legitimacy, members of the JACL’s 
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the JACL laid the initial groundwork for continuing partnership against racism in the decades to come. 
  
101 Masaoka to JACL Headquarters, March 19, 1948, Box 2, Folder 14, Mike Masaoka papers, Marriott 
Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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Communist taint or ties, lest official observers accuse the organization of “infiltration” by 
“Nisei or non-Nisei communists and fellow travelers.”102 
Masaoka’s argument echoed the “international” argument for civil rights reform 
outlined in the President’s Committee on Civil Rights’ 1947 report To Secure These 
Rights. According to the committee, improving America’s domestic record on race was 
critical to shoring up the United States’ international image as a democratic power in the 
world. “The United States is not so strong,” it had concluded, that Americans could 
afford to “ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.” To the extent that U.S. 
national security was “inextricably tied to the security and well-being of all people and all 
countries,” America’s “domestic civil rights shortcomings” were not merely an American 
concern but instead posed a “serious obstacle” to America’s international interests – in 
particular, its desire to contain the further spread of Moscow’s global influence.103  
Discrimination against, or mistreatment of, any racial, religious or national group 
in the United States is not only seen as our internal problem. The dignity of a 
country, a continent, or even a major portion of the world's population, may be 
outraged by it. A relatively few individuals here may be identified with millions 
of people elsewhere, and the way in which they are treated may have world-wide 
repercussions . . .104 
 
Asian Americans were one such group. Reflecting Asia’s postwar importance to 
America’s Cold War containment project, the authors stressed that although citizens of 
Oriental descent” numbered only “in the hundreds of thousands” within the United 
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102 Known Japanese American Communist Karl Yoneda was a particular concern. When Yoneda stopped 
by the Washington, DC office to offer his support for repeal, for example, Masaoka specifically asked him 
to refrain from expressing public support lest his Communist Party ties stain the bill as subversive or 
otherwise Communist-inspired. ADC memorandum, May 10 and May 31, 1947, Box 5, Folder 4, Mike 
Masaoka papers, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 
103 To Secure These Rights, 147-148, emphasis in original. 
 
104 To Secure These Rights, 147-148. 
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States, their poor treatment had implications to turn “hundreds of millions” of their Asian 
“counterparts overseas” against America.105 Asian Americans stood to benefit the most 
from the logic of Cold War geopolitics entwining American domestic racial policies with 
U.S. interests abroad; unlike European immigration activists, they were a small and 
politically negligible group in the United States with few votes.106 By tying the domestic 
to the foreign, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights exponentially increased the 
stakes of repeal, elevating it from a niche minority issue to a critical component of 
America’s Cold War battle to win Asian hearts and minds away from Soviet 
Communism. 
 Even as NAACP activists strategically adopted the language of anti-Communism 
to argue for the necessity of civil rights reform, official advocates of Asian exclusion 
repeal did the same, couching their calls for repeal within the context of U.S. Cold War 
imperatives in Asia and the decolonizing world. Speaking before the House Judiciary 
Committee in 1948, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew underscored the 
gravity of the postwar moment, a “time of great movement . . . of realignment and 
choosing of friends” when newly independent nations like Burma were deciding whether 
their loyalties would lie with the United States or the Soviet Union. During such a period !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
105 This is consistent with Mae Ngai’s observation that modifications to Asian immigration policy were 
conceived with Asian, not Asian American, audiences in mind, while the opposite was often true for 
policies affecting European groups. Mae Ngai, “The Unlovely Residue of Outworn Prejudices: The Hart-
Celler Act and the Politics of Immigration Reform, 1945-1965,” in Michael Kazin and Joseph McCartin, 
eds., Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996), 117-118.  
 
106 To Secure These Rights, 147-148. Japanese and other Asian Americans were very different from the 
“ethnic whites” of the New Deal Coalition, whom, as historians Oscar Handlin and Mae Ngai have 
observed, based their calls for immigration reform on their newfound political power; in their case, 
immigration policy arguably became a proxy for a group’s domestic status in the U.S. Mae Ngai, “The 
Unlovely Residue of Outworn Prejudices: The Hart-Celler Act and the Politics of Immigration Reform, 
1945-1965,” in Michael Kazin and Joseph McCartin, eds., Americanism: New Perspectives on the History 
of an Ideal (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 117-118.   
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of nationalist ferment, “everywhere there is receptivity to new ideas.”107 Under such 
conditions, Grew argued, U.S. relations with Asian powers could “never be expected to 
become entirely sound” unless lawmakers acted to “eliminate the humiliation inflicted by 
[U.S.] exclusion laws.”108 The bill’s sponsor Rep. Walter Judd concurred, underscoring 
the power of his immigration and naturalization measure to “win the people of the Far 
East to our side in our contest with Soviet Russia.”109  
From early in the campaign, non-Japanese supporters seized upon the Judd bill’s 
special connection to Japan, in particular. Under the Judd bill’s terms, the island nation 
stood to receive the largest annual immigration quota of 185 (most other powers were 
given 100 slots), while as the largest Asian American group still barred from U.S. 
citizenship, Japanese aliens constituted more than 97 percent of the persons the bill would 
make eligible to naturalize.110 The bill’s disproportionate benefit to Japan worked in its 
favor during a time when the island nation had become the centerpiece of American 
containment policy in the Far East. Departing from the more generalized Cold War 
language used by proponents of black civil rights measures, Grew contended that Japan 
“warrant[ed] particular attention” during a time when its “new leadership . . . [was] 
emerging under [American] tutelage.” Invoking negative lessons learned from the 1924 
Japanese Exclusion clause, he argued that the “ending of exclusion now would provide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 
80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 43. 
 
108 Quoted in Robert M. Cullum, “End of Oriental Exclusion?” Far Eastern Survey 17:21 (November 3, 
1948), 249; see U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for Equality under Naturalization and 
Immigration Laws, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948. 
 
109 Providing for Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 35. 
 
110 Japanese aliens made up 97% of the 87,942 persons classified in the 1940 census as “ineligible to 
citizenship.” Quoted in Robert Cullum, “End of Oriental Exclusion,” Far Eastern Survey 17:21 (Nov. 3, 
1948), 248.  
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concrete proof of American good faith at a time when it is most important that new 
leadership be oriented in [the United States’] direction.”111 Others went further, seeking 
to enlist Occupation officials from the U.S.-led SCAP government in Japan directly in the 
effort. Within weeks of the Judd bill’s first introduction to Congress in July 1947, Rep. 
Bertrand Gearhart of California (D-CA) wrote to General Douglas MacArthur of the 
Allied occupation government asking his endorsement for legislation to overturn the 
Oriental exclusion laws in the United States. Like Grew, he emphasized the benefit to 
American relations with Japan. Through the act of giving Japanese “equal treatment with 
the Chinese, Filipinos, and Hindus,” Gearhart argued, the U.S. Congress would 
strengthen both the formal U.S.-Japan alliance and increase America’s prestige among 
Japanese.112 MacArthur, for his part, declined to comment on the bill in line with his 
personal policy of not speaking out on political matters. Although unsuccessful, Rep. 
Gearhart’s attempt to enlist MacArthur reflected a clear understanding of how U.S. 
immigration laws were relevant to international diplomacy.  
While Masaoka and other JACL spokesmen initially resisted using arguments that 
cited geopolitics, they eventually relented as it became clear that martial patriotism would 
not suffice and that Cold War imperatives offered the most persuasive grounds for repeal. 
A comparison of JACL statements between 1947 and 1951 reveals a clear shift in the 
JACL’s strategy from domestic to foreign policy and geopolitical arguments as a prime 
focus. Speaking at a March 1948 hearing on the Judd bill before the House Judiciary 
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111 Quoted in Robert M. Cullum, “End of Oriental Exclusion?” Far Eastern Survey 17:21 (November 3, 
1948), 249.  
 
112 Congressman Bertrand Gearhart (R-CA), quoted in Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the 
U.S. Occupation of Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 34-36, fn 44. 
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Committee, Masaoka, representing the JACL, sidestepped foreign policy matters 
altogether. Claiming to know little about the immigration provisions of the measure, he 
instead focused his lengthy statement on describing Japanese Americans’ wartime loyalty 
and the many sacrifices of life, property, and dignity that demanded redress in the form of 
citizenship eligibility for the older generation.113 This was consistent with the JACL’s 
tendency early in the campaign to focus almost exclusively on the issue of Issei 
citizenship and avoid addressing foreign policy issues which, according to representatives 
like Masaoka, fell outside of the ethnic American organization’s purview.114 The real 
shift came in 1951, after the Judd bill’s provisions were incorporated into the omnibus 
immigration legislation introduced to the 82nd Congress by Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Pat McCarran (D-NV) and Rep. Francis Walter (D-PA) of Pennsylvania – both 
staunch anticommunists. By then, two key events had dramatically changed the situation 
in East Asia. The first was the Communists’ victory in China, leading to the emergence 
of a Red China under Mao Zedong. The second was the outbreak of war on the Korean 
peninsula, a conflict in which Chinese Communist forces joined the North Korean regime 
in a takeover attempt of South Korea, guarded by South Korean, U.S. and U.N. troops. 
Speaking at the height of the Korean War overseas and the furor of McCarthyite politics 
at home, Masaoka, the original author of the JACL’s Japanese American Creed, became a 
master of articulately recapitulating the Cold War language and logic appeals offered by 
Grew and other official supporters of repeal years earlier.  
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113 U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws: 
Hearings on H.R. 199, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 118.!
 
114 JACL leaders recognized the need to include both immigration and naturalization provisions in the Judd 
bill, however, noting how because of the “aliens ineligible to citizenship” clause present in the 1924 
Immigration Act, it was impossible to modify policy in one area without affecting the other. 
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A written and oral statement presented to a joint Congressional hearing on the 
revision of U.S. Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws by Mike Masaoka, 
speaking as a representative of the JACL-ADC, exemplified the organization’s 
wholehearted embrace of Cold War arguments. The JACL spokesman echoed other 
witnesses’ calls for Congressional passage of the McCarran-Walter omnibus bill as a 
“far-reaching and beneficial” means to advance “U.S. foreign policy in the Far East.” He 
explicitly invoked the Korean War and the approaching San Francisco Conference ending 
the U.S. occupation of Japan to justify the extension of gains to Koreans and Japanese, in 
particular. It was a critical moment in U.S. relations with Asian powers, he warned, as 
America was “meeting the Communist enemy in battle in Korea,” building up Japan as 
“our bulwark of democracy in the Orient,” and “aiding our friends in southeastern Asia 
with guns and money in order to stop the Communist menace.” And yet, he noted the 
irony in that the “very aliens that we are now discriminating against under our laws are 
the very aliens that we are looking to for support and help in the present crisis in the Far 
East.”115 Recapitulating arguments made by Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew 
and U.S. State Department officials at previous hearings, he lamented that for such 
groups – Japanese, Koreans, and Southeast Asian peoples – the preferential treatment 
Congress had given Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos but continued to deny them 
“accentuated” the original stigma of exclusion.116 Like Grew and Judd before him, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 U.S. Joint Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, 
and Nationality Laws: Hearings on S. 716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 49, 50, 
69.  
 
116 Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws, 1951, 50. W. Walton Butterworth of the 
State Department’s Far Eastern Affairs office made this argument at House Judiciary Committee hearings 
in 1948 when he argued that in terms of repeal, “[e]ach admission of an additional state…emphasizes the 
discrimination and no doubt the resentment of the states left outside the pale.” Former Ambassador to Japan 
Joseph Grew likewise pointed to how granting privileges to one group and not another “accentuated” the 
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JACL spokesman emphasized the ramifications of the legislation for America’s 
relationship with its newly reconstructed Cold War ally, Japan. He warned that another 
failure to act by U.S. lawmakers risked pushing the Japanese people squarely into the 
Soviet Communist camp.  
The people of Japan know that the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses failed to 
take conclusive action on legislation of this nature. If this Congress repeats this 
failure, Japan may fall prey to the Communists, especially in that transitional 
period following the signing of the peace treaty . . . There may yet be time to buy 
victory in the Orient, and the price may be this simple piece of legislation that 
demonstrates the sincerity of our protestations as to the brotherhood of man.117  
 
Particularly notable were the dual grounds on which Masaoka purported to make 
this statement. On the one hand, he professed special insight into the Japanese psyche as 
a “member of the Japanese race” who understood “how the people of Japanese ancestry 
feel about America and her democratic ways.” At the same time, he spoke as an 
“American realizing how we need the ninety-odd-million Japanese in Japan to serve as 
our friends and bulwark in the coming trying days.”118 This suggestion of duality, which 
had been largely absent from JACL statements since before Pearl Harbor, was even more 
remarkable for contradicting Masaoka’s several appeals to an unequivocal American 
identity in the same speech. The overall effect was schizophrenic, with Masaoka 
alternately embracing and explicitly disavowing his Japanese heritage.119  
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“stigma placed upon those who remain ineligible.” U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for 
Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws: Hearings on H.R. 5004, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 
36-37, 43. 
 
117 Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws, 1951, 66. !
118 Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws, 1951, 74.!
 
119 In a throwback to the JACL’s wartime mantra of 100% Americanism, Masaoka at one point claimed to 
speak “not as a person of Japanese ancestry but as an American” when he echoed calls by Rep. Judd of the 
omnibus bill’s boon to America’s “fight against communism.” He contradicted himself later in the same 
statement when he claimed special insight on account of his Japanese “ancestry” into what the bill 
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Masaoka’s multiple assertions of 100% Americanism reflected JACL leaders’ 
long-held policy of emphasizing the League’s undivided loyalty and patriotism to the 
United States. But the explicit appeal to a Japanese background was novel. Before 1951, 
JACL leaders rarely boasted about their Japanese heritage, which they saw as a liability. 
Certainly, this had been the case during World War II when, eager to dispel assumptions 
of disloyalty, JACL leaders lauded their American identity in cherished, unequivocal 
terms. By the early 1950s, it was arguably advantageous to claim an understanding of the 
Asiatic mind as expertise that was indispensable to America’s own future security in the 
world. Never before had Japanese identity been conferred such a strategic advantage, and 
Masaoka and other JACL spokespersons seized upon politically expedient language when 
and to the extent that it helped their cause. Masaoka, speaking for the JACL, alternately 
invoked and distanced himself from a given identity – American or Japanese – depending 
on the situation and which better suited the argument he was trying to make. Masaoka’s 
rhetoric not only charted a specific shift in the Judd campaign’s strategy. It also signaled 
the beginning of a broader transformation in the JACL’s stance toward Japan and its 
relationship with Japanese America, which would come to greater fruition after 1952.120 
For the purposes of the Judd lobby, it reflected the JACL’s growing recognition of how 
the Cold War calculus of the American containment project in Asia had transformed an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
personally signified to the “Asiatic peoples who are now excluded.” Revision of Immigration, 
Naturalization, and Nationality Laws, 1951, 66. 
 
120 There were other indications that Masaoka’s turn to Japan was not merely rhetorical or strategic. It 
would appear that as his contacts with Japanese officials increased, so did his willingness to see Japanese 
and Japanese American interests as mutually related. In a fall 1951 letter to Issei supporters in California, 
he conveyed a message of thanks from the Japanese Prime Minister along with his own lauding all that 
Issei had given “in the way of improving the welfare of the Japanese in this country.” “I know that the 
Japanese people in Japan are grateful for what you are doing here,” he wrote, “for by doing so, you are 
making persons of the Japanese race more acceptable to their fellow Americans. Such a statement linking 
the status of Japanese in America with Japanese audiences would have been unheard of just a few years 
earlier. Mike Masaoka to K. Koda, September 11, 1951, Box 4, Folder 1, JACL papers, JANL, San 
Francisco, CA. 
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association with Japan from a liability to be overcome to a potential tool strengthening 
the grounds upon which Japanese Americans could claim legal rights. 
  
The End of Formal Exclusion: The JACL and the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 
The Judd bill successfully passed the U.S. House twice only to languish in the 
Senate, until Rep. Francis Walter (D-PA) and Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) picked up 
its immigration and naturalization provisions for Asia and incorporated them into an 
omnibus immigration bill in 1951. As historian David Reimers has noted, the sponsors 
included Judd’s proposals in the omnibus measure for strategic reasons. They hoped the 
“liberal tinge” and popularity of the Judd bill’s immigration and naturalization proposals 
would offset the measure’s more controversial national security provisions and thereby 
make the overall bill more “palatable” to a bipartisan audience.121 The strategy worked. 
Despite widespread opposition – as well as a presidential veto by the Truman White 
House – the McCarran-Walter Act received sufficient votes to pass Congress not once, 
but also a second time to override the veto.  Judd, a Republican, remarkably stepped 
aside to allow Francis Walter, a Pennsylvania Democrat, to take credit for the legislation, 
at the request of Democratic House Speaker Sam Rayburn, who wanted his party to get 
credit for the legislation.122  
The JACL knowingly invited the ire of many minority and progressive groups 
when it redirected its efforts for the Judd bill to lobby for the Congressional passage of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
121 David Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), 16-20. 
 
122 According to JACL historian Bill Hosokawa, Judd’s willingness to forego recognition for his part in 
passing the measure testified to his commitment to the cause. After almost a decade of laboring for repeal, 
Judd was more concerned with ensuring the legislation passed than he was with who claimed the credit for 
it. Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, 295-296. 
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the McCarran-Walter omnibus measure, which today remains one of the most contested 
pieces of U.S. legislation ever enacted.123 Mike Masaoka, representing the JACL, 
quickly emerged as the McCarran-Walter campaign’s most prominent Asian American 
defender and a rare dissenting voice among the legislation’s many outspoken minority 
critics. For the JACL, pragmatism remained the byword. In a spring 1952 New York 
Times letter to the editor, Masaoka described the Walter-McCarran bills as “important 
and necessary reform measures . . . in keeping with [America’s] intelligent self-interest.” 
Charges of racism notwithstanding, he insisted that the bill’s “Asia-Pacific Triangle” 
formula represented a “long step forward . . . from absolute exclusion.” Reiterating the 
pragmatic approach of the JACL, he maintained that while the measure was by no means 
perfect, “[t]o scrap improvements on the grounds of their not being ideal would frustrate 
the achievement of any gains whatsoever.”124 In other words, he argued on behalf of the 
JACL, an imperfect bill was preferable to none at all.  
Opposition to the McCarran omnibus measure was strong and wide-ranging. The 
NAACP took issue with the legislation for its retention of the Judd bill’s discriminatory 
“colonial quota” restricting black migration from the Caribbean. Eastern and Southern 
European groups objected to the measure’s retention of a national origins quota system 
that severely disadvantaged their ancestral homelands in favor of northern and western 
European counterparts. Representatives of the ACLU, along with other progressive and 
liberal groups, decried the bill’s “repressive” national security clauses strengthening the 
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123 Opinion among Asian American groups remains divided to this day. See, for example, Phil Tajitsu 
Nash, “Fifty Years Since McCarran-Walter,” Asian Week, June 7, 2001. 
 
124 According to Masaoka, the bill reflected the “evolutionary nature” of legislative reform in a democracy.  
Mike Masaoka, “McCarran Bill Upheld,” New York Times, April 27, 1952, E8. 
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power of the government to detain and deport suspected subversives and other 
“undesirables.”125 Perhaps the most damning critique came from the White House, which 
vetoed the bill as soon as it passed both houses of Congress in June 1952. In his veto 
message, President Truman commended the omnibus bill’s elimination of racial barriers 
to immigration and U.S. citizenship but insisted that these provisions did not outweigh 
the bill’s “un-American” elements.  
 [T]his most desirable provision comes before me embedded in a mass of 
legislation which would perpetuate injustices of long standing against many other 
nations of the world, hamper the efforts we are making to rally the men of the 
east and west alike to the cause of freedom, and intensify the repressive and 
inhumane aspects of our immigration procedures.126  
 
Truman took special issue with the race-based nature of the Asian immigration quotas, 
calling it “invidious discrimination . . . without justification.” In the final analysis, the 
President concluded, the Act’s many “undesirable features” outweighed its “few 
improvements.” The “price is too high,” he wrote, and “in good conscience, I cannot 
agree to pay it.”127  
JACL leaders stood by their decision to support the 1952 omnibus measure and 
actively lobbied Congress to override the veto. Later asked to account for the JACL’s 
position, the JACL-ADC’s associate director Richard Akagi insisted that the goal of Issei 
naturalization had been too urgent for the League simply to wait for a less controversial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
125 For a systematic critique of the 1952 Act, see U.S. President's Commission on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Whom Shall We Welcome (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953). !
126  Truman, quoted in William R. Tamayo, "Asian Americans and the McCarran-Walter Act," in Asian 
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127 Truman, quoted in Tamayo, 348-349. Writing in the JACL’s organizational history, JACL historian Bill 
Hosokawa claimed for the League an especially dramatic role in the final lobby to override Truman’s veto 
of the bill in the fall of 1952. Hosokawa described the events of the night before the Senate re-vote with 
some vividness, having been personally present. Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, 296-297. 
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bill before taking action.128 While “young people” might have had the choice to “stand 
on principle for another 10 to 15 years,” aging Issei “in the twilight of their lives” did not 
have that option; if the JACL had waited another “5 to 6 years,” the fight itself would 
have become “meaningless” for those who stood to benefit most.129 In short, he 
concluded, the ends justified the means, even if the Issei’s gain had to come at another 
community’s expense and as part of a legislative package that was less than ideal.130 The 
JACL’s outspoken support for the McCarran-Walter bill was significant, official 
supporters used it to deflect criticisms of the bill as racist. Walter Judd and Pat McCarran 
both cited the JACL’s endorsement – misleadingly, at times – as evidence of broad 
Asian American support for the measure.131  
The JACL’s decision may have been controversial but it was not out of character. 
The League’s national leaders had exhibited similar resolve in a last-minute bid to pass !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Walter Resolution, a Japanese and Korean naturalization bill, first introduced as a 
more attainable alternative to the Judd bill several years earlier in the Eighty-First 
Congress. The episode was instructive in several respects, not least as a harbinger of the 
McCarran-Walter campaign. The opposition of one lawmaker, Georgia Senator and 
Dixiecrat Richard Russell (D-GA), held the bill up, reaffirming the power of individual 
lawmakers in leadership singlehandedly to delay legislative progress on Asian 
immigration.132 At the same time, the JACL’s dogged persistence in supporting the 
measure through in increasingly restrictive form – first, after it dropped Korean aliens 
from its citizenship provisions, and later, despite the security riders attached to it in the 
Senate – made clear the JACL’s steadfast commitment to Japanese American interests 
above all, a lesson that the McCarran-Walter campaign would again confirm. 
*  *  *  *  * 
 Though some criticized the JACL for its defense of the controversial bill, the 
organization ultimately got what it wanted: citizenship eligibility for Issei, and greater 
legitimacy and standing both within and outside the Japanese American community. As 
former JACL president Dr. Thomas Yatabe had predicted, the League’s role in winning 
Issei the right to naturalize helped repair its sullied reputation among disillusioned 
community members. The JACL’s membership rosters swelled from a nadir during 
World War II to unprecedented highs by the early 1950s. Changes in the League’s 
membership policy that made non-citizens (including first-generation Issei) eligible to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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join for the first time contributed to the surge, as did a rush by newly naturalized Issei to 
support the organization that had made their citizenship possible.133 Indeed, over the ten 
years following the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act in the fall of 1952, more than 
60,000 first-generation Japanese Americans availed themselves of this hard-won right. 
The impact of Japan’s newly won annual immigration quota was less dramatic, insofar as 
the vast majority of the 45,000 Japanese who immigrated to the United States between 
1952 and 1960 did so as the spouses of U.S. military and thus outside of the annual quota 
provision.134  
Inasmuch as the McCarran-Walter Act served as a litmus test for a group’s 
anticommunist credentials during a time of growing Cold War tensions, the JACL passed 
with flying colors. Outside the community, the JACL’s support for the bill won it the 
support of its staunchly anticommunist sponsor, Nevada Senator Pat McCarran, whose 
seniority and chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary Committee made him a formidable 
force on Capitol Hill. Through its support for the bill, the League not only strengthened 
its relationships with some of the most powerful lawmakers on Capitol Hill. It also 
proved its loyalty to the state’s anticommunist agenda, and in so doing reassured its 
position as the undisputed representative of the Nikkei community to the federal 
government, which one scholar described as a “far greater benefit than any attempts at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Indeed, the Issei’s disproportionate role in funding the JACL’s legislative efforts raised questions about 
the League’s U.S. citizens-only membership policy as early as 1947. In August of that year, national staff 
officers of the League passed a unanimous recommendation that Issei be allowed full membership in light 
of their critical support for the JACL-ADC’s legislative agenda. “JACL Staff Recommends Membership 
for Issei Group,” Pacific Citizen, August 23, 1947.  
 
134 Of the 45,000 Japanese, 85.9% of them were female, and a majority of them were GI brides. Figures 
taken from Tamayo, “Asian Americans & the McCarran-Walter Act,” 346. 
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liberalizing the immigration law.”135 It was on these grounds that, even years after its 
passage, JACL historian Bill Hosokawa continued to claim the 1952 McCarran-Walter 
Act as the League’s “greatest legislative triumph” to date.136  
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Wu, "Race and Asian American Citizenship: From World War II to the Movement." 392; Tamayo, 
“Asian Americans & the McCarran-Walter Act,” 356. 
 
136 Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, 293. 
Chapter 5 
 
Bridging Korea and Korean America:  
The Cold War Campaign for Korean Rights  
 
 
As Cold War tensions crystallized after 1947, Koreans in the United States 
revived the wartime campaigns to secure the immigration and naturalization rights their 
Chinese and Indian peers had won. Two groups led the charge. Politically, they were 
polar opposites. Long-time Korean residents of Hawaii with close ties to Syngman Rhee 
founded the Washington, DC-based Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee 
(KINC). KINC had the backing of mainline Korean American community groups, the 
United Korean Committee (UKC) and Korean National Association (KNA). The Korean 
American Committee for Wallace (KACW), an offshoot of the leftwing Korean National 
Revolutionary Party (KNRP) chapter in Los Angeles, occupied the other end of the 
political spectrum.  
Concurrent campaigns launched by the KINC and KACW both linked their 
campaigns for Korean American rights to events in Korea. This chapter illuminates the 
relationship between Korean Americans’ engagement with U.S. policy and practice in 
postwar Korea, and their struggles for rights in the United States. Each group enacted this 
relationship differently, reflecting their opposite visions of America’s role in Korea’s 
struggle for freedom. The first part of this chapter examines Korean Americans’ changing 
relationship to the United States in response to the U.S-Soviet joint occupation of Korea 
after World War II, the 1948 division of the Korean peninsula into two separate states, 
and, finally, the outbreak of civil war on the peninsula in 1950.1  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Throughout the chapter, I alternate between “South Korea” and ROK, and “North Korea” and DPRK to 
refer to the two Korean states established in 1948. 
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Korean Americans generally wanted their homeland to become a unified, 
independent Korean nation-state governed by Koreans for Koreans. However, they 
disagreed about the role of the United States in making this dream a reality. While 
mainline groups like the KNA and UKC continued to look to Washington for support for 
unified Korean independence, the leftwing KNRP wanted Washington to get out of the 
way so Koreans could decide their own future.2 Uninterested in obliging the U.S. 
government, KNRP members spent the postwar years critiquing American 
interventionism in Korea and racial discrimination in the United States as common 
expressions of American imperialism and white supremacy. They would pay for their 
critique under national security measures designed to rout out subversion and protect 
America from communist infiltration. Arrests, prolonged detentions, and formal 
deportation orders of Korean leftists intensified in the early 1950s, during the Korean 
War. Their experiences illustrate the costs of violating what legal scholar Richard 
Delgado has called the “implicit bargain” between minority groups and the U.S. 
government during the Cold War: “loyalty to America and hostility to communism . . . in 
return for civil rights gains.”3  
The second part of this chapter considers the experiences of Korean American 
radicals under the McCarran (1950) and McCarran-Walter Acts (1952). While both the 
KINC and KACW went defunct before the McCarran-Walter campaign and were 
therefore not formally involved in its passage, affiliates of the California-based Wallace !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
2 Richard S. Kim, The Quest for Statehood: Korean Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1905-
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 160. 
 
3 In this context, Delgado used the concept to explain the end of civil rights reforms for African Americans. 
Richard Delgado, “Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes - Interest Convergence and 
Civil Rights Gains,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 37 (2002): 376. 
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group suffered the delayed consequences of their earlier activism. Their persecution by 
the U.S. anticommunist state validates historian Cindy Cheng’s observation that civil 
rights reforms during the Cold War “worked together with the legal suppression of 
political dissent to establish the validity of the American political system” and “maintain 
the credibility of U.S. democracy.”4 Several Korean deportees sought relief in an unlikely 
source: a loophole of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act that empowered the U.S. Attorney 
General to stay deportation in cases where removal was likely to subject the accused to 
physical persecution.5 In framing their legal defense around this clause, deportees 
indirectly highlighted the entwined nature of the U.S. and South Korean anticommunist 
projects and, with it, Washington’s complicity in funding the increasingly authoritarian 
regime of leader Syngman Rhee. Their legal battles demonstrate the significance of the 
1952 Act and its patchwork of liberal and repressive elements for Asian American 
communities during the early Cold War.  
 
Korean Americans on the Eve of Formal Division  
In 1947, two years into the joint U.S.-Soviet occupation of Korea, the Korean 
American community was more divided than ever. As described in Chapter 3, Korean 
Americans had split into two camps during World War II over the Allied powers’ plans 
to oversee Korea’s gradual transition to independence after the war. The moderate UKC 
and KNA, accepted the Cairo Declaration of a postwar occupation as necessary, while 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
4 Cindy Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War (New York: New 
York University Press, 2013). 
 
5 Eligibility included a residency requirement of seven years and proof of “good moral character for the 
preceding five years.” 66 Stat. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1253(h) (1952).!
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critics in the leftwing KNRP opposed any delay of Korea’s transition to sovereignty and 
self-rule. The gap separating the two camps widened after 1946 when the Los Angeles 
and Hawaii chapters of the KNRP moved to the extreme left amidst reports of American 
incompetence and political factionalism in the U.S.-occupied Korean zone.6 Writers in 
the KNRP publication, the Korean Independence newspaper [Tongnip shinmun], 
regularly denounced Rhee’s regime while openly expressing their support for the Soviet 
occupation government and its Korean communist allies in the north.7 Indeed, they went 
further to embrace the promise of Communism itself. In a typical example, KNRP 
member Choon Ho Penn’s November 1946 piece advocated for Communism as the 
“foundation of a true emancipation and independence for Korea.”8 Even as the KNRP 
moved left, leaders in the mainline UKC and KNA continued to endorse the U.S. Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK). During the first year of American control over the 
southern zone of the peninsula, leaders of both groups returned to Seoul to assist the 
efforts of USAMGIK officials to form a coalition government uniting Korea’s left and 
right-leaning political factions.  
Debate within the Korean American community raged over the question of what 
shape Korean independence would and should take; after 1946 the division revolved !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This mirrored the polarization of right- and left-wing political factions in Korea. See Eun-Sik Yang, 
"Korean Revolutionary Nationalism in America: Kim Kang and the Student Circle, 1937-1956," California 
Sociologist 13, no. 1-2 (1990). 
 
7 Yang, 191-193. 
 
8 U.S.-based Korean leftist Choon Ho Penn combined his advocacy of Communism with an implicit 
critique of American economy. “Only when Korea becomes a communistic Korea,” he argued, would 
Korea “be immune from [the] economic exploitation of foreign monopoly capitalists.” “Koreans Condemn 
AMG Scheme,” Korean Independence, November 13, 1946. In an earlier piece, Penn had argued that 
“[o]nly when Korea becomes a communistic Korea” would it be able to achieve the “universal happiness of 
the entire Korean people” and safeguard the “Korean people against the “economic exploitation of foreign 
monopoly capitalists.” Korean Independence, November 13, 1945.  
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around the figure of Syngman Rhee and what he came to represent: the creation of a 
separate South Korean state. A long-time resident of the United States, Rhee had been a 
polarizing figure in the U.S. Korean community even before he left America and returned 
to Seoul in October 1945. By the late 1940s, there were few Korean Americans who had 
not interacted with the elder statesman firsthand, and most held him in disrepute. Rhee 
had repeatedly refused to cooperate with community leaders in the past, and resentment 
lingered. U.S. officials did not necessarily like Rhee either, but his staunch 
anticommunism and the fact that his rivals seemed likely to ally Korea with the Soviet 
Union ensured him Washington’s continued support.9 Rhee’s crusade for the 
establishment of a separate South Korean state beginning in 1946 tested Washington’s 
commitment, but ultimately resulted in its unwavering assistance.  
 
Koreans as “Loyal Soldiers, Model Americans”: The KINC’s Campaign for Rights, 
1947-1949 
Historians have marked early 1947 as a turning point in America’s Korea policy 
away from cooperation with Moscow and toward the unilateral creation of a separate 
anticommunist South Korean state. The previous year had ended with massive rebellion 
and strikes in four southern provinces, mostly over the unresolved land problem, as 
conservative political leaders blocked the redistribution of land to tenants that Soviets had 
successfully completed in the north. As U.S. occupation officials filled the ranks of a 
newly created South Korean interim government with conservative figures, Korean 
communists and leftwing leaders protested their marginalization by fomenting unrest and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Other potentials included Kim Koo, Yo Un-hyong, and Kim Kyu-sik. Each was ruled out, in turn, either 
due to untimely death or to a perceived willingness to work with pro-Soviet Korean factions.  
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violence across the U.S. zone. Government police responded with force, provoking 
further retaliation and thus perpetuating a longer cycle of violence.  
Eager to safeguard his favored position with the USAMGIK, Syngman Rhee 
seized upon the disorder to launch a personal campaign calling for immediate self-
government and independence in the American zone through the formal creation of a 
separate South Korean state. Through the last months of 1946, Rhee embarked on a one-
man tour through Japan and the United States to raise support in official circles. He 
traveled first to Tokyo, where he met with Allied occupation commander, General 
Douglas MacArthur, in a highly publicized event. From there, he went to Washington, 
DC, where he alarmed White House and State Department officials with reports of 
Communism’s spread throughout the peninsula, proposing the immediate creation of an 
anticommunist South Korean state as the only solution. Citing reports that the semi-chaos 
of American occupation had multiplied the number of Korean Communists on the 
peninsula, he decried the incompetence and inadequacy of the current U.S. military 
regime and even accused USAMGIK officials such as Governor General John Hodge of 
being secretly sympathetic to communism.10 Rhee’s admonitions of a growing Korean 
Communist threat found receptive ears among Washington officials increasingly 
preoccupied with routing out communist elements both at home and abroad. Beginning in 
February 1947, Rhee publicly claimed to have secured Washington’s official pledge to 
support a separate southern government. The premature claim led to the real pledge. 
As Rhee made his rounds in Washington, U.S. Senator Claude Pepper (R-FL), 
Hawaii territorial delegate Farrington (R-HI), and New York Congressman Emanuel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For more on the contentious relationship between Rhee and Hodge, see James I. Matray, "Hodge Podge: 
American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948," Korean Studies 19 (1995). 
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Celler (D-NY) reintroduced Korean immigration and naturalization measures to both 
houses of the 80th Congress in early 1947.11  Celler’s involvement was especially 
encouraging to Korean Americans, rekindling their hopes for legislative success. As 
chairman of a newly organized and empowered House Judiciary Committee, which 
replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Committee under the Congressional 
Reorganization Act of 1947, the Brooklyn Democrat could presumably expedite the bill’s 
passage through committee and onto the floor for a vote.12 As soon became clear, 
however, the opposition of Celler’s Democratic counterpart Pat McCarran, head of the 
Judiciary Committee in the Senate, offset Celler’s advantage .13 McCarran, a restrictionist 
and anticommunist, would remain a barrier so long as he remained in charge of the 
committee overseeing immigration. Through the late 1940s and the 1950s, McCarran was 
one of the most powerful lawmakers on Capitol Hill. He singlehandedly delayed 
comprehensive immigration reform for a decade or more.14  
 A group of Korean American community leaders marked the revival of the KINB 
by organizing the Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee (KINC) as a 
centralized lobbying vehicle to promote the bill’s passage in the mold of the wartime 
Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion. Formed in January 1947, the KINC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 11 In the Senate, Pepper introduced S. 152 on January 10, 1947; Farrington introduced H.R. 860 to the 
House on January 13, 1947; it was later superseded by H.R. 2932, also introduced by Farrington on April 2, 
1949. Celler sponsored H.R. 1237 on January 29, 1947. 
 
12 For more on Congressional reorganization, see Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of 
Immigration Control in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 180-181. 
 
13 Political scientist Daniel Tichenor has singled out the importance of “conservative committee barons” 
like McCarran to the preservation of the national origins system as a main feature of U.S. immigration 
policy through 1965. Tichenor, 217. 
 
14 For more on McCarran’s Congressional career, see Jerome Edwards, Pat McCarran: Political Boss of 
Nevada (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1982), 147, quoted in Tamayo, 344. 
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shared several similarities with the Japanese American Citizens League’s Anti-
Discrimination Committee (JACL-ADC), which opened its Washington office around the 
same time.15 Like its Japanese American counterpart, the KINC received most of its 
funding from first-generation donors from within the community, but a younger, 
American-born spokesman led the group – in this case, Hawaii-born Walter Jhung – 
fluent in English and well versed in American politics. Formally the KINC’s executive 
secretary, Jhung was the youngest of the group but had amassed quite a resumé by the 
time the KINC began. During World War II, he served as president of the Hawaii Korean 
Civic Association, a group comprising second-generation Korean Americans like himself 
whose stated purpose was to “foster good citizenship” and encourage eligible community 
members to vote.16 A self-described businessman, Jhung moved to southern California 
after World War II and founded the Korean Chamber of Commerce to promote 
“reciprocal commercial and cultural relations between Korea and the United States.”17 
While eloquent and well-liked within Korean American circles,  Jhung, however, never 
rivaled the JACL’s Masaoka’s rhetorical skill or political connections in Washington.  
The KINC also emulated the JACL in its strategy of pushing for change through 
cooperation and accommodation with the U.S. government. The KINC’s five founders 
and fourteen advisory board members each boasted long histories of activism and 
leadership within the Korean American community as part of mainline groups including !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
15 For further discussion of the two organization’s relationship, see Chapter 4. The KINC lasted a little 
more than two years, through the duration of the 80th Congressional session (January 1947-January 1949).  
 
16 The Hawaii Korean Civic Association also aimed to “cooperate in any worthwhile community projects 
and undertakings.” Walter Jhung, “Koreans and the New U.S. Immigration Quota,” Korea Survey 2:6 
(June-July 1953), 6.  
 
17 “Korean Chamber of Commerce in America Launches New Digest to Open Constructive Program,” New 
Korea, May 9, 1946. 
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the UKC, KNA, and Syngman Rhee’s Tongjihoe. KINC co-chair Won Soon Lee and 
founding member J. Kyung Jacob Dunn were active in the UKC: Dunn as the 
organization’s public relations chairman during World War II and its Washington 
representative after 1945, and Lee as its former chairman. Board member Ben Limb and 
KINC vice-chairman Henry Chung (DeYoung) belonged to the Tongjihoe or Korean 
Comrade Society originally founded by Rhee in the 1920s. As a group, the men had 
impeccable accommodationist credentials. Amidst growing criticism of the U.S. military 
government in Korea in media and government circles, they generally expressed support 
for America’s aims in Seoul, restricting criticism to suggestions that would support 
Washington’s agenda of containing Communism. Dunn and several other advisory board 
members had been part of Korean American delegations handpicked and dispatched by 
UKC and KNA chapters in California and Hawaii to advise the USAMGIK in Seoul 
during the first year of the occupation. The relationships they developed with USAMGIK 
officials in Seoul later benefited the KINC efforts, helping Committee members secure 
the endorsement of Major General Archer Lerch, the USAMGIK governor in Korea, who 
described the measure as a means to “cement” Korean-American relations.18 
KINC’s leadership had a close relationship with Syngman Rhee, who remained 
the centerpiece of Washington’s anticommunist project in South Korea through the 
creation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948. A controversial figure within even 
mainstream Korean American circles, Rhee found unusually strong support from 
members of the KINC’s leadership and advisory board, many of whom shared a close, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
18 All the endorsements cited are reprinted in Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee, “Brief in 
Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860 (Superseded by H.R. 2932),” Summer 1947, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, 
Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
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long-standing relationship with the elder statesman, who was now based in Seoul. These 
close ties led to Rhee’s award of official and unofficial positions in the ROK government 
to several of the men, including Jhung himself. Though few sources document the 
postwar Korean American community, existing materials provide some basic information 
about the men and their associations with Rhee. Born in Korea, Ben Limb (Im Pyong-jik) 
was Rhee’s long-time secretary and advisor, having followed Rhee from Korea to the 
United States and remained in his service while living in Hawaii. In 1947, he was based 
in Washington, DC lobbying Rhee’s cause. He would return to Korea one year later to 
serve as the ROK’s first foreign minister, a position he held until 1951. 
Dr. Henry C. DeYoung (Chung)’s relationship with Rhee also pre-dated the 1919 
Korean Congress held in Philadelphia, at which they both spoke in support of Korea’s 
independence from Japanese colonial rule. Like Rhee, Chung had proven anticommunist 
credentials. In 1947, Chung, a Ph.D. graduate of American University, published The 
Russians Came to Korea, a harsh critique of Soviet occupation policies north of the 38th 
parallel after World War II.19 After 1948, Chung returned to Seoul where he remained 
one of Rhee’s closest unofficial advisors and prepared many of the President’s formal 
letters.20 A businessman in New York City, Won Soon Lee, provided much of the 
financing for the KINC’s activities, primarily from his personal bank account. Lee and 
his wife had been prominent leaders in Rhee’s Korean Christian Church in Hawaii and 
the Tongjihoe before relocating to the mainland. American-born Walter Jhung had the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (1947). Other titles by Chung included The Oriental Policy 
of the United States (1919) and The Case for Korea (1921).  
 
20 This despite the fact that Rhee himself described Chung’s Korean language skills as “inadequate.” 
According to one expert on the first ROK government, Chung had been in America so long that he was 
only semi-fluent in the Korean language by the time he returned to Korea after the war. Cumings, vol. II, 
231.  !
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least personal history with Rhee, but by the early 1950s, even he had been enlisted to 
serve Rhee’s ROK government as a special assistant to South Korean Prime Minister 
Paik Too-chin. This involvement led KINC leadership to support U.S. Korea policy, and 
Rhee personally, more strongly than did the overall Korean American community during 
this period.21  
Just as the JACL had done, the KINC diverged from its community to appease the 
U.S. government, and the KINC borrowed conspicuously from JACL argumentation and 
strategy. Seeing the Japanese American group’s early success, Jhung and several 
members of the KINC in Hawaii adapted several of its trademark arguments to fit their 
own case. Jhung had seen JACL-ADC representative Mike Masaoka speak at a 
Congressional hearing earlier that year and Masaoka’s rhetorical skill and 
overwhelmingly positive reception from lawmakers impressed Jhung. A brief co-
authored by the KINC’s Walter Jhung and members of the Hawaii Korean Civic 
Association in the summer of 1947 included several examples of modified JACL 
arguments, exemplifying a dual strategy combining martial citizenship with geopolitical 
arguments to make the case for Korean rights. While minority groups had used many of 
the KINC’s arguments, the writers of the brief expressed the influence of the JACL by 
explicitly comparing Korean Americans to their Japanese American counterparts at 
several points. Echoing the JACL’s project to construct Japanese Americans as model 
citizens and patriotic soldiers, the brief enumerated Koreans’ many contributions to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 There remained a wide gap between public rhetoric and private opinion. Many members of mainline 
groups like the KNA and UKC claimed to support U.S. Korea policy in their public statements, but their 
private list of grievances against Washington’s chosen leader was often long and angry. In reality, Rhee 
had few outright supporters even in U.S. government circles (State and War Department circles), and even 
fewer in Korean American ones.  
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America as both soldiers and civilians during World War II, and the many qualifications 
Koreans had to offer America as persons deserving of citizenship. !
The thirty-seven-page KINC brief argued that Koreans made good Americans. 
Toward that end, they attempted to debunk the notion of Asian inassimilability to 
American society, enumerating the many ways that Koreans were well qualified for 
American life. Not simply defensive, Jhung and his co-authors suggested that individuals 
of Korean ancestry – both American-born and the recently immigrated – were better 
adapted to U.S. society than were many Euro-American citizens themselves. In doing so, 
they did not challenge dominant notions of American-ness so much as attempt to prove 
that Korean immigrants and U.S.-born citizens alike fit into an idealized mold of what an 
American should be. Identity, as they presented it, was an either/or proposition. Too 
Americanized to be Korean, they maintained that the U.S.-born generations were “in the 
fundamentals of Americanism no different from the child who was born in the deep 
South or the children of immigration parents who came over from Europe and settled in 
the New England States.” Like their American-born counterparts of European descent, 
they identified with a common set of American traditions and cultural practices: “movies 
. . . baseball, hot-dogs and popcorn, scouting, Sunday family auto-ride, soap-opera over 
the radio, juke-box music.” Unable to speak Korean and ill-informed in Korean customs, 
this younger generation would “never make good Korean[s].” While as non-whites, the 
brief acknowledged that Korean immigrants could never be “American biologically,” the 
Korean American writers nevertheless insisted that certain traits enabled them to “blend 
in”: key among these, their “moral straight[ness], “adequate educational background to 
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blend with the Western civilization,” and their ability to be “economically independent so 
as not to become a public charge.”22  
The brief also emphasized the Korean American community’s high rates of 
conversion to Protestant Christianity. Insofar as the religion was the one “most 
compatible with American values and morality,” the authors maintained that Koreans’ 
quick embrace of Christian practices and beliefs had enabled them to achieve a “quick 
and successful assimilation compared to other groups.” On these grounds, they 
recommended that Korean immigration be restricted to “those of the Christian faiths 
only.”23 Here the KINC may have erred, as a pluralistic postwar Congress would have 
responded ambivalently. Even as it potentially bolstered support among white Protestant 
lawmakers, the argument threatened to offend the cause’s many strong Jewish advocates, 
a group that included House Judiciary Committee chairman Emanuel Celler (D-NY).24  
In the brief’s lengthiest section by far, the KINC authors presented a case more 
broadly appealing in Congress, advocating for Korean rights on the basis of the 
community’s wartime contributions. The rhetoric of bodily and military sacrifice closely 
echoed the JACL’s appeals to martial patriotism. Loyalty to America had come “almost 
naturally” for both U.S.-born and alien Koreans alike, the authors insisted, out of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 This discussion taken from Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee, “Brief in Support of S. 
152 and H.R. 860 (Superseded by H.R. 2932),” Summer 1947, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii.  
 
23 Ibid. The emphasis on religion is not surprising in light of Christianity’s centrality to the migration and 
historical experience of Koreans in America. For more on religion’s role, see David K. Yoo, Contentious 
Spirits: Religion in Korean American History, 1903-1945 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010), especially the Introduction. 
 
24 Throughout the longer movement, Jewish organizations remained some of the most committed advocates 
of Asian exclusion repeal, and of immigration reform, in general. The American Jewish Congress is one 
example. !
 ! 239 
gratitude for the “peace and asylum” America had granted them from Japanese 
oppression and their belief that Korea’s “future destiny rested in full cooperation with the 
United States.”25 They cited high military enlistment rates within the Hawaii Korean 
community as proof of Korean Americans’ patriotism; over ten percent of all American-
born Koreans in Hawaii and more than fourteen percent of the community in California 
had served in World War II, many with distinction. What these Korean American soldiers 
lacked in numbers, they made up for in patriotic service. Anecdotes described the 
courage and sacrifice of individual Korean American soldiers and immigrants alike. 
Although barred from military service by citizenship requirements, Korean aliens had 
served the war effort as civilian intelligence and as interpreters. Echoing entitlement 
appeals made by Masaoka and other JACL leaders, the authors argued that their record of 
loyalty to the United States had earned Korean aliens the right to American citizenship, 
and it was now America’s turn to reward faithful service.26 
In order to tap into official sympathy for Japanese Americans after World War II, 
Korean American authors of the brief endeavored to take the argument further for their 
own benefit. In a striking juxtaposition, they likened the injustice faced by Korean aliens 
to the irony of Japanese American soldiers liberating prisoners of war abroad while their 
parents lived in internment camps back home.27 This association belies the strong anti-
Japanese sentiment that historically characterized the Korean community in America.28 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
25 KINC, “Brief in Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860.” 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 See Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1993) for further discussion of Japanese internment and the experiences of Japanese Americans 
during the war.  
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One could argue that the analogy reflected a growing pan-Asian consciousness and 
recognition of shared injustice – nascent concepts which would later prompt Korean 
Americans toward a cooperative Asian American civil rights effort. More immediately, 
the KINC made the because of public sympathy for Japanese Americans after the war, 
stemming from recognition of the exceptional bravery on the European front of primarily 
Nisei military battalions the 442nd and 110th regimental combat teams – two of the most 
highly decorated military units in all of American history. Both divisions had included 
several Hawaii-born Korean Americans as commissioned officers, and the brief 
emphasized their role.29  
 Such efforts notwithstanding, key differences between the Korean and Japanese 
American communities undermined the KINC’s attempt to replicate the JACL’s success. 
The first was the sheer discrepancy in size. By 1950, the Japanese American population 
exceeded 325,000 on the U.S. mainland and Hawaii, while Koreans numbered less than 
10,000 overall.30 Koreans’ concentration in Hawaii, a remote U.S. territory hundreds of 
miles from the nation’s political center in Washington, DC, also diluted their political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Lauriel E. Eubank, “The Effects of the First Six Months of World War II on the Attitudes of Koreans and 
Filipinos toward the Japanese in Hawaii” (M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1943). Eubank attributed this 
to two factors: first, to the fact that Korean Americans in Hawaii usually lived in close proximity to 
Japanese Americans, who made up most of the Asian American population there. Regular and close 
interaction presumably made extreme feelings harder to maintain; secondly, to the composition of the 
Korean American community in Hawaii, where the majority were American-born and therefore did not 
carry the same intense hatred against the Japanese as their parents’ generation; in the Los Angeles Korean 
American community, by contrast, Korean aliens dominated both the population and community 
leadership, leading to their being more outrightly antagonistic.  
 
29 This can be seen in Japanese American petitions for the War Claims Act of 1948, for example. 
 
30 Among Japanese Americans, 140,000 lived on the U.S. mainland and another 185,000 in Hawaii. U.S. 
Census, 1950: Hawaii - Race and Hispanic Origin (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950); U.S. 
Census, 1950: Asian and Pacific Islander, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States: 1940 and 
1950 (Washington: GPO, 1950), accessed May 8, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabC-07.pdf 
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influence. That the KINB’s main Congressional sponsor was a House territorial delegate 
without formal voting privileges underscored the community’s political impotence. 
Hawaii’s perception as an exotic locale with little translatability to Midwest or East Coast 
cities further undercut the authors’ repeated attempts to hold up Hawaii communities as 
exemplars of Koreans’ assimilatory potential. In the eyes of many U.S. lawmakers at the 
time, Hawaii barely qualified as America.31 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the 
Korean American community had no history of mass internment or comparable 
mistreatment to fortify their petitions for rights. As historian Naoko Shibusawa has 
argued, widespread official remorse over the injustice of wartime internment helped 
make postwar Congress receptive to the JACL’s lobbying efforts.32 Koreans could not 
draw on as compelling a record of grievances, at least not based on their experiences in 
America.  
Consequently, even as they expressed solidarity with their fellow Japanese 
Americans, the brief’s KINC authors returned to the theme of Korean victimization and 
colonization under Japanese rule in Asia in an effort to win lawmakers’ sympathies. They 
not only disparaged the Japanese who had colonized their homeland. They pointed to 
Washington’s perpetuation of the injustice in making Japan’s postwar reconstruction a 
greater priority than Korea’s independence. The tone of the brief grew more antagonistic 
and even accusatory in its critical assessments of Washington’s policy of prioritizing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 On mainland American views of Hawaii, see Beth Bailey and David Farber, The First Strange Place: 
Race and Sex in World War II Hawaii  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). For a Cold 
War treatment, see Gretchen Heefner, "A Symbol of the New Frontier: Hawaiian. Statehood, Anti-
Colonialism, and Winning the Cold War," The Pacific Historical Review 74, no. 4 (2005). 
 
32 Naoko Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). 
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Japan over Korea so soon after the Pacific War.33 The brief’s narrative painted Korea’s 
history as marked by episode after tragic episode of Washington’s neglect of the 
peninsula in favor of China and Japan. Revisiting the geopolitical logic of the 
community’s World War II appeals, the KINC combined accusation with appeal, 
recapitulating a list of Koreans’ longer-standing grievances at how U.S. officials had 
turned a blind eye to Korean suffering under Japanese colonial rule. 
While old mistakes might die hard, the brief’s authors warned that Washington’s 
policy of persistent neglect threatened to imperil American goals in Asia. Insofar as any 
“future Asiatic balance-of-power hinge[d] upon Korea and her people,” they maintained, 
“stabilizing Korea [was] just as important as maintaining a strong Chinese republic” or 
rebuilding its defeated Pacific enemy, Japan. The document’s discussion of Japan 
evinced clear resentment at Americans’ preferential treatment of their former colonizer. 
Americans would do well not to “forget too soon the days of Pearl Harbor,” which had 
been a “real stab-in-the-back business” in its rush to “groom” Japan “for future 
eventualities.”34  
How could Washington treat Japan, a “defeated and conquered nation” like a 
“former ally,” while giving a “liberated nation” like Korea only a “small fraction of the 
attention given to Japan?” The KINC argued that America’s Cold War project in Asia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
33 Try as they might, Koreans in the United States found themselves hard-pressed to escape the shadow of 
their larger East Asian neighbors, both of whom had long eclipsed Korea as Washington’s main priorities 
in the region. Korea, along with the rest of the region, was downgraded on Washington’s list of overseas 
priorities as part of a broader “reordering of priorities” in the spring of 1947 whereby American officials 
“emphasized economic assistance to Western Europe at the expense of U.S. interests in the Far East and 
elsewhere.” The Marshall Plan was a fruit of this shift. John Gaddis, "Korea in American Politics, Strategy, 
and Diplomacy, 1945-50," in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, eds. Akira Iriye and Ynosuke Nagai 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).  
 
34 KINC, “Brief in Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860.” 
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had suffered for this illogical decision. When America began its military occupation over 
southern Korea, the “U.S. Government and her people [had become] directly responsible 
for the future welfare of Korea and her people everywhere.” But it had failed to live up to 
its responsibility to protect the peninsula from the evils of Communism. America’s 
decision to prioritize postwar Japan over Korea had enabled Communist Soviet Russia to 
“infiltrate” the peninsula; too focused on Tokyo, Washington had left USAMGIK 
officials “groping in the dark to feel [their] way about,” helpless to stop a growing 
communist threat.35  
The KINC leveraged its modest resources as best it could in support of its brief. 
Leaders obtained endorsements for the KINB from state governors, local and federal 
legislators, and less successfully sought to enlist “outstanding internationally-minded 
Americans” to serve on its advisory board. Not surprising in light of the authors’ home-
base in Honolulu, a disproportionate number of supportive letters came from local and 
state officials in Hawaii who emphasized the Korean community’s many contributions to 
the islands’ economy, culture, and society.36 One notable message came from the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, which characterized the KINB as a logical 
successor to Chinese legislative gains. Chamber members expressed their appreciation 
for “all those Congressman who so nobly voted to help the Chinese nationals” and their 
hope that Koreans would be given the “same consideration.” In another show of support 
by an Asian group, the editor of the Filipino Press, a Filipino American newspaper in 
Los Angeles, endorsed the KINB on similar grounds. Representing regional and local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 KINC, “Brief in Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860.” 
 
36 Walter Jhung to Joseph Farrington, March 7, 1947, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, Hawaii State Archives, 
Honolulu, Hawaii. 
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voices, however, most of the letters carried limited weight. Support from the national 
president of the American Federation of Labor, which abandoned its historically 
restrictionist position after the end of World War II, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel in the U.S. Navy Department has more 
influence. The KINC also used endorsements from the New York Herald-Tribune and 
New York Times.37 But the legislation was out of their hands. General hearings on 
immigration and naturalization policies occupied the House Judiciary Committee all 
spring, and the KINB was tabled for the rest of the 80th Congressional session.38 
 Over the following year, Jhung remained active in his capacity as executive 
secretary of the KINC. In April 1948, he offered a brief statement in support of the Judd 
bill at hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. His classic Cold War appeal 
warned that Asia was at a critical “juncture,” and time was “running short” for 
Washington to preempt disaster. He described a Korea on the brink, a powder keg where 
the Soviets’ “ominous nerve war” could at any time develop into “an actual fighting war 
between the forces for world domination by Communist Soviets and those who believe in 
world peace through democratic processes.”39 In the aftermath of the 1948 Congressional 
elections that fall, Jhung wrote Farrington expressing hope for the bill’s passage in the 
next Congressional session.40 In an encouraging sign, all four of the KINB’s sponsors 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 All the endorsements cited are reprinted in Korean Immigration and Naturalization Committee, “Brief in 
Support of S. 152 and H.R. 860 (Superseded by H.R. 2932),” Summer 1947, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, 
Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
 
38 The 80th Congressional session lasted from January 1947 to January 1949. 
39 U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Providing for Equality under Naturalization and Immigration Laws, 
80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 153-154. 
40 Walter Jhung to Joseph Farrington, November 8, 1948, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, HI.  
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from the 80th Congress reintroduced their bills in the first two months of 1949. They were 
joined by Rep. Herman Eberharter (D-PA) and two veterans of the repeal movement 
during World War II: Senator William Langer (R-ND) from the Indian campaign, and 
Warren Magnuson (D-WA), who had moved from the House to the Senate since his 
successful wartime work for Chinese exclusion repeal.41 Jhung wrote the Hawaii delegate 
to thank him for his long-standing support and reported that the Committee had been 
delayed in reopening its Washington, DC, office. It was his final note on KINC 
letterhead.42 The Committee went defunct later that year due to lack of funding and 
personnel, having lost several key members when they left the United States to serve in 
the first ROK government in Seoul, South Korea upon its creation in the summer of 
1948. 
 Monumental change swept Korea and East Asia during the two-year period 
between the KINB’s first reintroduction in January 1947 and its revival in early 1949. In 
August 1948, Washington, working under the auspices of the United Nations, welcomed 
the creation of the Republic of Korea as a separate South Korean state led by Syngman 
Rhee. China’s fall to Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in October 1949 led some U.S. 
policymakers to expect communist victory on the Korean peninsula; dismissing further 
efforts as futile, they began agitating for an end to U.S. military and economic aid to 
Korea altogether. One especially fed-up Congressional critic likened continued funding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
41 Bills on Korean immigration and/or naturalization introduced in the 81st Congress were H.R. 167 by 
Farrington (R-HI), H.R. 374 by Celler (D-NY), S. 554 by Pepper (D-FA), H.R. 1897 by Eberharter (D-PA), 
S. 761 by Langer (R-ND), and S. 853 by Magnuson (D-WA). After the failure of the Judd bill in 1948, 
several lawmakers associated with the JACL introduced joint resolutions providing for Japanese and 
Korean naturalization only, but these, too, stalled in the Senate. 
 
42 Walter Jhung to Joseph Farrington, January 5, 1949, Joseph Farrington, Jr. papers, Hawaii State 
Archives, Honolulu, HI. 
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of Rhee’s South Korean government to “pouring money down another [Asian] rathole.”43 
Based on such Congressional statements, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, believing 
that the United States would not intervene, sent troops across the 38th parallel into South 
Korean territory on June 25, 1950 in an effort to unify the country under a single 
communist government.44 To Kim’s surprise, the United States and U.N. did step in, 
deploying troops to guard Rhee’s presidency and thereby escalating the conflict that came 
to be known as the Korean War. 
Although the KINC had ceased to exist by the end of 1949, the Korean 
Immigration and Naturalization Bill (KINB) reemerged as a political issue one last time 
in the summer of 1950 as war raged on the peninsula. In a speech on the Senate floor, 
KINB sponsor Republican Senator William Langer (R-ND) cited the KINB as proof that 
his party had done its part to prevent the crisis by taking steps to ameliorate the situation 
on the peninsula. In contrast, he argued, Congressional Democrats had failed to extend 
“even token recognition” to America’s Korean friends by repeatedly blocking the Korean 
measure. If not for Democratic opposition, Langer insisted, the bill would have passed; as 
it was Democrats had repeatedly buried the bill in committee, and, in so doing, 
effectively “sold [Korea] down the river to communism.”45 This remark capped the 
legacy of the KINB from its origins in World War II. The measure, first drafted as a 
wartime bill to secure a space for Koreans in America and legitimize Korea’s place in an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
43 Congressional Records, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 193. 
 
44 The main statement of this type was Dean Acheson’s “perimeter speech” in early 1950, which did not 
include Korea in the U.S. defensive perimeter in East Asia. 
45 Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 4565. 
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international community of nation-states, had degenerated into a tool of partisan blame-
shifting by 1950, used by one group to discredit the anticommunist credentials of the 
other. Just as cooperation with the U.S. government had not secured Korean Americans’ 
interests, war would prove equally ineffective to do so.  
 
A Transnational Critique for Korean Rights: The Korean American Committee for 
Wallace 
 On the opposite coast, a group of Korean Americans affiliated with the leftwing 
KNRP chapter in Los Angeles launched their own campaign for Korean naturalization 
rights in 1948 under the banner of the KACW, or Korean American Committee for 
Wallace. The group championed the candidacy of former vice-president Henry A. 
Wallace, the Progressive Party’s 1948 candidate for U.S. president, and in doing so, 
claimed to represent the interests of “all Koreans living in America regardless of their 
political beliefs or affiliations.”46 In contrast to moderate groups like the Washington, 
DC-based KINC, however, the KACW harshly opposed U.S. postwar policy in Korea – 
particularly its project to stem the spread of Soviet Communist influence. As an offshoot 
of the Los Angeles-based KNRP, the KACW reflected the views of a minority radical 
group active during the early Cold War years. It labored alongside mainstream Korean 
American groups as part of the UKC during World War II but broke with the coalition in 
1944 over its rejection of Allied plans to oversee a gradual process of Korean 
independence after the war.47 After the U.N. oversaw elections for a separate South 
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Korean National Assembly in May 1948, the KNRP joined a coalition of leftwing groups 
called the Korean Democratic Front in America (KDFA), whose members claimed to 
oppose “unto death” foreign interference in Korea’s internal and domestic affairs.48 By 
the fall of 1948, the KNRP chapter in Los Angeles had moved to the far left, emerging as 
an outspoken supporter of the newly created Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 
North Korea.49 Along with other members of the KDFA coalition, they considered the 
DPRK government of Kim Il-Sung the rightful government of Korea and rejected Rhee’s 
ROK government as Washington’s puppet. 
In forums organized by the KACW over the fall of 1948, members described their 
political awakening as closely connected to recent events in Korea. One editorialist in the 
Korean Independence credited the “powerful upsurge of the people in Korea” with 
fostering a “political awakening of Koreans in America.” Through witnessing Koreans’ 
oppression by foreign powers on the peninsula, Koreans halfway across the world in 
America had come to recognize that their “deepest desires and hopes are bound together 
with the desires and hopes of all minorities and the oppressed peoples.” As the “only 
force which is fighting for equal rights for all minorities on the domestic front, and for 
the policy of non-interference in Korea on the Foreign front,” he maintained, the 
Progressive Party represented the interests of not only Koreans in the United States, but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 For more on the KNRP during World War II and this episode, see Chapter 3 and Anne Soon Choi, 
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48 “Koreans in Open Forum Make Their Stand Clear,” Korean Independence, May 26, 1948. 
 
49 For more on the KNRP after 1945, see Yang, “Korean Revolutionary Nationalism in America,” 191-194. 
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of Koreans on the peninsula as well.50 This transnational perspective extended to the 
KACW’s platform. Rejecting the accommodationist and pro-American arguments of the 
KINC campaign, the KACW described its two-pronged project as first, to restore 
sovereignty to the Korean people and reunify the divided Korean peninsula, and second, 
to challenge racial discrimination in the United States, including Korean exclusion. In so 
doing, the left-wing KACW framed U.S. imperialism in Asia and racial discrimination in 
the United States as two sides of the same coin, common expressions of Americans’ 
white supremacy.  
The KACW’s platform entwining critiques of U.S. domestic and foreign policy 
was on full display at an October, 1948, rally in downtown Los Angeles, jointly 
sponsored with the KNRP to raise local support for Wallace’s presidential campaign. The 
event’s estimated 250 attendees adopted resolutions ranging from local appeals for the 
release of the “Los Angeles Ten,” who had been arrested under the Smith Act for their 
suspected ties to the Communist Party; to foreign policy entreaties demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula. Calls to eliminate the 
racial bar to American citizenship featured prominently on the night’s program agenda, 
as the KNRP asked the rally’s participants to sign a petition addressed to local southern 
California lawmakers. The petition called for the extension of naturalization rights to 
Koreans as a gesture that would win for America the “confidence and friendship of other 
peoples abroad,” even as it challenged Washington’s authority to maintain a presence in 
Korea.51 In general, it was unclear how seriously rally organizers expected U.S. state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
50 “Koreans for Wallace,” Korean Independence, October 20, 1948, 1.  
 
51 This discussion of the Korean-American Rally is taken from Korean Independence, November 10, 1948.!
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officials to take their requests. At a time when restrictionist sentiment remained strong, 
the KACW’s decision to focus on naturalization was a strategic one. Citizenship-only 
bills promoting the incorporation of foreign-born persons already living in the United 
States were more likely to receive support than measures to admit even a small increase 
of immigrants to America, particularly from regions like East Asia with a well-known 
communist presence. The KACW’s narrowed demands reflected recognition that while 
U.S. officials might be persuaded to grant the petitions of Koreans already living in 
America, they opposed welcoming additional Korean immigrants.52 Yet the radical nature 
of the KACW’s expressed goals and the subversive reputations of many key participants 
meant that it was more likely to raise official suspicion than support.  
Even as immigrant and ethnic American groups like the JACL and KINC sought 
to distance themselves from the stigma of communism, the KACW invited government 
scrutiny with the rally’s open support for recognized communist entities and figures with 
known ties to communist and communist front groups. The evening’s program featured 
Earl Robinson, a well-known Communist Party (CP-USA) member during the 1930s, 
leading the C.I.O. chorus in song, and Diamond Kimm, KNRP chairman and editor-in-
chief of the Korean Independence newspaper, who addressed the crowd with a speech on 
Koreans’ contributions to the United States. The California State Senate Committee on 
Un-American Activities had identified the KNRP newspaper as a communist front earlier 
that year. Kimm and fellow rally speaker and Progressive Party candidate for the 
California state assembly Maynard Omerberg both appeared before the House Committee !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
52 The same logic underpinned the JACL’s support for the Walter Resolution in 1949. The alternate 
measure omitted provisions related to an immigration quota and proposed citizenship rights for Japanese 
and Koreans only.  
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on Un-American Activities (HUAC) several years later. In the late 1940s, the Progressive 
Party came under suspicion of Communism. While most of its leaders were not 
themselves Communist, the Party received the endorsement of the CP-USA and its ranks 
included several known Communists and Communist sympathizers. In the words of one 
political pundit, the Party comprised “a malaprop chief and a mass of malleable youth, 
manipulated by a Communist minority.”53 A staff writer at Time focused on the Party’s 
presidential candidate in particular, noting that while it was “not true that Henry Wallace 
is an agent of Moscow,” he often “behave[d] like one.”54 
While support for the Progressive Party bought the KACW under suspicion, its 
leader’s ties tended to confirm the organization’s Communism. Chairwoman and rally 
speaker Alice Hyun was the sister of known CPUSA member Peter Hyun. Fluent in 
Korean, Chinese, and Japanese, Alice served as a language specialist for the U.S. 
Women’s Army Corps for three years after World War II, during which time she 
reconnected with her old friend Pak Hun-Young, a rising leader in the Korean 
Communist Party.55 Upon her return stateside in 1948, Alice Hyun joined her brother 
Peter in Los Angeles, where he served as the Korean Independence newspaper’s English-
language editor. In one of the October rally’s featured speeches, Alice Hyun described 
thriving conditions in North Korea based on a report from the Korean Unity Conference, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
53 Howard K. Smith, "The Wallace Party," Nation 167:6 (August 7, 1948): 145-147. 
 
54 Underscoring how far the candidate diverged from the views of most mainline voters, the writer went on 
to conclude that “Wallace ha[d] made a career by supplying to the liberals a commodity they crave: rhetoric 
which accomplishes in fantasy what cannot be accomplished in reality." "What Is Henry 
Wallace?" Time 51:11 (March 15, 1948): 118. !
 
55 Alice and Pak were old friends from the Hyun family’s time spent in China with the Korean Provisional 
Government. Peter Hyun also wrote about a meeting with Pak during his time with the USAMGIK in 
Seoul. Peter Hyun, In the New World: The Making of a Korean American (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1995), 238-239. 
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a gathering of 500 Korean political leaders from across the peninsula held in Pyongyang 
earlier that year.56 The platforms adopted by the Unity Conference ran sharply counter to 
the strategic interest of the United States to keep Korea firmly within its anticommunist 
orbit. These included calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops 
(both American and Soviet) from the peninsula; the creation of a unified, free Korean 
government through a free national election without international oversight; and the 
adoption of an economic program best suited to the welfare of the Korean people, 
presumably socialist communism.  
Hyun posed a sharp contrast with conditions in South Korea, which she declared 
now teetered on the verge of civil war because of continued U.S. intervention. In a 
prescient statement, she warned that unless the United States ended its support for the 
current reactionaries in power – a reference to Rhee – Washington would be responsible 
for starting a civil war on the peninsula. Hyun’s remarks called attention to the conflict 
between Washington’s plans for a creation of a separate South Korean state and Korean 
Americans’ vision of a unified, sovereign Korea. Alice Hyun aligned the KACW and its 
supporters with the former group, Korean nationalists, first.    
In spite of Hyun’s ties, neither the parent organization KNRP nor its offshoot, the 
KACW, began as a Communist front group or organ of the Korean Communist Party, and 
neither group ultimately became entirely Communist.57 While several of the groups’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
56 The report had been authored by two well-known Korean nationalist leaders, Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Koo. 
Their involvement at Pyongyang had consequences for the two men, losing for Kim Kyu-Sik, in particular, 
the confidence of many U.S. occupation officials who had long preferred him to Rhee. Kim’s willingness to 
engage with the North and communists made supporting him out of the question.   
 
57 According to scholar Eun-Sik Yang, the KNRP likely had some form of regular correspondence with the 
Korean Communist Party beginning in 1946 – that was the year that the KNRP organ, the Korean 
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leaders – Peter and Alice Hyun, and Diamond Kimm, among others – did join the 
Communist Party at some point, most KNRP members and supporters – of what few 
remained by the 1950s when official harassment was at its peak – did not. At any point in 
time, they remained more interested in Korean reunification and independence than in 
any plan for Soviet Communist domination, but U.S. officials had difficulty 
distinguishing their nationalist goals and their communist rhetoric.  
However distinct the KNRP and KACW may have been from the Communist 
Party, this association weakened its political power and a final assessment of the KACW 
and its 1948 effort remains mixed. As an ephemeral third party candidate, Wallace had no 
real hope of the White House; the controversial candidate did even worse than expected, 
winning only 2.4 percent of the popular vote and no electoral votes.58 From the vantage 
point of Korean rights, the KACW and KNRP’s efforts to champion the cause of 
citizenship undoubtedly harmed more than they helped by threatening to taint the issue 
with the stigma of communism. The right-wing elements of the McCarran-Walter 
measure tended to remove this stigma, but several of the KACW and KNRP’s individual 
supporters battled charges of subversion after 1950.  
In spite of these failures, the KACW represented a significant development for 
Korean Americans. In the words of one KACW supporter, the Committee heralded a 
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Independence newspaper, began printing dispatches from the Haebang Ilbo or Liberation News, the 
newspaper of the Korean Communist Party. See Hyun, In the New World, 273; Yang, “Revolutionary 
Nationalism,” 191-193. 
 
58 The vast share of the Wallace’s votes – 1.5 million votes – came from New York alone. Another third-
party candidate, Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond, by contrast, won 39 electoral votes in the South. Wallace 
would become estranged from the Progressive Party two years later over his support for U.S. and U.N. 
intervention in the Korean conflict, which directly contradicted the party’s platform of non-intervention and 
peace. In 1952, Wallace published Where I Went Wrong, detailing where he had been wrong and discussing 
his newfound embrace of anticommunism. 
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departure from the community’s long-held “position of isolation . . . and the beginning of 
their practical move in identifying themselves as an integral part of the American 
community.”59 Certainly, the October 1948 rally suggested that a shared commitment to 
common principles of racial equality and the right of all peoples to self-determination 
could serve as a basis for collective action, at least in principle, if not always in practice. 
Indeed, Wallace’s 1948 run for president galvanized minority communities across the 
nation, leading to groups like the New York Nisei for Wallace and, in southern 
California, Harry Hay’s Bachelors for Wallace (a precursor to the Mattachine Society, the 
first significant American grassroots organization for LGBT rights). While the KACW 
did not end Korean American political nonparticipation, it did set the stage for collective 
action on issues such as protection for the foreign-born and peace efforts focused on 
Korea after 1950. The assistance of organizations including the National Lawyers Guild 
and the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, for example, would 
prove especially valuable to KACW alumni in their subsequent legal battles against U.S. 
state deportation.   
 
A Forgotten People in a “Forgotten War”: Korean Americans and the Korean War  
 A few months after the KACW rally, INS officials arrested and briefly detained 
featured speaker and Korean Independence newspaper editor Diamond Kimm on the 
charge of overstaying his visa. Kimm’s 1949 INS reactivation notice stated that his case 
had been reopened “for the purpose of permitting him to apply for the benefits of recently !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
59 Although the piece was unsigned, the author was likely Peter Hyun. Korean Independence, November 
10, 1948. 
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enacted legislation,” but it was a ruse; in a common practice at the time, the government 
only intended to expedite deportation.60 The timing of the state’s crackdown was notable. 
Years of outspoken opposition to U.S. foreign policy and unqualified support for Soviet 
and North Korean Communist policies formed the basis of the state’s case against Kimm. 
Local immigration officials arrested him again on June 15, 1950 and held him. Ten days 
later, North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korean territory in 
a surprise attack. Within days, U.S. and U.N. troops and money began pouring into the 
peninsula. Sitting in a small Los Angeles jail cell, Kimm heard the news: Korea was at 
war. In early 1951, as the war escalated on the peninsula, the United States deported 
Kimm to South Korea. His legal team immediately appealed the order, beginning nearly a 
decade of gains and setbacks in the courts. Over the next few years, at least seven of 
Kimm’s staff at the newspaper, including several alumni of the KACW, would receive 
similar orders citing various grounds to justify their removal.  
 Much has been written about how the Chinese Communist victory and emergence 
of “Red China” in late 1949 led to a U.S. state crackdown on Chinese communities in 
America.61 Fewer scholars have explored how that racialization expanded beyond 
Chinese to shape the experiences of Koreans, the other major target of U.S. containment 
efforts in early Cold War Asia.62 Perceived racial similarities between Chinese and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 The law in question empowered the Attorney General to grant stays or suspensions of deportation to 
qualified individuals. Eligibility included a residency requirement of seven years and proof of “good moral 
character for the preceding five years.” Yang, 195. 
 
61 The Chinese Confession Program of the mid-1950s was a notable example. See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004) and Ellen D. Wu, “America's Chinese”: Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy 
during the Cold War," Pacific Historical Review 77, no. 3 (2008). 
 
62 A notable exception is Cindy Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold 
War (New York: New York University Press, 2013), Chapter 4. 
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Koreans, coupled with the emergence of a formal wartime partnership between North 
Korea and the newly established Communist government of the People’s Republic of 
China, encouraged Koreans’ racialization with Chinese as part of a broad Asian 
Communist threat. This association carried grave consequences for Korean leftists in 
America at the height of the Cold War in Asia: the Korean War.  
The early 1950s marked for many Korean leftists the height of Cold War 
repression in the form of arrests, prolonged detentions, and even formal deportation 
orders. The McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 formed the major legal basis for this 
treatment, making membership, past or present, in either Communist or Fascist 
organizations grounds for expulsion from the United States with no statute of 
limitations.63 Immigration boards and other government agencies asked the accused to 
confirm such membership. Like Kimm, most refused to answer, invoking their Fifth 
Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination. Divergent views of Communism lay at the 
heart of the deportation cases.64 Leftwing groups like the KNRP and its offshoot KACW 
justified their support for the North Korean Communist regime on nationalist grounds; in 
contrast with Rhee’s ROK government, the DPRK’s had been chosen by and for the 
Korean people, largely free of overt foreign interference. Yet Washington’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
63 A product of the Cold War, the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, also known as the Subversive 
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preoccupation with containing Soviet influence discounted this understanding; for many 
U.S. officials, the Korean civil conflict was a proxy for America’s bilateral contest with 
Moscow.65  
The perceived menace of a formal Asian communist bloc that began with the 
creation of the DPRK in September 1948 expanded exponentially with the victory of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the U.S.-supported Chinese Nationalists over the 
second half of 1949. China’s “fall” to the CCP redoubled U.S. policymakers’ fears of a 
distinctly Asian variant of Communism that posed a formidable threat independent of 
Moscow. Reports of Communism’s growing popularity on the peninsula only 
compounded their alarm, reshuffling, in turn, American views of the lines dividing 
“good” from “bad” Asian groups.66 Whereas Chinese Americans had once enjoyed the 
approbation of white Americans during World War II, they now faced mounting 
harassment by the U.S. anticommunist state as overseas extensions of the Chinese 
Communist threat.67 Japanese Americans usurped their once-favored position.  
Despite the efforts of Korean Americans to claim similarity with their Japanese 
American counterparts, Washington increasingly linked Koreans in the United States 
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with the Chinese Communist threat because of perceived similarities between the DPRK 
and the newly established People’s Republic of China. The entry of Chinese Communist 
forces into the Korean conflict on the side of the North Korean Communist regime in 
October 1950 only confirmed the association. Several additional factors compounded the 
racialization of Koreans in America as continuous with the Communist threat in Asia. 
The first were the red-baiting tactics that Rhee and the ROK government regularly used 
to discredit his critics in the United States, who grew in number and outspokenness after 
1948. Years after his return to Korea, Rhee maintained an active hand in Korean 
American community affairs through his network of loyal supporters scattered 
throughout the United States.68 Over the first year of his presidency, he took concerted 
steps to establish his government’s legitimacy and ensure the support of Koreans in 
America. Instead, his perceived meddling became the target of attack by anti-Rhee 
intellectuals, in particular. One especially controversial decree in the spring of 1949 
required Koreans in America to register with the new ROK government, or risk losing 
their eligibility for Korean citizenship and with it, the hope of ever returning to the 
peninsula, even to visit.69 Rather than solidify Rhee’s control over U.S. Korean 
communities, the measure renewed criticism of his administration’s authoritarian 
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methods.70 To counter such criticism, Rhee took to branding his major opponents 
“communist or communist sympathizers” – accusations that resulted in the deportation of 
several opponents to Europe. Not detrimental for his detractors alone, Rhee’s methods 
fueled anticommunist fears in Washington by giving substance to U.S. officials’ 
suspicions of communist loyalties among Koreans in America.  
The vocal support of Korean radicals like Kimm for Chinese Communists in Asia 
added to the clamor. As civil war in China raged through the summer of 1949, writers in 
the KNRP’s Korean Independence newspaper openly identified with the CCP and its 
leader Mao Zedong as co-fighters in a larger race war against the West. One editorialist 
described Koreans like himself in common cause with Chinese Communists as a single 
“democratic Asiatic people . . . shedding blood to liberate themselves from the 
cannibalism of Western Imperialism.”71 In his telling, Chinese Communists’ success was 
a badge of racial pride not only for Chinese, but for Koreans like himself insofar as it 
demonstrated the equality of Asian peoples with Western whites. During World War II, 
Tokyo’s use of pan-Asian rhetoric in their calls for a Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
uniting Asian peoples from across the continent had ignited alarm in Washington 
regarding the threat of Asian racial solidarity to U.S. security interests.  
The revival of similar appeals by Mao Zedong and the CCP renewed these fears, 
and all the more keenly during a time of nationalist ferment and decolonization 
throughout Asia. KNRP writers welcomed the CCP’s eventual victory with declarations 
of a “new day awakening in Asia.” Their sense of Asian racial pride was unmistakable. 
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The Korean Independence newspaper’s English editor, Sang Park, called the CCP’s 
capture of the Nationalist capitol Nanking on April 24 a “glorious triumph” for “all 
Asiatics” over Americans’ use of scare tactics to threaten Asia with “atomic bombs” and 
efforts to “enslave hungry peoples to [the] Dollar.” The editorial reflected a growing 
sense of Asian racial pride. Park argued that the Chinese Communist victory proved that 
Westerners could no longer “look down upon the Asiatic peoples as an inferior race . . . 
predestined to eke out their bare subsistence by serving them as their slave[s].” Instead, it 
heralded Asia’s rise to become the “cradle of new spiritual, cultural, and intellectual 
Renaissance” in the world. 72  
FBI informer Anita Bell Schneider confirmed the existence of Sino-Korean 
Communist networks linking DPRK and CCP leaders to Koreans in southern California 
several years later in a statement before the HUAC. The FBI hired Schneider to infiltrate 
and gather intelligence on the peace movement in California. Her testimony drew a direct 
chain of command from Communist leader Mao Zedong to Koreans in southern 
California. She claimed to have worked closely with Alice Hyun’s brother Peter and 
other CPUSA members in the Southern California Peace Crusade from 1951 to 1954, 
when the organization identified her and expelled her. In a series of very leading 
question-and-answer exchanges, she testified that Communists like Peter Hyun had used 
peace issues to mask their main work of spreading “Communist or Russian propaganda.” 
By presenting themselves as a “peace movement,” Schneider maintained, the Party had 
been able to mobilize the money and prestige of unsuspecting, non-Communist members 
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to further the Com-intern’s agenda to “weaken the United States” by creating dissension 
and encouraging criticism of U.S. government policies.73 
The outbreak of the Korean War less than a year later prompted a more mixed 
reaction from Korean American communities. The fighting began in June of 1950 with 
North Korean troops unexpectedly crossing the 38th parallel into ROK territory in a bid to 
reunify the peninsula under the North Korean Communist government. Members of the 
KNA in Hawaii, the oldest and largest Korean American organization, took the 
opportunity to denounce Rhee’s ROK government for creating conditions ripe for 
violence.74 Most Koreans in the United States hoped for reunification and peace, leaving 
them unable to pick a side in the conflict.75 The left wing of Korean America by no 
means monopolized the preference for reunification of the Korean peninsula; moderate 
Korean American groups also desired reunification, regardless of American priorities. 
When rumors of an American plan began to circulate in Seoul during the first year of the 
occupation, KNA and UKC leaders categorically denounced the idea because it would 
divide the state.76 In May 1948, KNA leaders in Hawaii rebuffed an invitation by Rhee’s 
supporters to join them in commemorating the new South Korean state. In their formal 
reply, KNA leaders stipulated that they would only “join their countrymen to honor the 
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occasion when the united government of north and south Korea is established.”77 At the 
same time, KNA leaders were pragmatic above all. Thus, though they may have opposed 
the creation of the ROK in 1948, the Hawaii KNA chapter released a statement calling 
for the passage of a bill introduced to Congress in 1949 as a way to cement relations 
“between the new Korean government and the United States of America.”78 By the 
Korean War years, the UKC had gone defunct, and the KNA spoke as the main 
mouthpiece of the Korean American community. But the more extreme pronouncements 
of the community’s left wing drowned out its moderate voice after 1950. 
Kimm and several alumni of the KACW and the KNRP in southern California 
spearheaded the left-wing cause. Uninterested in appeasing Washington lawmakers, they 
spent the Korean War years propagating critiques of America’s unwelcome meddling in 
Koreans’ domestic affairs on the pages of Korean Independence. As English-language 
editor Peter Hyun once described it, the paper’s editorial policy during the war 
overwhelmingly repeated three themes: “stop the war in Korea, oust Syngman Rhee, and 
all powers outside Korea – hands off.”79 Unlike the majority of Korean Americans, 
Korean Independence writers largely welcomed war on the peninsula as a necessary step 
toward Korea’s reunification and self-government. They openly aligned themselves with 
the Communist DPRK and CCP. Notably they published in English as well as Korean, 
unlike other major Korean immigrant newspapers of the time, which seemed to invite 
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official scrutiny by America’s anticommunist bureaucracy.80 As fighting raged in Korea, 
the Korean Independence issued a steady stream of petitions calling on the United States 
and the U.N. to withdraw from what they called an “internal family matter” and restore to 
Koreans their right to govern themselves.81 Defying the accepted wisdom of North 
Korean culpability, they named U.S. troops as the true “aggressor” behind the conflict 
and expressed their hope that North Korean troops and their “Chinese saviors” would 
prevail against the forces of “American imperialism.”82  
Over the course of the Korean War, Korean Independence writers became 
increasingly aggressive in their attacks on America and its role in escalating the violence 
on the peninsula. An October 1950 article series cited “secret documents” captured by 
North Korean soldiers during its brief occupation of Seoul as “irrefutable evidence” of 
Rhee’s plot to attack North Korea and unite it under South Korean rule, a plan “conceived 
long before” June 1950 and carried out with American and U.N. officials’ support.83 Two 
years later, they printed their most damning piece to date, alleging that U.S. military 
forces had introduced germ warfare to Korea. According to the report, U.S.-piloted 
planes had dropped “bubonic plague-carrying fleas” over the city of Kaesong, North 
Korea. The piece cited exclusive testimony from a Chinese spy – identified as 21-year old 
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Wang Chi – who claimed to have been hired by U.S. officials to gather intelligence on 
the effects of America’s bacteriological weapons on North Korean civilians.84 
Lawmakers questioned Kimm about these reports during his hearing before the HUAC 
several years later.   
Kimm’s HUAC experience typified what one scholar described as the “stylized 
rituals” and “staged quality” of most public HUAC hearings and indeed, of much U.S. 
government redbaiting after 1950.85 The committee sought exposure, not information. At 
Kimm’s hearing, HUAC members focused their questions on the nature of the Korean 
Independence newspaper and its relationship to the Communist Party and Party 
directives. The specificity of the committee’s questions about the publication’s content 
attests to the care with which state officials had monitored its pages for years. But no 
matter how damning or specific the question, Kimm refused to answer. When asked to name 
the sources behind the newspaper’s charges of U.S.-deployed bacteriological warfare in 
North Korea, for example, Kimm declined even to confirm his affiliation with the 
newspaper, much less reveal anything about the origins of those reports. He parried query 
after query by invoking the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, much to 
the committee’s exasperation. As a self-identified “active newspaperman,” Rep. Donald 
Jackson (R-CA) insisted that constitutional freedoms did not apply to the Korean 
Independence because it was not a “free American newspaper,” but rather a “house organ 
of the international Communist conspiracy” which regularly printed “policies and 
directives . . . handed down from a foreign power.” He depicted the Korean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Independence as “little free from the influence of international communism as anything I 
have ever observed in the way of journalistic endeavor.”86 Kimm’s reticence 
notwithstanding, committee members condemned Kimm and the Korean Independence 
as servants of the Communist cause, exempt from constitutional rights. Local press 
covering the hearings reprinted an especially testy episode from the exchange, in which 
Rep. Jackson decried Kimm’s multiple references to his First and Fifth Amendment 
rights as a “misuse of the Constitution.”87  
Throughout the 1950s, Kimm contested his deportation order in multiple appeals 
in U.S. courts. As a foreign-born alien, Kimm had few rights and little recourse under 
existing laws that barred him from U.S. citizenship and Cold War security measures like 
the McCarran Act of 1950, which drew sharp distinctions between the rights of aliens and 
the rights of American citizens. For him and other Korean deportees, the assistance of 
outside civil liberties and progressive organizations, including several of the partnerships 
forged during the 1948 Wallace campaign, proved invaluable to organizing an effective 
legal defense. With the help of the ACLU, for example, Korean Independence English 
editor Sang Ryup Park won a permanent stay of his deportation order in 1952.88 Formed 
in 1950, the Los Angeles Committee to Protect the Foreign Born (LACPFB) created an 
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Asian subcommittee committed to the defense of Asian-born deportees, a group that 
included Kimm and his colleague David Hyun, KACW chairwoman Alice Hyun’s 
brother. When appeals on procedural grounds failed to bring lasting reprieve, both men’s 
team of lawyers, secured with the help of the LACPFB, ACLU, and National Lawyers 
Guild, turned to a provision of the McCarran-Walter Act (1952) empowering the 
Attorney General to stay deportation orders in cases where a deportee was likely to face 
physical persecution in his destination country.89 At a loss for other options, Kimm and 
Hyun, their legal teams and families, seized upon the clause with renewed hope. 
The fact that the United States expelled Korean-born aliens to South Korea 
influenced their legal defense. Kimm – like Rhee himself – was originally from a city 
located above the thirty-eighth parallel, but the United States would not send him to 
North Korea. First, the United States did not officially recognize North Korea as a nation. 
This created visa technicalities that made it impossible to repatriate directly to North 
Korea from America. This allowed Koreans threatened with deportment to make reports 
of ROK President Syngman Rhee’s violent and dictatorial practices, which had already 
been circulating for years, central to their case. Between 1952 and 1954, Kimm and 
Hyun’s legal teams and their supporters undertook a concerted effort to document Rhee’s 
record of violence against political opponents and critics, compiling affidavits and news 
reports attesting to Rhee’s use of strong-arm tactics against individuals he perceived as a 
threat to his government or to himself personally. 
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A 1956 defense pamphlet issued by Kimm’s supporters drew from these affidavits 
and articles to argue for his legal relief.90 Reginald Thompson, a British press 
correspondent in South Korea, recounted how “men, women and even children were 
brutally beaten up,” “hundreds faced the firing squads” and their corpses “riddled with 
bullets were heaped into common graves.” Yale anthropologist Cornelius Osgood wrote 
about how Rhee’s “South Korean police publicized murder and brutality by depositing 
the dead bodies of their prisoners on the doorsteps.” Some of the most damning 
statements came from one-time members and employees of the USAMGIK in Seoul. Ely 
Haimowitz, former chief of the Cultural Affairs division of the Office of Civil 
Information of the U.S. armed forces in Korea during 1947, testified to Rhee’s 
government practice of silencing opposition “with bullets or clubs or both.” Stewart 
Meacham, former labor advisor to the commanding general of U.S. armed forces in 
Seoul, concurred with his observation that “[t]he opponents of Rhee die violently.” 
Stanley Earl, now working as a local official in Portland, Oregon, claimed to have 
resigned his government post “in protest over U.S. support of Rhee’s dictatorial 
policies.”91  
Korean newspaper reports naming Kimm supported the view that the Rhee 
government would persecute him if he were sent to South Korea. According to the Dong-
Ah Daily, one of South Korea’s major newspapers, government officials in Rhee’s 
administration were “closely watching the outcome of the traitors under deportation 
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proceedings” whom they believed had “sold themselves to the reds in the U.S.” Pieces 
written by ROK government sources denounced Kimm and the Korean Independence by 
name, referring to Kimm as a “traitor to Korea” and the Independence as a “Communist 
propaganda newspaper.”92 Clearly, Kimm would face brutality in South Korea.93 
 Kimm’s supporters’ strategy had one major flaw, however, which made it 
unlikely that the U.S. Attorney General would accept the argument. By inviting scrutiny 
of Rhee’s record, the deportation loophole indirectly shone light on Washington’s role in 
not only helping to create but also continuing to fund Rhee’s widely criticized regime. 
The defense’s focus on Rhee placed INS and Justice Department officials in the awkward 
position of passing judgment on the State Department’s policy of supporting Rhee’s 
South Korean government. To rule in Kimm’s favor meant, in effect, to uphold his legal 
team’s argument that Rhee was a dictator and thereby implicate U.S. policymakers and 
State Department officials with supporting an anti-democratic administration.94 The 
alternative – to defend U.S. support for Syngman Rhee as media observers, humanitarian 
groups, and other news sources presented proof of his brutalities and corruption – was 
likewise unenviable. To be sure, the arguments contained in Kimm’s 1956 legal brief 
were not new; they simply recapitulated charges already circulating in the international 
media. However, the Kimm case and those of other Korean deportees did humanize the 
stakes of the reports for the individuals and families involved. 
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 Deportees’ experiences of harassment by U.S. authorities also pushed them 
closer, both rhetorically and in practice, to other American minority groups. Between 
1950 and 1954, local authorities raided the Korean Independence newspaper office three 
separate times. Everyone on the newspaper staff had received deportation summonses by 
1954. Few were surprised at the charges; many had been present at Diamond Kimm’s 
arrest in 1950. The newspaper emphasized the plight of its staff, publishing pieces 
decrying the “deportation hysteria” as symptomatic of a broader “anti-[S]emite, anti-
communist, and anti-foreigners hysteria” sweeping the United States, and protested the 
“second-class status,” “oppressive laws,” and “vanishing civil rights” that Koreans and 
other foreign-born Americans suffered under a “discriminatory” government.95 One 
editorialist declared Koreans’ part in the “struggle of ALL freedom-loving people . . . 
irrespective of faith, color, or national extraction” against “U.S. white supremacy and 
aggression.” Drawing an explicit link between the oppression of Koreans in Korea and 
minorities in the United States, the writer maintained that so long as white supremacy 
drove Americans in America to practice “discrimination against Mexican nationals and 
Mexican Americans,” “anti-Semitism,” and “second-class citizenship for Negro people,” 
Koreans could never achieve victory in their own “struggle for self-determination” which 
was “bound very closely with the mores of America.” In this way, deportees used the 
opportunity both to claim solidarity with other persecuted minority groups in America 
and to situate their common plight within a transnational critique of “U.S. white 
supremacy and aggression,” as practiced at home and in Asia.96 
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Ultimately, the LACPFB, ACLU, and other progressive groups could not save 
Kimm. In 1959, a Southern California district court judge concluded on the basis of 
Kimm’s expired student visa alone that there was “not the slightest hint of any evidence 
that he is not deportable.”97 In 1960, having exhausted all his other legal options, Kimm 
appealed one last time before the U.S. Supreme Court, whose decision would be 
irrevocable and not subject to further appeal. Recognizing the gravity of the hearing, the 
Friends of Diamond Kimm Committee in Los Angeles issued final pleas in the 1960 
conference journal of the Los Angeles Committee to Protect the Foreign Born.98 A piece 
titled “Hangman Rhee Must Never Get Kimm!” overviewed the government’s case 
against Kimm and called for donations and prayers in the concluding push.99 But to no 
avail. By a narrow margin of 5 to 4, the Court denied Kimm’s request for a suspension of 
deportation. The decision cited his “failure to prove his eligibility for a suspension” on 
the grounds of physical persecution.100 With no further options for legal recourse, Kimm 
and his wife, Fania, departed Los Angeles in 1962, having chosen to depart voluntarily 
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rather than be formally deported to South Korea where Kimm faced certain persecution 
as a communist traitor.101 
Writing from Czechoslovakia where the couple stopped to file for entry to North 
Korea, Kimm reflected on the idea of going home, which he claimed had been his 
“sweetest dream for the last 30 years.” Despite the circumstances of his homecoming, 
Kimm declared his case a “victory” insofar as he had been able to decide his destination. 
North Korea had been the natural choice. He supported the North Korean government of 
Kim Il Sung and feared no harm from DPRK state officials. Kimm wished the Los 
Angeles Committee continued “courage . . . [and] steadfastness” in its battle to “make 
victory a reality” for foreign-born Americans facing deportation. He ended by expressing 
the couple’s hopes for the final leg of their journey. “We are looking forward with great 
anticipation to the day when we set foot in my native land,” he wrote, “now so much 
more beautiful than when I left it so many years ago.”102 Fania, Diamond’s American-
born Czech wife, conveyed similar resolve. In a note dated July 1962, she reported that 
the couple had arrived at their destination: “Korea, the land of Morning Calm, the 
eastern-most part of the Asian continent.” “For me,” she wrote, “it is a complete and 
terrific change in every respect, apart from missing my family and that of my larger 
family—you my friends. Were I to say that the adjustment is easy, I would not be telling 
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ch‘ubangkwa hanin tiasŭp'ora [The View from Washington: Political Deportation & the Korean Diaspora 
in the United States]. Yoksa munje yon’gu (Critical Studies on Modern Korean History) 26 (December 
2011): 259-275 and Cheng, Citizens of Asian America, Chapter 4. 
 
102 Diamond Kimm, “Letter from Afar: Homeward to My Native Land.” Constitutional Protection for the 
Foreign Born (Journal for 1962) (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, 
1962), 19-20. 
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the truth. However, this is my home now, and I am determined to learn and make 
good.”103 Whether she did so remains a mystery; the couple was not heard from again.104  
By contrast, history records the fate of former KACW chairwoman Alice Hyun. 
Hyun left the United States for North Korea shortly after the war began in July 1950. In 
Pyongyang, she reunited with her old friend, Korean Communist Party leader Pak Hun-
Young, then serving as the minister of foreign affairs for the DPRK government. She 
served as his personal secretary for several years before being executed as an “American 
spy” in a government purge that also claimed the lives of Pak and thirty-eight other 
associates whom DPRK President Kim Il-Sung had deemed a threat to his position. 
Writing about her death years later, her brother Peter remarked on the irony that his sister 
had “spent all her life fighting for Korea, only to be executed by another Korean.”105 
Together with Kimm, Alice Hyun’s fate stands as one of the most striking examples of 
Cold War consequences in action, exemplifying the very real consequences that 
communist and nationalist struggles could carry for Korean Americans during these 
years.  
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103 “Exile,” Journal for 1963, 40. 
 
104 Kimm was purportedly killed several years later by the North Korean regime on charges of being an 
American spy, but it is hard to know for sure as these reports have never been confirmed. Michael Munk, 
“The Fate of the Kwaks,” NK News, February 21, 2011.!
 
105 Along with Kimm, Alice Hyun’s brother Peter was called to testify before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC) in 1955 and suffered ongoing harassment on U.S. authorities for his role in 
the Southern California Peace Crusade, widely considered a Communist front organization. His American 
citizenship by virtue of his Hawaii birth shielded him from the same degree of punishment that his Korean-
born peers faced, however, particularly the threat of deportation. In comparison, it took Peter’s younger, 
Korean-born brother David Hyun more than a decade and a half to prevail in his own deportation appeals. 
For more on Alice Hyun, see Peter Hyun, In a New World, 272-273. For more on the David Hyun case, see 
Cheng, Chapter 4. 
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Korean Immigration After 1952  
The long shadow cast by the Korean War arguably influenced Korean 
immigration to the United States more than any single piece of legislation passed by 
Congress before 1965. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act had made Koreans eligible to 
naturalize as U.S. citizens for the first time in American history, but the U.S. Korean 
population, numbered fewer than 12,000 by the early 1950s.106 The McCarran-Walter 
Act’s granting of a nominal immigration quota to Korea likewise had small impact. But, 
like Japanese immigrants, the majority of the seventeen thousand Koreans who had 
entered the United States by 1965 were women who entered the United States outside of 
the annual quotas, as the spouses of American servicemen.107 As scholars such as Ji-Yeon 
Yuh have shown, the migration experiences of these women diverged widely from those 
who came as a result of the formal quota of 105 Koreans per year. Norms of white male 
patriarchy indelibly shaped these women’s experiences in the United States. The stigma 
associated with these unions also separated these women from existing Korean American 
communities and networks upon their arrival in the United States.108 Ironically, these 
ostracized women formed some of the earliest links in the chain migration system that 
later led to an exponential increase in Asian immigration. According to one estimate, as 
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106 Choy, 183. 
 
107 Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans  (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1989). 
 
108 According to historian Ji-Yeon Yuh, nearly one hundred thousand women came to the United States as 
military brides from South Korea between 1950 and 1989. Ji-Yeon Yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: 
Korean Military Brides in America (New York: NYU Press, 2004). Also see Katharine H. S. Moon, Sex 
among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).  
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many as forty to fifty percent of all Korean immigrants since 1965 came to the United 
States directly or indirectly through the sponsorship of a Korean military bride.109  
The influence of the Korean War on immigration trends also extended to another 
kind of immigrant: the Korean adoptee. Like military brides, these children came to the 
United States outside of the national quotas. Between 1955 and 1961, American families, 
most of them white, adopted 4,190 mixed-race and full-blooded Korean children into the 
United States.110 As historian Arissa Oh has shown, the mechanisms of these adoptions 
lay the “imaginative, procedural, and institutional groundwork” during the 1950s and 
early 1960s for inter-country adoption in the United States. By the time the 1965 
Immigration Act overhauled the national origins quota system, a 1961 law had 
normalized adoptees as immigrants by giving them the status of “immediate relatives,” 
who could enter the U.S. as non-quota migrants, rather than as “eligible orphans” or 
“refugees.”111  
This trend toward non-quota immigration was not limited to Korea but reflected 
broader changes in Asian immigration over the 1950s, whereby formal national quotas 
were increasingly rendered meaningless by new categories of non-quota migration that 
were the product of an increased American military presence across the continent. As 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee 
in 1964, non-quota immigrants accounted for roughly 90% of the approximately 120,000 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Cited in Ji-Yeon Yuh, “Out of the Shadows: Camptown Women, Military Brides, and Korean 
(American) Communities,” Asian American Studies Now: A Critical Reader, eds. Jean Yu-wen Shen Wu 
and Thomas C. Chen (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 247-8. !
110 Figure taken from Arissa Oh, “From War Waif to Ideal Immigrant: The Cold War Transformation of the 
Korean Orphan,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31:4 (Summer 2012): 41. !
 
111 For a more detailed discussion of the legal mechanisms underwriting Korean adoptee migration, see Oh, 
“From War Waif,” 35, 40-42.!
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persons admitted to the United States from China, Japan, and the Philippines between 
1953 and 1963.112 Such figures, when used to underscore the inadequacies of the 1952 
McCarran-Walter Act, fueled calls for more sweeping immigration reform – in particular, 
the elimination of the national origins quota system– as the next logical step in America’s 
bid to update its immigration policy to reflect its leadership role and foreign policy 
priorities in the world.  
!
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112 House Committee on Judiciary, Immigration, Part 2: Hearings on H.R. 1629, H.R. 1654, et. al., 88nd 
Cong., 2nd sess., August 1964; quoted in David Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to 
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 75. 
  
!
EPILOGUE 
 
The [McCarran-Walter] bill represents the first major revision of our immigration 
laws since 1924. As such I think it should make a contribution to the solution of 
some of the problems we face in the world; it should be in harmony with the spirit 
which animates our foreign policy and our relations with other countries; and it 
should strengthen our claim to leadership of the free world. Measured by these 
standards, it is a thoroughly bad bill.1 
  
 
After the McCarran-Walter Act passed Congress over a presidential veto in June 
1952, observers and scholars alike agreed that a comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. 
immigration system was a matter of time. As Harvard historian and public intellectual 
Oscar Handlin declared in the title of a magazine piece published just weeks after the 
legislation became law, “The Immigration Fight Has Only Begun.” The article offered 
“lessons” from the “McCarran-Walter Setback” for the future of immigration policy in 
America.2   
As his actions in the final months of his presidential term reflected, Truman 
agreed with Handlin. In September 1952, he created by executive order a Commission on 
Immigration and Naturalization charged with evaluating and making recommendations 
on U.S. immigration and naturalization policies “desirable in the interests of the 
economy, security and responsibilities of this country.”3 The President stated his belief 
that America’s immigration and naturalization policies were “of major importance to [the 
                                                
1 Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, to President Harry S. Truman, June 21, 1952, reprinted in 
Raymond H. Geselbracht, “Harry S. Truman and Immigration: A Graphic Essay Based on the Holdings of 
the Harry S. Truman Library,” in Roger Daniels, ed., Immigration and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman 
(Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2010), 83. 
 
2 Oscar Handlin, "The Immigration Fight Has Only Begun," Commentary 14 (July 1952): 1-7. 
3 U.S. President Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Report of the President’s 
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization,” January 13, 1953. 
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United States’] own security and to the defense of the free world.”4 His statement 
reaffirmed the central importance of U.S. foreign policy imperatives to the formulation of 
American immigration and naturalization laws.  
Through the 1950s and early 1960s, Presidents echoed the priority of foreign 
policy imperatives, citing America’s Cold War interests in Asia and other parts of the 
non-white world in relation to U.S. immigration policy. The Commission’s final report, 
Whom Shall We Welcome (1953), laid out an expansive vision for reform that anticipated 
many of the changes to come in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality, or Hart-Celler, 
Act, including elimination of the 1920s-established national origins quotas.5 The 1965 
Act created in their place a preference system based on immigrants’ skills and family 
reunification. Supporters of the measure welcomed the change, but scholars have called 
the liberal nature of the legislation into question.6  
Scholars and media observers alike frequently describe the 1965 Act as a 
“watershed” in U.S. history, as well as in the words of a 2008 Boston Globe article, the 
“most important piece of legislation that no one’s ever heard of.”7 In the 1950s, 153,000 
immigrants (or 6% of the overall flow) entering the United States were of Asian descent; 
                                                
4 “Order Creating the Commission,” September 4, 1952, reprinted in U.S. President's Commission on 
Immigration and Naturalization, Whom Shall We Welcome (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1953), 272-273.  
 
5 Act of 1965, Public Law 89–236. U.S. President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom 
Shall We Welcome (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).   
 
6 For a discussion of why the 1965 Act was not the liberal watershed it is often described to be, see Mae 
Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), Chapter 7.  
 
7 See, for example, Pyong-Gap Min, ed., Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing, 1995), 267. Quoted in Peter S. Canellos, “Obama victory took root in 
Kennedy-inspired Immigration Act,” Boston Globe, November 11, 2008, A2. 
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in the 1970s, those numbers had risen to 1.6 million or 35% of legal immigration.8 
Scholars debate whether the 1965’s Act’s framers anticipated the legislation’s dramatic 
consequences. According to historian David Reimers, the consequences of the legislation 
were sweeping, but they were not planned.9 More recently, legal scholar Gabriel Chin has 
challenged this view, arguing that lawmakers clearly recognized the likelihood of an 
influx of Asian immigrants to the United States, and that they supported the measure in 
clear anticipation of this shift.10 Regardless of the vision of the framers of the 1965 Act, it 
has transformed U.S. demographics.  
 
Asian Americans and the Immigration Debate After 1952 
Several major developments both at home and abroad shaped the immigration 
debate in America during the thirteen-year period between passage of the McCarran-
Walter Act in 1952 and the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965. The first of these 
was the escalation of Cold War tensions that cemented the centrality of national security 
concerns in discussion of immigration reform. Asia emerged as a key site of Cold War 
                                                
8 Figures taken from Charles B. Keely, “The Immigration Act of 1965,” in Hyung-Chan Kim, ed., Asian 
Americans and Congress: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 530-532. 
 
9 As evidence, Reimers quoted the words of President Lyndon Johnson upon his signing of the Hart-Celler 
bill at the foot of the Statue of Liberty on Ellis Island in October 1965. In Johnson’s own words, the Hart-
Celler legislation was “not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape 
the structure of our daily lives, or really add importantly to either our wealth or our power.” On the other 
hand, Johnson’s words were arguably intended to mollify the fears of U.S. lawmakers and other opponents 
of the measure. President Lyndon B. Johnson's Remarks at the Signing of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, 
October 3, 1965, reprinted in David Reimers, “An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and 
Third World Immigration to the United States,” Journal of American Ethnic History 3:1 (Fall 1983): 17. 
 
10 For the two main sides in this debate, see David Reimers, “An Unintended Reform: The 1965 
Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United States,” Journal of American Ethnic History 
3:1 (Fall 1983): 9-28 and Gabriel J. Chin, “The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A 
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 North Carolina Law Review 1 (November 
1996): 273-345. 
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conflict when, two years after an armistice ended the fighting in Korea, the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1955 formalized Washington’s recognition of an Asian – and specifically, 
Chinese and North Korean – Communist threat independent of Moscow.11 During the 
same period, U.S. military involvement in Vietnam steadily deepened, and conflict at 
home about that involvement deepened as well.   
The admission of Hawaii into the Union as America’s fiftieth state in 1959 also 
represented a major development impacting immigration debates, by changing the culture 
of Congress. For the first time, U.S.-born citizens of Asian descent joined the elite ranks 
of the U.S. House and Senate as equal voting members.12 Hawaii had long served as a 
hotbed of lobbying and fundraising for the repeal campaigns. Now Chinese and Japanese 
American officials like Hiram Fong, Daniel Inouye, and (later) Spark Matsunaga led the 
fight for immigration reform firsthand from their positions of power on Capitol Hill; 
Fong did so as the only Hawaii Senator ever to serve on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
which oversaw immigration and naturalization policy.13 They joined the handful of Asian 
American witnesses who spoke in support of immigration-related reform measures at 
executive and legislative hearings throughout the 1952-1965 period.14   
                                                
11 Stalin’s death in 1953 also led to significant shifts within Soviet Communism itself.  
 
12 For more on the importance of Hawaiian statehood to conceptions of Asian American citizenship, see 
Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), Chapter 7.  
 
13 For example, see Hiram Fong’s testimony at U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, S. 1932 and Other Legislation Relating to Immigration Quota System, Volume 2, 88th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, 58-89. 
 
14 Asian American witnesses at the various hearings represented the Chicago Shimpo (The Chicago 
Japanese American News), Japanese American Citizens League, Chinese American Citizens Alliance, 
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of New York, Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association 
and Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, and the American Legion of California, among other entities.  
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While southern and eastern Euro-American groups directed their energies toward 
abolition of the national origins quotas and, to a lesser extent, refugee policy, Asian 
Americans focused on issues related to refugees and deportation in about equal measure. 
With Southern Democrats and conservative committee barons blocking comprehensive 
reform, immigration activists had the most success in lobbying for policy on admitting 
displaced persons into the United States. While their voting power never rivaled that of 
Euro-Americans, Chinese Americans skillfully leveraged their connections to both U.S. 
and Chinese Nationalist officials to press for the admission of Chinese under 
Congressional and executive refugee policies.15 Using the logic of anticommunism, the 
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association spearheaded campaigns for the inclusion 
of Chinese Nationalists fleeing Communist China under newly passed refugee legislation. 
Their moderate success included the 1953 Refugee Relief Act permitting the entry of 
2,777 Chinese, and a 1960 Fair Share Law allowing for the immigration of 4,500 Chinese 
refugees from Hong Kong.16  
Asian American activism in the arena of deportation policy sought to address 
injustices related to the government’s harassment and deportation of Asian-born 
individuals suspected of having Communist ties and/or holding Communist beliefs. The 
1950 McCarran Security Act and 1952 McCarran-Walter Act together strengthened the 
                                                
15 Mae M. Ngai, "Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration During the Cold War Years," Journal 
of American Ethnic History 18:1 (Fall 1998): 20-21. 
 
16 In assessing the impact of refugee laws pertaining to Chinese immigration on the 1965 Act, historian 
Madeline Hsu has observed that a significant portion of the opposition to the McCarran-Walter legislation 
came from groups that targeted the measure’s inability to account for the problem of refugees. The problem 
of displaced persons was increasingly seen as an especially egregious failing within the context of 
America’s Cold War security interests abroad. Madeline Y. Hsu, “The Disappearance of America’s Cold 
War Chinese Refugees, 1948–1966,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31:4 (Summer 2012): 17-18; 
David Reimers, “An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the 
United States,” Journal of American Ethnic History 3:1 (Fall 1983): 13-14. 
 
 281 
government’s powers to deport and even denaturalize foreign-born subversives. Asian 
American organizations, such as the Korean National Revolutionary Party in Los 
Angeles, partnered with progressive groups like the ACLU to contest the constitutionality 
of these state practices and rally in support of Asian American civil rights.17 The Chinese 
American Citizens Association (CACA) and the Nisei Progressives did the same for 
suspected subversives within the Chinese and Japanese American communities, 
respectively.18  
While the Nisei Progressives fought deportation, the staunchly anticommunist 
JACL and other Japanese Americans remained active in Washington, advocating for 
Hawaiian statehood and general civil rights legislation. In 1952, the League’s 
Washington representative Mike Masaoka began a career as a professional lobbyist, 
opening his own public relations firm called Mike M. Masaoka Consultants.19 Masaoka’s 
subsequent appearances and statements in the media prompted debates within the JACL’s 
ranks and leadership regarding the organization’s proper role in relationship to U.S. 
international affairs. This controversy highlighted the continued ambivalence of Asian 
American citizenship even after the end of formal exclusion. 
As the most prominent Asian American organization to support the 1952 
McCarran-Walter measure, the JACL gained widespread recognition (as well as 
                                                
17 See Cindy Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War (New York: 
New York University Press, 2013), Chapter 4. 
 
18 According to Cheng, CACA leaders consciously emulated the JACL’s public relations campaigns to 
improve and rehabilitate the public image of Chinese Americans in an effort to prevent the possibility of 
Chinese internment in the Japanese American (World War II) mold. For more, see Cheng, Citizens of Asian 
America, Chapter 5. On the Nisei Progressives, see Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans 
and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Chapter 3. 
 
19 See Mike Masaoka and Bill Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka: An American Saga (New York: 
William Morrow & Company, 1987), 253-255, 267-280. 
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notoriety) on both sides of the Pacific for its role in lobbying for the legislation’s 
passage.20 Mike Masaoka, who spearheaded the national campaign as the JACL’s 
Washington representative, received much of the credit. Desiring to capitalize on the 
goodwill the McCarran-Walter Act’s victory won for the JACL, JACL leaders debated a 
proposal in 1952 to send Masaoka to Japan as an envoy of the League. Supporters of the 
plan argued that the welfare and treatment of Japanese Americans depended on U.S.-
Japan relations, making any contacts Masaoka might forge with Japanese officials and 
business leaders useful. But former JACL president Saburo Kido warned that Japan 
might seek to use the JACL “as a tool.” Others joined him in reiterating that the JACL 
had been created on behalf of Japanese Americans, not Japanese.21 The proposal was 
tabled after heated discussion, but the larger issue of the League’s official stance on 
foreign affairs remained a point of contention throughout the 1950s.22  
The debate was ostensibly resolved in 1957 with the establishment of a National 
Committee on International Relations. The following year, several figures affiliated with 
the JACL, such as Masaoka and former JACL president Saburo Kido, helped oversee the 
formation of the American Committee on Japan as a separate group dedicated to U.S.-
Japan affairs. Both entities claimed to speak for the Japanese American community in 
                                                
 
20 Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, 236-237.  
 
21 JACL, Official Convention Minutes, 1952, quoted in Wu, The Color of Success, Chapter 3.  
 
22 In the meantime, the JACL had its commitments repeatedly called into question. The 1956 release from 
prison of Iva “Tokyo Rose” Toguri d’Aquino, one of the young Nisei women stranded in Japan during 
World War II who had worked for Radio Tokyo delivering Axis propaganda as an announcer for its 
English-language broadcasts, evoked a heated exchange in publications including Newsweek and the 
JACL’s Pacific Citizen newspaper over Japanese American loyalty. JACL spokespersons vehemently 
defended Nisei loyalty to the United States, seeking to silence voices within the Japanese American 
community that were pledging allegiance to Japan. See Wu, The Color of Success, Chapter 3. 
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international matters. Their creation reflected the League’s recognition that U.S. relations 
with Japan would guide the fate of Japanese America.23  
Apart from the JACL, Asian American organizations involved in the repeal 
movement generally diminished in influence over the following decades. The state 
deportation of leaders like Diamond Kimm and other left-wing Koreans all but 
dismantled the Korean National Revolutionary Party by 1956. The Korean National 
Association (KNA), the oldest Korean organization in the United States, continued to 
exist, but throughout the 1950s, internal factionalism and government harassment of its 
suspected pro-communist elements weakened it. ROK president Syngman Rhee 
continued to suppress criticism of his government by Koreans in the United States by 
branding them communist sympathizers and punishing any dissenters by making them 
ineligible to visit South Korea.24 Community repression was especially strong in Hawaii, 
Rhee’s former base of power. When popular protest forced Rhee from office in April 
1960, many Korean Americans could visit South Korea for the first time in decades.25  
By the early 1970s, KNA membership had dropped to record low levels, and the 
group’s focus turned inward to social and cultural affairs within the community and away 
from politics. Few U.S.-born Korean Americans maintained KNA membership, and the 
overwhelming majority of Korean immigrants in the 1950s and early 1960s came as 
military brides and adoptees. These newcomers generally settled far from the largest 
                                                
 
23 For more on the JACL’s ties to Japan, see Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Chapter 13. 
 
24 Wayne Patterson, The Ilse: First-generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaiʻi, 1903-1973 (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 212-214. 
 
25 That is not to say that political dissent ended in the United States. Korean American communities became 
a center of opposition to Park Chung Hee, the military general who led South Korea from 1963 to 1979.  
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Korean American communities in Hawaii and California and did not seek out 
organizations like the KNA.  
The India League of America (ILA) maintained an active voice in U.S. foreign 
affairs through the 1950s. Even after India became formally independent (and Great 
Britain helped establish Pakistan as a separate Muslim state) in 1947, Singh and the ILA 
remained outspoken, anti-colonial voices for the Indonesian and Indochinese 
independence movements.26 The ILA’s efforts benefited from the reputation it had built 
during the 1940s through its campaign for Indian independence and the Luce-Celler 
immigration bill. Singh and the ILA develop a closer relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru, 
the Indian National Congress leader who became India’s first Prime Minister.27 In 1952, 
the New York Times Magazine published J.J. Singh’s essay, “How to Win Friends in 
Asia.” The piece arguably marked the pinnacle of Singh’s career as a bridge between the 
United States and India.28 When Singh returned to India in 1959, the ILA’s influence 
waned until it eventually went defunct.  
Dalip Singh Saund took up Singh’s mantle to some extent. A Punjabi Sikh, Saund 
originally came to the United States in 1920 to study agriculture but instead earned a 
mathematics doctorate at the University of California at Berkeley. After graduating in 
1924, Saund spent the next three decades as a lettuce farmer in California’s Imperial 
                                                
 
26 The ILA practiced what historian Robert Shaffer has described as a “nuanced” or “liberal” anti-
communist approach that refused membership to known and suspected communists on the one hand, but 
did not hesitate to criticize U.S. policies that appeared racist or colonial in nature on the other. Robert 
Shaffer, "J.J. Singh and the India League of America, 1945-1959: Pressing at the Margins of the Cold War 
Consensus,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31:2 (Winter 2012): 81-85. 
 
27 For example, in 1949, the ILA cosponsored one of Nehru’s public appearances in New York City. Ibid., 
80.  
 
28 J.J. Singh, “How to Win Friends in Asia,” New York Times Magazine, September 28, 1952.  
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Valley. In 1949, he became a U.S. citizen under the citizenship provisions of the 1946 
Luce-Celler Act, which J.J. Singh and the ILA had championed.29 In 1956, the 29th 
District of California elected Saund to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he 
served as the first U.S. Congressman of Asian descent in American history. He served 
three terms from January 1957 to January 1963.30 Saund’s Congressional career stands as 
a testament to the gains that repeal made possible.  
*  *  *  *  * 
Writing in 1969, JACL historian Bill Hosokawa revisited Asian Americans’ 
quintessential dilemma when he posed the question, “Must it be inevitable that when 
some irritant from Tokyo causes Washington to sneeze, the Nisei will run a fever?” 
Hosokawa argued that it should not. Nikkei should have “control over their own destiny;” 
he called the idea “futile and fatalistic” that Japanese Americans’ fates were “tied in 
perpetuity to the land of his ancestors because of white America’s racism.”31  
Evidence suggest Hosokawa had reason to hope. On many measures, Asian 
Americans are moving toward acceptance as equal members of the U.S. body politic. As 
one example, a National Public Radio program asked in August 2012 if it could be the 
“Year of the Asian Voter.”32 Quoting political scientist Janelle Wong, the piece predicted 
that Asian Americans’ increasing tendency to congregate in swing states, combined with 
                                                
29 Saund also supported the Luce-Celler campaign from his home on the West Coast. Although far removed 
from Washington, DC, West Coast Indian communities provided significant financial support for the ILA 
effort. Premdatta Varma, Indian Immigrants in USA (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1995), 294. 
 
30 For more, see Dalip Singh Saund, Congressman From India (New York: Dutton, 1960). 
 
31 Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1969), 497. 
 
32 National Public Radio, “Could 2012 Be the Year of the Asian Voter?,” August 5, 2012. It bears noting 
that the piece used the term “Asian voter” rather than “Asian American.” 
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their growing numbers and high rates of naturalization and voting, would make them a 
growing political force in the future. 
At the same time, there is reason to remain sober. A recent New Yorker piece, 
citing the rise and intensity of anti-Chinese messages in rotation before Election Day, 
described 2012 as the year when “China-bashing went mainstream.”33 Not since the early 
1980s, when “Japan bashing” became commonplace and advocates launched “Made in 
the USA” campaigns to counter Japan’s inroads into American markets, has an Asian 
people featured so centrally in U.S. political campaigns and media as a racialized threat 
to American prosperity and security in the world. The episode in the 1980s gave rise to 
racial violence at home, such as when two laid-off auto workers from Detroit beat 
American-born Chinese Vincent Chin to death, making him a target for their anger at the 
Japanese car companies then undercutting American brands. The incident made clear that 
the assumption of an indelible racial link connecting Asian Americans to Asia still 
mattered. It is worth thinking about how similar perceptions, based on race, are still 
relevant today, even if the target group has changed. 34 
 
                                                
 
33 Evan Osnos, “The Year China-Bashing Went Mainstream,” New Yorker, November 6, 2012, accessed 
May 2, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/11/the-year-that-china-bashing-
went-mainstream.html. 
 
34 See, for example, Murtaza Hussain, “Anti-Muslim Violence Spiraling Out of Control in America,” 
December 31, 2012, Al Jazeera News, accessed May 1, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/20121230135815198642.html 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Select U.S. Immigration Laws Pertaining to the Repeal of Asian Exclusion,  
1943-1965 
 
 
1943  Magnuson Act, Public Law 78-199 (57 Stat. 600)  
Repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act, established an annual immigration 
(race-based) quota of 105 for Chinese, and made Chinese eligible for U.S. 
citizenship. 
 
1946  Luce-Celler Act, 8 U.S.C.A. 703 (60 Stat. 416) 
Provided annual immigration (race-based) quotas of 100 to Indians and 
Filipinos, respectively, and made both groups eligible for U.S. citizenship. 
   
1946   Chinese War Brides Act, Public Law 79-713 (60 Stat. 975) 
Permitted Chinese alien wives of U.S. citizens to enter the United States as 
non-quota immigrants.  
 
1947 Alien Fiancés and Fiancées Act, or Soldier Bride Act, Public Law 213-289 
(80 Stat. 190) 
 Amended War Brides Act of 1945 to allow Japanese wives of U.S. GIs to 
enter the United States despite the general restriction on Japanese 
immigration under the 1924 Immigration Act. 
 
1952 McCarran-Walter (Immigration and Nationality) Act, Public Law 82-414 
(66 Stat. 163) 
Created the Asia-Pacific Triangle to replace the Asiatic Barred Zone, 
granting all Asian powers annual (race-based) immigration quotas (usually 
between 100 to 185) with an overall ceiling of 2,000 immigrants from 
Asia; struck down all racial restrictions to U.S. citizenship; and 
strengthened the power of the federal government to deport (and 
denaturalize) suspected subversives.  
 
1953   Refugee Relief Act, Public Law 203 (67 Stat. 400)  
Allocated 214,000 non-quota refugee visas, including 2,000 to Chinese, 
and enabled several thousand Chinese living in the United States to adjust 
their status to permanent residence and citizenship. In total, 2,777 Chinese 
refugees entered the U.S. under this Act.   
 
1965 Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Celler) Act, Public Law 89-236 (79 
Stat. 911)  
Abolished the national origins quota system and replaced it with a series 
of preferences based on immigrants’ skills and family reunification; under 
the revised system, Asians have comprised 40% of all legal immigrants to 
the United States since the early 1970s.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Population and Immigration Tables 
 
 
TABLE 1 Chinese American Population with Immigration by Decade and the 
Immigration Law in Effect, 1900-1980  
 
 
DECADE 
ENDING 
POPULATION IMMIGRATION 
OVER PRIOR 
DECADE 
LAW IN EFFECT 
IN PRIOR 
DECADE 
1900 118,746 14,799 Chinese Exclusion 
Act 
1910 94,414 20,605 Chinese Exclusion 
Act 
1920 85,202 21,278 Chinese Exclusion 
Act  
1930 102,159 29,907 Chinese Exclusion 
Act and 1924 Act 
1940 106,334 4,928 Chinese Exclusion 
Act and 1924 Act  
1950 150,005 16,709 1924 Act  
until Magnuson Act 
in 1943 
1960 464,332 25,201 Magnuson Act, then 
1952 Act 
1970 591,290 109,771 1952 Act  
until 1965 
amendments 
1980 716,331 237,793 1965 amendments 
1990 847,562 446,000 1965 amendments 
SOURCE: Adapted from Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through 
Immigration Policy, 1850-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 48. 
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TABLE 2 Asian Indian Population with Immigration by Decade and the Immigration Law 
in Effect, 1900-19801   
 
 
DECADE 
ENDING 
POPULATION IMMIGRATION 
OVER PRIOR 
DECADE 
LAW IN EFFECT 
IN PRIOR 
DECADE 
1900  68 Open immigration 
1910 5,424 4,713 Open immigration  
1920  2,082 Open, then Asiatic 
Barred Zone of 
1917 Act 
1930 3,130 1,886 1924 Act  
1940 2,405 496 1924 Act 
1950  1,761 1924 Act, then 
Luce-Celler quota in 
1946  
1960 12,296 1,973 1946 quota,  
then 1952 Act 
1970 72,500 27,189 1952 Act  
until 1965 
amendments 
1980 387,223 164,134 1965 amendments 
1990 815,447 147,900 1965 amendments 
SOURCE: Adapted from Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through 
Immigration Policy, 70. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The term “Asian Indian” includes natives of India, Pakistan (after its creation in 1947), and Bangladesh 
(after its creation in 1971). 
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TABLE 3 Korean American Population with Immigration by Decade and the Immigration 
Law in Effect, 1900-1980 
 
 
DECADE 
ENDING 
POPULATION IMMIGRATION 
OVER PRIOR 
DECADE 
LAW IN EFFECT 
DURING PRIOR 
DECADE 
1900    
1910 5,008  Open until  
Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
1920 6,181  Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
1930 8,332  Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
until 1924 Act  
1940 8,568  1924 Act 
19502 7,030  1924 Act  
1960 11,000 7,025 1924 Act  
until 1952 Act 
1970 69,150 34,526 1952 Act  
until 1965 
amendments 
1980 357,393 267,638 1965 amendments 
1990 798,849 336,000 1965 amendments 
SOURCE: Adapted from Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through 
Immigration Policy, 66. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 The INS did not count Koreans separately until 1948.  
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TABLE 4 Japanese American Population with Immigration by Decade and the 
Immigration Law in Effect, 1900-1980  
 
 
DECADE 
ENDING 
POPULATION IMMIGRATION 
OVER PRIOR 
DECADE 
LAW IN EFFECT 
DURING PRIOR 
DECADE 
1900 85,716 25,942 Open immigration 
1910 152,745 129,797 Open immigration 
until  
Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
1920 220,596 83,837 Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
1930 278,743 33,462 Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907) 
until 1924 Act  
1940 285,115 1,948 1924 Act 
1950 326,379 1,555 1924 Act  
1960 464,332 46,250 1924 Act  
until 1952 Act 
1970 591,290 39,988 1952 Act  
until 1965 
amendments 
1980 716,331 49,775 1965 amendments 
1990 847,562 44,800 1965 amendments 
SOURCE: Adapted from Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through 
Immigration Policy, 54. 
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